MINURCAT/MONUC: URGENT NEED TO BEGIN PLANNING NEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000172 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO CT CD CG FR SUBJECT: MINURCAT/MONUC: URGENT NEED TO BEGIN PLANNING NEXT PHASE OF OPERATIONS REF: A. NDJAMENA 70 ¶B. NDJAMENA 63 AND PREVIOUS ¶C. PARIS 84 Classified By: Wallace R. Bain, Political Officer, 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: French MFA officials on February 11 stressed the need to begin planning for the end of MINURCAT's current mandate in Chad/C.A.R. on March 15 and for the end of MONUC's current mandate in the DRC on May 31. France is operating on the assumption that Chad's President Deby will not be persuaded to accept the renewal of MINURCAT's mandate. We should instead be working toward a year-long drawdown and withdrawal process during which we should try to enhance the DIS's capabilities so that it can assume MINURCAT's core functions (protecting refugees and humanitarian workers) after MINURCAT's drawdown and withdrawal. Concerning MONUC, the French would like to see a successor mission that would focus on the protection of civilians, DDR, and improving the DRC's military. This mission could be a restructured and possibly reduced version of the current MONUC. The French suggested close P-3 cooperation in managing the transition of both UN missions into whatever will take their place. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) MFA IO desk officer Jeanne Simon, Chad/C.A.R. desk officer Vincent Alexandre, and DRC desk officer Frank Marchetti met with Africa Assistant on February 11 to discuss the future of MINURCAT (reftels) and MONUC in view of the imminent expiration of their mandates (March 15 for MINURCAT, May 31 for MONUC). MINURCAT -------------- ¶3. (C) Alexandre referred to Deby's January 19 letter to the UN which stated Deby's desire not to have MINURCAT renewed but his willingness to enter into negotiations on how to drawdown MINURCAT. Alexandre said that Deby's letter meant that we should not be thinking in terms of MINURCAT's renewal but how to negotiate the most favorable exit plan. The GOF would like to see a year-long drawdown and withdrawal phase that would terminate with MINURCAT's closing down on March 15, 2011. He noted that UNSCR 1861, para 29, mentions March 15, 2011, as a target date for meeting the benchmarks set forth in UNSCR 1861. This would lend support to allowing the drawdown phase to continue until that date. ¶4. (C) Alexandre was critical of the Cammaert Mission (ref A),which he said went to Chad with the wrong mind-set, focusing on renewing MINURCAT's mandate rather than on seriously negotiating with Deby. Alexandre observed that the UN delegation was not well conceived in that Cammaert himself could not speak French and that the team did not contain the right mix of personnel. (NOTE: It is difficult for us to judge whether Alexandre's criticism of the Cammaert Mission was justified or was off-base, given what appears to have been a serious effort by the Cammaert Mission to engage with Chad on MINURCAT, as reported ref A. END NOTE.) Alexandre and Simon said that the UN needed to begin a serious negotiating process with the Chadians, as soon as possible. The negotiation should seek a one-year drawdown phase and begin identifying MINURCAT elements that could be progressively withdrawn, starting with the least important first. ¶5. (C) Alexandre, making points he had made earlier (ref C),said that Deby was justified in complaining about MINURCAT's shortcomings. One of Deby's criticisms focused on MINURCAT's failure to carry out promised infrastructure improvements. Alexandre said that during the drawdown phase, both for practical reasons and to mollify Deby, MINURCAT should make an effort to carry out infrastructure projects that would help the DIS, the Chadian security force the training of which has been one of MINURCAT's main functions. The UN could, for example, build field offices/stations for DIS units. ¶6. (C) Alexandre said that the international community should assist the DIS in developing its capabilities so that the DIS would be able to assume MINURCAT's core functions -- protecting displaced persons as well as humanitarian workers -- once MINURCAT is disbanded. A one-year drawdown phase as he had described it could provide enough time to develop the DIS to the point that it could be able to carry out those core functions. The DIS might not be in optimal form by the end of that year but it could do an acceptable job if all parties -- the UN, Chad, and interested parties -- worked hard enough to develop it during the next year. PARIS 00000172 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Alexandre stressed the importance of retaining a presence in C.A.R. for as long as possible within the framework of MINURCAT's drawdown. He said that C.A.R. President Bozize favored MINURCAT's presence in Birao but was not vocal because he did not want to offend Deby. Alexandre said that Togo's unit in Birao was doing a good job and that an absence of a force there could prove destabilizing. ¶8. (C) Alexandre and Simon hoped that the P-3 would work closely with each other in managing this phase of MINURCAT and whatever might follow it. MONUC -------------- ¶9. (C) DRC desk officer Frank Marchetti and Simon said that the UN would send an evaluation team to the DRC during the February 28-March 5 period that would yield a report to the UNSYG on April 1. They also noted a discussion of MONUC at the UN on February 16. They hoped that these activities would help focus attention on MONUC and the issue of what to do when its mandate expires on May 31. Marchetti and Simon, without providing details, said that the GOF would like to see a UN Security Council visit to Africa, including especially the DRC, perhaps in April. This would allow Security Council members a close look at MONUC and the situation in the DRC and help Security Council members to identify priorities for the post-May 31 phase. ¶10. (C) For France, MONUC's priorities should remain as articulated in UNSCR 1906 -- protection of the civilian population, DDR (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration), and reform of the DRC military. Marchetti commented that MONUC had been in the DRC in such numbers and for such a long time that it was beginning to become part of the landscape and was suffering from continual mission creep as a result of the tendency of others to find solutions to various problems by "letting MONUC do it," whatever the problem might be. Marchetti thought that a new mandate for MONUC could refocus energy on its essential functions. Such an approach could lead to a restructuring that might even allow for a less expensive operation. ¶11. (C) All that said, Marchetti said the GOF was still in a thinking mode. He welcomed an exchange of views with the U.S. and UK, particularly as to what DRC President Kabila might actually find acceptable. Kabila's vagueness had not helped others to discern what might be the best acceptable formula for a successor mission to MONUC. Marchetti added that it would be well to maintain an international presence in the DRC to enhance stability during the upcoming DRC elections. ¶12. (C) COMMENT: GOF concern about the end phases of these two missions was evident. Our interlocutors stressed the need for DPKO, and the UN more generally, to begin serious work on how the drawdown mechanisms would work and what the UN intended to do in terms of successor missions. The French emphasized their desire to work closely with the U.S. and UK and stated several times that they would welcome our thinking on both MINURCAT and MONUC. END COMMENT. ¶13. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered. RIVKIN