OECD: OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE U.S. DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 000101 SENSITIVE SIPDIS ALSO FOR USAID SENT FROM USOECD 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID EFIN OECD XA XE XF XL XM SUBJECT: OECD: OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE U.S. DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES PARIS 00000101 001.2 OF 005 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: OECD development institutions provide opportunities for harnessing the OECD's unique strengths (donor coordination, peer learning, analysis of market-based best practices, and statistics) in support of U.S. development priorities. As the USG looks for ways to elevate its development efforts, decisions will need to be made on the level of USG involvement in and support for three OECD development institutions -- the Partnership for Democratic Governance (which the U.S. was instrumental in creating),the OECD Development Center (which the U.S. was also instrumental in founding, but then left in 1997),and the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). ¶2. (SBU) The recently-created Partnership for Democratic Governance (PDG) brings OECD expertise to the problems of fragile and post-conflict states. Three years into its creation, members are faced with the question as to whether it should be folded into other OECD activities (or be allowed to expire.) The OECD Development Center is a think-tank that brings rigorous OECD-standard production of statistics and policy analysis to development issues, but that works in partnership with regional institutions such as the African Development Bank and has broad developing country acceptance as an independent institution. This is now a good time to review whether the U.S. should rejoin the Development Center. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the premier venue for donor coordination and incubation of development policies (such as the Millennium Development Goals). A decision to seek a U.S. leadership role in the DAC would help ensure DAC support for U.S. development goals, and demonstrate the renewed U.S. focus on development. ¶3. (SBU) And finally, there is growing developing country demand for OECD economic development policy expertise. The OECD Center for Tax Policy, the DAC and the Development Center are working together to respond to a request from twenty-plus African countries to learn from the OECD and its member countries how to better mobilize domestic resources, particularly taxes. The United States can support initiatives such as these by prioritizing development funding within the assessed budget envelope for increases (which requires cutting back other OECD activities),encouraging more cross-committee work and by providing voluntary contributions. End Summary. ¶4. (U) OECD development institutions provide opportunities for harnessing the OECD's unique strengths (donor coordination, peer learning, analysis of market-based best practices, and statistics) in support of U.S. development priorities. The OECD can advance US principles of partnership, economic development, gender and coordination. This cable discusses the opportunities ahead for using the OECD development institutions to the best effect. Partnership for Democratic Governance (PDG) -------------- ¶5. (U) The PDG was conceived and championed by State's Office of Policy Planning to help states in fragile and post-conflict situations deliver essential public services and strengthen governance institutions. The State Department's office of Conflict Resolution and Stabilization (S/CRS) has recently assumed responsibility for PDG from the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs ¶6. (SBU) The PDG's brief lifespan has been controversial. Some OECD members did not support the PDG's establishment. Other OECD members were split between those advocating field projects (such as the United States),and those preferring that it remain research-oriented. In the event, the PDG has steered a middle road, launching pilot projects in three countries, while pursuing "knowledge development activities" (reports, conferences, etc). It was expected that the PDG would design projects for donor funding, but the PDG's first projects found no funders, and it had to use its own funds (provided by voluntary contributions, including from the United States) to implement them. The PDG's 2008-11 budget is .6.8 million of which the USG contributed $3 million. ¶7. (U) PDG's outputs to date include: projects in Guatemala (reinforcing Municipal Governance),Liberia (Strengthening the rule of Law, and Georgia (Enhancing Aid Effectiveness and Donor Coordination). A project request from Haiti, on innovative PARIS 00000101 002.2 OF 005 possibilities to support the justice System, was under consideration. Other PDG products include a PDG-African Development Bank Conference on "Contracting-out Core Government Functions and Services in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations," a Joint PDG/Berlin Center for International Peace Operations Senior Level Policy Dialogue on Deployable Civilian Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction, case studies on Afghanistan, Haiti, South Sudan, Timor-Leste on "bridging Capacity Gaps in Situations of Fragility" and case studies on Afghanistan, Southern Sudan on "Contracting out Government Functions and Services: Emerging Lessons from Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations." ¶8. (U) In mid-2010 PDG members will consider renewal of the mandate. They will have a comprehensive evaluation of PDG in hand to assist in this decision (S/CRS and USAID have participated on the evaluation Steering Committee.) In a June 2009 letter from Secretary Clinton to SG Gurria, the USG committed to continuing support for PDG through the end of its mandate in February 2011 but has made no commitments past that date. ¶9. (SBU) PDG issues for decision for the USG (with S/CRS lead) in the coming months include: -Should the PDG mandate be renewed or allowed to expire? -Should the PDG be folded into the OECD Development Directorate with a more modest mandate? -Should PDG continue, including with a mandate to pursue an expanded role in areas such as civilian response? If the decision is to continue the PDG mandate, funds will need to be identified for future USG contributions. The OECD Development Center (DC) -------------- ¶10. (U) President John F. Kennedy proposed the creation of the Development Center in 1961 to serve as an interface between the OECD and developing countries. Since its creation in 1962 (two years after the OECD was created),the Center has served as a forum for developing countries - including government, business and civil society leaders - to share and learn from each other's economic and social development experiences, as well as from those of OECD countries. The Center has considerable autonomy within OECD. It has recently grown from 22 to 38 members, including 15 developing country and emerging economy countries. Several others, notably in Africa, are in advanced membership discussions. ¶11. (SBU) Developing and emerging country policy makers have sought policy guidance from the Center, seeing the Center as offering an "independent" perspective. For example, after Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and two years before he was elected President, he asked the Center rather than the World Bank or the IMF to help prepare his party for governing. The Center's significant, yet low profile support proved crucial in helping the ANC to reorient its policy thinking and to implement the market-friendly policy framework pursued by its first two presidents. ¶12. (SBU) Most OECD members are also members of the Development Center. However, the U.S. withdrew in 1997, citing - in writing - that budgetary reasons were the only factor. The British and Japanese also withdrew, but they also cited management concerns, including concerns that the Center's analytical program was not sufficiently attentive to member interests. Subsequently, the U.S. internally indicated that it shared these management concerns and cited them as a reason for being hesitant to re-join. The U.S. absence is frequently and publically noted by other OECD members. ¶13. (SBU) The U.K. rejoined the Center in 2007, after providing one million pounds to the Center to help it tighten its management policies and practices. Japan has been reviewing whether to re-join, and has indicated that a positive decision by the U.S. to re-join could help push it in the same direction (although Japan has publicly acknowledged that its current budget constraints might call this into question.) ¶14. (SBU) Under new and improved management, the Center is regularly invited by members of Congress to discuss its works and findings. Its annual presentations of the Latin American and African Economic PARIS 00000101 003.2 OF 005 Outlooks and other reports on Capitol Hill have reportedly helped generate Congressional interest in launching a Development Center Caribbean Economic Outlook. Unfortunately, the current dynamic and effective Center Director just announced his departure. ¶15. (SBU) The US Mission strongly supports rejoining the Development Center (under the assumption that the new director will be someone who has the necessary qualifications). The Center's work program and the U.S. perspective match. Its findings in its regional economic outlooks generally re-enforce the benefits of market-oriented policies, transparency, and good governance, articulated by experts from the region. What is unique about the DC is that it is not about development by donors - it is about best practices for and by developing countries in managing their own economies in a fiscally responsible and equitable manner. US membership would also allow us to orient the DC towards key U.S. priorities (such as MENA, the Caribbean, and work on gender). ¶16. (SBU) Development Center issues for decision for the USG (USAID lead) in the coming months include: -Should the USG rejoin the DC (roughly $1.3 million/year)? -Should the USG provide grant funding for certain elements of the Center's Work Program? -Should the USG attend DC meetings as an observer, but provide no new funding? The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) -------------- -- ¶17. (SBU) The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provides the platform: -To extend relevant best practices and lessons learned from OECD work to developing countries (taxes, procurement, public finance, anti-bribery). -To continue to track and assess donor commitments to key U.S. priorities (gender, food security, global climate change - adaptation and mitigation); -To enable developing countries to take fuller ownership over donor-funded development assistance programs in their countries by helping improve the transparency, accountability and effectiveness of their public finance, procurement, and performance monitoring systems; -To directly communicate and obtain support for the forthcoming U.S. development strategy and goals to other OECD member countries and multilateral organizations, and through the DAC's subsidiary bodies, to developing countries, civil society, and the private sector. U.S. Chairmanship of the DAC -------------- ¶18. (SBU) USOECD strongly recommends that the United States identify and propose a U.S. candidate for Chair of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee for the term beginning January 2011. The DAC is the premier donor coordination institution, and a unique venue where the major donors meet to agree on the "rules of the road" for development assistance. It is an ideal forum in which to exert US leadership with a view to bringing greater consistency and effectiveness to development assistance globally and to encourage other countries to share the burden. ¶19. (SBU) The US last chaired the DAC from 1994-1999. The current chair, Eckhard Deutscher (Germany) will have served three years at the end of 2010. Looking back at the previous chairs, the DAC chair has tended to be a senior career employee of a development agency; USAID has historically picked the candidate and funded the position (the Chair's government pays the Chair's salary and overseas living expenses/travel etc). ¶20. (SBU) If the USG decides to suggest a candidate for the DAC Chair and USAID again funds the position, then a candidate should be settled upon within the next several months, preferably before June ¶2010. This timing will permit the U.S. to "introduce" the candidate in June 2010 to other heads of key donor agencies at the annual PARIS 00000101 004.2 OF 005 informal heads of donor agency meeting, to other organizations at the annual IMF-World Bank meetings and permit a scheduling of visits to key donor capitals before a "vote" in early December 2010. Advancing U.S. Development Priorities by Leveraging Relevant OECD Expertise with Reforming Developing Countries -------------- --- ¶21. (SBU) USOECD has examined how the U.S. can advance development by better tapping into and leveraging OECD's deep knowledge base and staff expertise. There is an emerging recognition that the OECD has expertise developing countries want, but that it is often not effectively exploiting these opportunities because of the stove-piped operations of OECD's technically-oriented committees. In addition, committees work under a rigid budget envelope, thereby creating a strong disincentive to divert resources from planned activities in favor of collaboration with OECD development entities. There are, however, some excellent examples of collaboration that clearly demonstrate the potential within the OECD: -- The OECD Center for Tax Policy (CTP),the DAC and the Development Center are working together to respond to a request from twenty-plus African countries to learn from OECD countries how to better mobilize domestic resources, particularly taxes, so they can fund more of their own development priorities and reduce a dependence on donor assistance; - The Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance serves as a regional hub for exchanging experiences and advancing the reform agenda on corporate governance based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; - The OECD working Party of Senior Budget Officials brings together senior budget officials in Latin American and Asia. It provides technical support to governments based on cross country analytical studies in order to identify best practices, peer reviews of the budgeting systems and updating of extensive databases of budget institutions and practices. ¶22. (SBU) These efforts dovetail with the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action commitments to support efforts to help developing countries increase the abilities of their peoples and institutions to assume greater responsibility and ownership for their own development. And they support on-going U.S. efforts to improve the quality of partner-country public financial management and procurement systems, both of which are key to giving citizens, foreign investors, multilaterals and others confidence. ¶23. (U) At the January 21 Council meeting on development, USOECD urged the OECD to: -Focus its development efforts in a way that will allow it to make a noticeable difference and learn from its efforts. The OECD cannot be all things to all countries. -Choose a limited number of issues of importance to developing countries and OECD core competency (such as tax, governance/anti-corruption, investment, and innovation). The OECD should work horizontally with the DAC and Development Center on bringing its expertise to regional or even country-specific efforts. -Invite countries to participate which are able to benefit, as reflected by a willingness to put resources or high-level participation on the table and a track record of sound economic policy and good governance. ¶24. (SBU) Further extending OECD expertise to developing countries in a number of focused areas would require approximately $2.5 million to provide additional staff and resources for the relevant OECD committees. Given the Zero-Real-Growth (ZRG) budget envelope, any new work must be funded by reducing other activities, finding efficiencies in existing work (such as improving cross-committee collaboration) or through voluntary contributions. We believe that all three of these options should be pursued for the 2011-2012 biennium. PARIS 00000101 005.2 OF 005 Comment: ¶25. (SBU) The OECD's competencies can be deployed to build capacity in developing countries and advance US principles for development. There are high expectations for US leadership on development at the DAC and at the OECD overall It is the opportune time for the U.S. to signal its intent to lead by demonstrating its interest in the DAC chair, expressing its intent to work multilaterally by rejoining and building on what the Development Center has to offer, and better leveraging OECD resources in key policy areas to assist developing countries help themselves. Kornbluh