NORWEGIAN FM VISITS THE MIDDLE EAST: OSLO READOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000069 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/10 TAGS: PREL KPAL IS NO SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN FM VISITS THE MIDDLE EAST: OSLO READOUT DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 (B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoere's meeting on the Middle East in Brussels (January 12) and then in the region (January 16-20) have led him to believe that Palestinian President Abbas is not in a position to move forward in the way that European and U.S. leaders want him to, due to internal political dynamics. Pressure on Abbas may make him even more recalcitrant, and the Norwegians counsel low-profile diplomacy. On the bilateral front, the Norwegians had productive meetings with high level Israeli government officials, including a good meeting with Foreign Minister Lieberman who proposed a list of areas of cooperation that both sides have agreed to work on to improve Norway-Israel relations. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Deputy Chief of Mission and poloff met with MFA officials Jorn Gjelstad and Torunn Viste, Director and Deputy Director, respectively, of the MFA Middle East Section on February 8 for a readout of Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoere's trip to Brussels and then Israel. All quotations in this cable, unless otherwise indicated, are of Gjelstad's words. BRUSSELS CONSENSUS: IT'S ABBAS'S MOVE ¶3. (C) Gjelstad said that the majority opinion in Brussels, in a meeting with Special Envoy Mitchell, French Foreign Minister Kuchner, EU Foreign Minister Ashton, Quartet Envoy Blair, Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoere and Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, was that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has moved from his initial bargaining position ("which was zero") and is now ready for negotiations. The general impression, Gjelstad said, was that the U.S. has extracted what it can from the Israelis, and it is now Palestinian President Abbas who has to move from his position of "stubbornness." Kuchner was especially emphatic on this. At the other end of the spectrum, Moratinos said that Abbas still needs something from the Israelis, including, perhaps, a statement from the U.S. that East Jerusalem should be included in negotiations. Moratinos said that a clearer "policy of confidence" was needed from the Israelis. All agreed that Abbas needs support from Arab leaders if he is to take a step forward. AD HOC LIAISON COMMITTEE (AHLC) ISSUES ¶4. (C) Gjelstad said that the main Norwegian message on the AHLC was that public sector-led development is not sustainable. (Comment: emboffs have been hearing this message, along with the "donor fatigue" message, for over a year from various Norwegian interlocutors.) Gjelstad began by saying that the work of the AHLC faced a great challenge in establishing the framework conditions for the Palestinian private sector's functioning. Gjelstad said that according to Prime Minister Fayyad, there is great interest among investors in the region to come in and look for projects in Palestinian-controlled areas. Fayyad told the GON that there is $1.2 billion "waiting in the Gulf states" that would be invested over the course of about two years, should the framework conditions improve. Gjelstad said that amount would make current donor support seem insignificant. ¶5. (C) In Brussels, Tony Blair was forward looking on private investment, and said he would redouble efforts to remove economically strategic checkpoints that choke off trade. Gjelstad said that development is currently totally dependent on the capital inflows from international donors, and local value creation was key to a sustainable Palestinian economy and political stability. ¶6. (C) Gjelstad warned that European donors are cutting back their OSLO 00000069 002 OF 003 funding, and have committed less than half of what they contributed in 2009: $230 million in pledges so far for 2010 versus $500 million contributed last year. Gjelstad interpreted this as a result not of the financial crisis, but of reduced faith that the money can have real results when there is no change in Israeli policy. Summing up, Gjelstad said that the AHLC functions as a good preparation for capital-level political talks. ¶7. (C) Gjelstad said that Stoere had a very interesting discussion in Brussels with Special Envoy Mitchell, in which the two agreed that there was no need for a pledging conference (especially the French proposal for one in Paris) absent a political breakthrough on the peace process. The AHLC, they agreed, was not a pledging mechanism at all, but a venue to move forward on how to use the money already pledged. On that basis, the next AHLC meeting would be in Brussels or (more likely) Madrid on the working level. Gjelstad put in a plea for Special Envoy Mitchell to attend, and said the Norwegian envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer will speak to Deputy Envoy Hale on this issue. EUROPEAN VIEW OF CONFLICT "CORRECTED" BY PALESTINIANS ¶8. (C) Gjelstad said that when Stoere went to the region and talked with Palestinian officials, the majority view in Brussels-that it was now Abbas's turn to make a move-was "corrected." (Comment: the use of this word clearly indicates Gjelstad's view that Norway and Moratinos-not Kuchner, Ashton, and Blair-have a better understanding of the situation). Gjelstad said that in the current environment, moving toward the negotiation table would "break Abbas's neck." The Palestinians look at settlements in East Jerusalem as a policy of harassment, and Abbas wants a "silent moratorium" on expansion of already-existing settlements to create an atmosphere in which he can move ahead. Incursions into the "A" areas and interference with well-functioning Palestinian security forces are humiliating and demoralizing. ¶9. (C) The way forward according to the Palestinian side was twofold: (1) there must be a greater level of sensitivity toward creating an atmosphere conducive to negotiations, and (2) the terms of reference for the negotiations are very important and must include reference to the 1967 borders and the issue of East Jerusalem. PRESSURE ON ABBAS WON'T WORK ¶10. (C) After meeting with Prime Minister Fayyad, Stoere's view, according to Gjelstad, was that the more public pressure there is on Abbas to approach the negotiating table, the more he will resist, as he cannot politically survive the impression of weakness that caving to that pressure would create. In fact, resisting the pressure actually helps his political standing. While the chasm between the Israeli and Palestinian positions has narrowed somewhat, the bridge offered to Abbas is neither wide nor strong enough for him to politically cross. Gjelstad emphasized, therefore, that the only way to work these issues is through low-profile, quiet diplomacy. He said that Special Envoy Mitchell agrees, and that there is a limited window of opportunity in the coming weeks. PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS ¶11. (U) While in Israel, Stoere met with Deputy Prime Minister Dan OSLO 00000069 003 OF 003 Meridor, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, President Shimon Peres, and opposition Kadima party leader Tzipora Livni. ¶12. (C) Lieberman pointedly refused to answer any questions about whether he could support a two state solution. Other than that, the meeting was very positive from the Norwegian side. FM Lieberman presented FM Stoere with a list of areas of cooperation that Norway and Israel could work upon. (Comment: Embassy Oslo has heard both from the MFA and from the Israeli embassy multiple times in the past year that the two countries' relations suffer from a meager number of bilateral issues that would give substance to the relationship.) Lieberman's list included the negotiation and conclusion of an MOU on Research and Development cooperation, an expansion of cultural cooperation, cooperation on the relocation of the Israeli embassy in Oslo, and cooperation on OECD membership for Israel. ¶13. (C) On the R&D MOU, which Gjelstad characterized as the most important of the issues, there is a state-to-state and a ministry-to-ministry option, the latter of which Gjelstad implied was more likely to be politically possible in Norway. The MOU would likely cover four or five areas, including renewable energy, desalination of water, medical and biotech research, and other environmental technologies. All of the issues have importance for the whole Middle East region, said Gjelstad, and some areas of cooperation could eventually pull in Jordan and other regional players. ¶14. (C) On the issue of cultural exchange, Gjelstad admitted that the bilateral nature of the discussion was something of a fig leaf-the real issue is not of getting Norwegian cultural representatives to Israel, as plenty go already. The real issue is the difficulty of getting Israelis in front of Norwegian audiences of any type. Norwegian institutions, Gjelstad said, often insist that if an Israeli visits, a Palestinian must visit, thereby putting every educational, artistic, or cultural exchange into a "peace context." (Comment: Post finds this to be a telling commentary on the narrow view many Norwegians have of Israel, and of the politicization of the very concept of "Israel" in Norway. Post believes that educational and cultural decision makers in Norway are afraid of criticism or controversy if they invite an Israeli to speak without counterbalancing his or her appearance with a Palestinian.) ¶15. (C) Kadima leader Livni was clear that she wants a two state solution, which she sees as the only option. According to Gjelstad, she likened failing to openly pursue a two state solution to "sitting on a volcano." Livni said that her Kadima party was ready to fill the gap in a coalition government should there be a shift, and said that she doesn't think the negotiation of a two state solution is possible within the current coalition. ¶16. (C) In a separate meeting with Ambassador and DCM on another subject February 8, MFA Director General for UN, Peace, and Humanitarian Affairs Geir Pedersen, who also accompanied FM Stoere, said that Israelis of all persuasions had expressed that Netanyahu had genuinely shifted his position and that now was the time to begin talks. He expressed the belief that the Israeli PM now accepted the "two state solution." Pedersen also indicated support for Special Envoy Mitchell's proposal to begin "proximity talks" between the Arabs and Palestinians. WHITE