EUR/RPM DIRECTOR DISCUSSES NATO, ARCTIC, AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000045 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020 TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS PARM KNNP KCFE PGOV SENV AF NO SUBJECT: EUR/RPM DIRECTOR DISCUSSES NATO, ARCTIC, AND AFGHANISTAN WITH NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS Classified By: DCM James T. Heg for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On the margins of the January 14 NATO Strategic Concept Seminar EUR/RPM Director Bruce Turner, DCM, and PolOff conducted bilateral meetings January 13 to discuss Afghanistan, NATO, Russia, and the Arctic High North. On Afghanistan, MFA and MoD officials described increasing Nordic Cooperation in Regional-Command (RC-North), recommended improved coordination between the civilian effort and ISAF, and asked for details on U.S. troop deployment in their Area of Operation. On NATO's Strategic Concept deliberations, MoD Deputy Director of Security Policy Jan Olsen made the case for Norway's Core Areas Initiative (High North) to ensure NATO remains relevant to the public and capable of homeland defense, and outlined the GoN's views on strategic weapons and concern over sub-strategic weapons. MFA Director for Security Policy and North America Unni Klovstad noted a NATO focus on energy issues should be limited to infrastructure protection, and outlined Norway's hope for improved efficiency as an outcome of the NATO reform effort. ¶2. (C) On Russia, Olsen described a growing "convergence of Russian rhetoric and military capability," which had the potential for creating a "more interesting" situation with Russia as its pursues its ambitions in the Arctic High North. MFA Russia Expert Anne Kjersti Karlsen contrasted Russia's continuing flights along Norway's coastline and portrayal of NATO as Russia's worst enemy with her judgment that Russia's true security focus was on China. Klovstad cautioned against extensive NATO involvement in Arctic issues, saying the GoN wanted to avoid an escalation of tensions, but noted Norway's desire for NATO to monitor the situation. Olsen noted that the frigate Fritdjof Nansen, part of the EU's ATALANTA effort, would complete its mission in the Gulf of Aden in early 2010 and would not be replaced, and that the GoN Hospital in Chad would also shut down in 2010. Norwegian special forces likely will return to Afghanistan o/a March 2011, following the end of the current deployment of New Zealand special forces. End Summary. Afghanistan -------------- ¶3. (C) Turner told Klovstad, Karlsen, and MFA North America Coordinator Morten Aasland that the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) could not do everything and that there was a need for a Senior Civilian Coordinator for Afghanistan to coordinate PRT engagement. Klovstad said that SRSG Kai Eide believed that ISAF needed to get better at civilian coordination. Turner discussed the state of play in France and Germany in advance of the London Conference on Afghanistan, and said the U.S. still hoped that those nations would do more, although the domestic situation in Germany was complicated. ¶4. (C) MoD Deputy Director for Security Policy Jan Olsen briefed on increased Nordic cooperation in Afghanistan, driven in part by resource implications and the benefits of sharing logistical costs. He noted that Finland may looking to increase its boots on the ground, and Sweden was considering an increased presence at the Norwegian PRT in Meymaneh, Faryab Province. Olsen wondered about the FRAGO received from NATO stating the two U.S. "brigades" would be arriving in RC-North, given that the COMISAF report had been quite clear that the focus of increased troops would be in the south and east. He noted that Norway would likely extend its medevac helicopters in Afghanistan through the end of 2011 and would need to explore cooperation with the U.S. if U.S. helicopters deploy in RC-North. He added that in the period between Christmas and New Year, the Norwegian troops had engaged in ten "incidents," and that while previously German troops provided Quick Reaction Force support, they were now "always engaged" in Kunduz and unable to assist. In response to a query from DCM, Oslen indicated that Norwegian special forces likely would return to Afghanistan o/a March 2011, when the current deployment of New Zealand special forces is due to expire. Strategic and sub-Strategic Weapons and NATO -------------- ¶5. (S) In response to a question on whether MoD and MFA OSLO 00000045 002 OF 003 views differed on NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, Olsen said the GoN is watching the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review closely and is committed to NATO's current policy until changes can be agreed upon by Allies. He further noted that the GoN's goal is in line with President Obama's speech in Prague, but recognizes there is a process that must be followed. Olsen suggested that any changes should wait until 2011, but any reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in Europe must not undermine European security. He concluded by noting that NATO's new nuclear doctrine had to grapple with the reality that Russia possessed 5,000 sub-strategic weapons, while "Europe" only had two hundred, which complicated efforts to negotiate a significant reduction in the Russian stockpile. NATO Reform -------------- ¶6. (C) Klovstad asked what the U.S. expected out of the Strategic Concept update, noting that capabilities, Article 5, Missile Defense, new security threats, and the Comprehensive Approach topped the GoN's list. Turner asked if the GoN saw a role in increased consultations with partners that share our values in the spirit of Article 4, for example in dealing with cyber-security incidents. Klovstad responded that Norway was unclear on the applicability of Article 5 in a cyber-attack and that the GoN was looking for more clarity on what is meant by "future challenges." The GoN was not sure if "rephrasing" new threats, such as energy issues, would be the correct path for NATO. Karlsen chimed in that the GoN did not think NATO should duplicate responsibilities held by other organizations, and a definition for "energy security" needed to be developed. Klovstad added that NATO's role on energy security thus far means infrastructure protection, and concluded by advocating for overall NATO reform, potentially including rethinking the consensus principle, for a more efficiently run organization. Olsen noted that the Norwegian public perceived NATO as engaged in Afghanistan only, which pressed the GoN to focus on its Core Areas Initiative so that NATO would remain relevant to Norwegians. He mentioned Norway's upcoming Cold Response Invitex exercise in February, indicating that SACEUR attendance would be very welcome. Russia and NATO -------------- ¶7. (C) Karlsen said that NATO's on-going efforts with Russia had to be at least in part about confidence building. Klovstad continued that we needed to wait until after the February Defense Ministerial to determine whether Russia really would engage more actively, adding that SYG Rasmussen had ambitions to move the relationship along, and had scheduled several meetings over the next few weeks. arlsen said that Russia still considered NATO "is worst enemy," but the GoN did not feel threateed by Russia or the Zapd and Ladoga exercises, hich took place 20 kilometers from the Norwegian order. When Turner brought up that Russia's revsed declaratory nuclear policy appeared to include regional crises, Karlsen responded that th GoN wanted to keep the NATO-Russia cooperation process moving regardless, but realizes that the U.S. and other allies "won't be patient forever." In her view, she said, Russia security and military planning was very focused on China, with more than half of its resources in the East. However, she added, Russian flights in and around Norwegian airspace had increased, and while not up to Cold War levels, did raise concern among GoN officials. ¶8. (C) Olsen noted that Russia currently had more active submarines and a more "declared and beefed-up military," and described the growing "convergence of Russian rhetoric and military capability," which could create a more "interesting" situation with Russia as its furthers its ambitions in the Arctic High North. Olsen mentioned that the GoN puts forward a work plan each year with Russia for military cooperation, and maybe half of what is proposed is actually accomplished. When asked whether the GoN had given thought to a potential Russian demand for the flank regime to be removed from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Olsen responded that the GoN would prefer to maintain the flank regime but would consider other arrangements if necessary. OSLO 00000045 003 OF 003 NATO in the Arctic and Cooperation -------------- ¶9. (C) Klovstad said that the GoN would like NATO to follow and be aware of developments in the Arctic High North in a way that would avoid provoking the Russians into tit-for-tat responses and escalation. For example, NATO could play a role in exercises for search and rescue capabilities, including through the NATO-Russia Council. She brought up the "Stoltenberg process," which calls for enhanced security cooperation with Iceland, Sweden and Finland while respecting each country's differing relationship with NATO. In response to Turner's question on NATO Enlargement, she noted that Finland is closer than Sweden to a decision on joining the Alliance, adding if Finland chooses to join NATO, Sweden may be inspired to take a new look, although it would be a hard sell. She also added that the EU and NATO do not know each other well enough as organizations, and suggested that the NATO SYG consult more regularly with EU counterparts. She concluded that the EU is now in a different "mode" under the Lisbon treaty. Update on Other Deployments -------------- ¶10. (C) Olsen said that the Norwegian frigate Fritdjof Nansen, currently deployed as part of the EU ATALANTA operation, would return to Norway shortly, and the GoN had no further plans to deploy a frigate due to budgetary restraints. He noted that staff officers instead would join a Swedish-flagged vessel scheduled to head to the Gulf of Aden in 2010. He also mentioned that Norway would shut down its field hospital in Chad in 2010, noting that the Russians now were unlikely to replace the Norwegians as previously promised. During a recent visit to Chad by Norway's relatively new Minister of Defense Grete Faremo, Olsen described how she had received a dressing down by the UN operations in Chad, which complained that Norway's hospital was so "fancy" that the Russians refused to set up a replacement hospital, as it would be perceived as inferior. He added that Faremo also got an ear-full from the UN about Norway's success in drilling for water in the hospital environs, given the scarcity of water generally and the potential for conflict as a result. Olsen described Faremo as shocked by the UN responses to the Norwegian contribution. ¶11. (C) Comment: The pending withdrawals of the Norwegian military hospital in Chad and the frigate from the Gulf of Aden will constitute a de facto scaling back of Norway's currently robust scale of global military deployments. Mention of the budget constraints preventing continued deployment of the Nansen highlights the overall inadequacy of the GoN's defense spending relative to its ambitions. WHITE