FRANCE RECOMMENDS NEGOTIATING NEW MINURCAT MANDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000192 SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO/PSC:TBROWN, AF/C:GMCKEEL E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2030 TAGS: PREF PREL KPKO CD CT FR SUBJECT: FRANCE RECOMMENDS NEGOTIATING NEW MINURCAT MANDATE IN RESPONSE TO P5 DEMARCHE TO EXTEND PRESENT MANDATE REF: A. STATE 14164 ¶B. PARIS 172 Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, reason 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In response to Ref A request for P5 members to demarche the Government of Chad on reconsidering its call for MINURCAT withdrawal, French MFA officials, mostly in line with their previous assessment, stated that the next step should be for the UN to negotiate a new mandate focused on the transition of MINURCAT to GOC responsibility. In France's view, President Deby is ready to start this negotiation and will be "flexible." END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Africa-watcher delivered REF A demarche on February 18 to MFA DAS-equivalent for Central Africa, Stephane Gruenberg and Chad/C.A.R. Desk Officer Vincent Alexandre. Their response was influenced by apparently having received a readout of the February 17 P5 discussion in New York that differed from the USG's interpretation of that meeting regarding the MINURCAT mandate and the views of those participating in the discussion on Deby's willingness to accept a continued MINURCAT presence. The French MFA representatives did not confirm a P5 agreement, at least not from capitals, to demarche the Government of Chad in any specific way, while noting that they remain in contact with the GOC on this issue. As for how best to influence Chad on this issue, Gruenberg stated that he did not see any problem with a P5 demarche, while recommending two caveats: a demarche should be done by embassies in Ndjamena, and rather than requesting an extension of MINURCAT's current mandate, the demarche should promote negotiations for a revised mandate that would focus on the transition of MINURCAT's responsibilities to the GOC. ¶3. (C) In the MFA's view, President Deby could accept this approach. The new mandate would need to target MINURCAT's withdrawal by March 2011, but this could be based on achieving specific benchmarks, which, if not fulfilled, could permit a further extension. Gruenberg and Alexandre reiterated many of the points on the need to focus on MINURCAT's transition shared with us previously (Ref B),but asserted that Deby has always been open to negotiations, even in early January when he delivered his formal request for MINURCAT's withdraw. Alexandre stated that the biggest problem is that the UN has not put in place a proper negotiating counterpart. Gruenberg concurred and stated that he believed Deby could be "flexible," but the international community needs to be "pragmatic." ¶4. (C) When asked about France's efforts to date to move Deby away from demanding MINURCAT's termination, Alexandre responded that President Sarkozy raised the importance of MINURCAT before January, and that FM Kouchner had tried to change Deby's mind after Deby formally presented his request. Gruenberg asserted the French view that the most effective next step is for the UN to work with the GOC to negotiate a mandate renewal. RIVKIN