Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10OSLO37
2010-01-25 15:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Oslo
Cable title:
GON VIEWS: LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000037
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN AF NO
SUBJECT: GON VIEWS: LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN
REF: SECSTATE 6355
OSLO 00000037 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: DCM James T. Heg for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000037
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN AF NO
SUBJECT: GON VIEWS: LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN
REF: SECSTATE 6355
OSLO 00000037 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: DCM James T. Heg for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: On January 25 MFA Af/Pak Director
Ambassador Janis Bjorn Kanavin told PolOff and MoD Deputy
Director of Security Policy General Bjorn Solberg told DCM,
A/DATT and PolOff that the GoN was supportive overall of the
US objectives for the London Conference. Kanavin did note
that the communiqu required additional "refinements." In
regards to the reintegration trust fund, Kanavin said that
the GoN was not prepared to commit funds to an
as-yet-unestablished, ill-defined fund and would likely be
more inclined to make a pledge at the upcoming Kabul
Conference once details are more fleshed out. Kanavin
provided key recommendations to improve the communiqu points
on the reintegration fund, and had questions about the points
on fighting corruption. Solberg said the GoN was taking a
pragmatic approach to London, given the that the Afghan
government remains a work in progress and Afghan leadership
was required for a successful outcome. Solberg and MoD
Afghanistan Desk Officer Lt. Col. Borre Rikardsen asked for
additional details on U.S. troop deployments in
Regional-Command North (RC-North) in order to allow for the
MoD to plan accordingly, and also noted that the Afghan
security plan remains worryingly short on details. Solberg
reported one Norwegian Killed In Action (KIA) in Faryab
today, bringing the total of Norwegian KIA in Afghanistan to
five. End Summary.
Overall Reaction and Corruption
--------------
2. (SBU) Kanavin told PolOff that the GoN overall supported
reftel message. However, he quickly shifted to addressing
the draft communiqu he had received from the UK's Foreign
Office late evening January 22. He said the GoN would
request several "refinements" to ensure the text adequately
reflected Afghanistan's reality in order to avoid a repeat of
the London Compact, which contributed to "an unrealistic
understanding of the situation in Afghanistan." Kanavin
brought up three concerns regarding the communiqu's point on
fighting corruption: 1) reference to a monitoring group that
would provide reports against agreed benchmarks; Kanavin
asked, what benchmarks? 2) reference to a "district delivery
program" which he believed is a U.S. bilateral program, so
may not be appropriate for the communiqu. and 3) reference
to a single framework for the priority programs: Kanavin said
he understood what was meant by priority program, but did not
understand the single framework concept.
3. (C) Solberg explained that given the need for an Afghan
lead to achieve success, combined with the reality that the
Karzai government remains a work in progress, the GoN would
take a pragmatic approach and had somewhat reduced
expectations as to what the conference would deliver. He
added that the host UK government was "suprisingly stumbling"
in the conference run-up, which could provide both
disadvantages and opportunities, although he did not specify
which. In regards to GoN support for reftel points, Solberg
said that Norway supported the NATO decisions that were to be
endorsed in London, but that he would appreciate details on
OSLO 00000037 002.2 OF 003
security planning: how realistic was the security plan at
this point, he asked. The GoN was aware of the challenges in
cooperation between the Afghan Ministries of Defense and
Interior, he said, and noted it was "too early" to see
strategic thinking from the Afghan side.
No Pledges Now for Reintegration Fund
--------------
4. (SBU) When asked if the GoN would pledge funds for the
reintegration fund, Kanavin responded "it will not happen"
given that the fund does not yet exist and the program
remains unfinalized. He said that the upcoming Kabul
Conference would be a more likely venue for a GoN pledge. He
mentioned the US - UK discussions on whether to include a
Kabul Conference date, noting with a bit of concern the U.S.
push not to include a time frame more specific than 2010. He
said the communiqu text lacked details on how the fund would
work, and did not emphasize what was "important." Kanavin
specified the following elements as key for Norwegian
participation: 1) clear reference to the Afghan role and
responsibility for the Fund; 2) recognizing the need to
address strategic and political elements of reintegration,
including reconciliation, to ensure the Fund has the strength
and capacity to accomplish the job; 3) reference to a
national and transparent program; 4) recognizing the need to
avoid parallel structures and to use existing tools such as
the National Solidarity Program for implementation, and 5)
reference to the inclusion of women in the reconciliation
process. He also emphasized that the communiqu listed
reintegration under the security sub-title, which he said was
unnecessarily restrictive. His recommendation to the UK was
to simply take out sub-titles entirely, he said.
5. (C) Solberg said that reintegration required political
leadership to be successful, and that it remained unclear as
to whether or not GoA wanted to engage, in particular the
Afghan parliament. He noted that the Norwegian MFA had
previous reintegration experience and remained skeptical
about "wrong incentives" such as "giving cash." He wouldn't
want the funds to be used instead as a recruiting tool, he
said, and emphasized again the need for Afghan leadership and
ownership of the reintegration agenda.
Security Transition and U.S. Forces arriving in RC-North
-------------- --------------
6. (C) Solberg expressed optimism for increased
opportunities for mentoring, training, and partnership in
2010 for Norwegian forces in Faryab, but asked whether this
would entail a shift away from the PRT model, and if so, what
type of criteria would be established for the transition. He
noted that Norway was already engaged daily in "serious
partnerships," but anticipated additional details on the
Afghan security roll-out. He noted that the increase in US
troops coming into RC-North would be welcome, adding that
details on troop roll-out would be highly appreciated, to
allow for the GoN to plan appropriately. He said that
according to the COMISAF FRAGO, 700 U.S. troops would be
arriving in Faryab, and would therefore outnumber the 500
Norwegians troops currently deployed there. He noted that it
OSLO 00000037 003.2 OF 003
was important for the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan
National Army (ANA) roll-outs to "complement each other,"
adding that the NATO Chief of Defense discussion taking place
this week in Brussels could help address this issue.
ANSF Build-up
--------------
7. (C) Rikardsen said that he was "somewhat puzzled" by the
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approval of
ANP and ANA increases and the long-term implications of such
an increase in force size. He said he understood that the
USG had agreed to fund the troop increase over two years, but
what would happen when the two years are up, he asked? He
said that as the GoN did have a seat at the table when the
ISAF Ambassadors discussed the initiative and also on JCMB
that they would not raise this issue, but said he expected
other ISAF partners to express concern over the implications.
He said it seemed that the UK and the US pushed through the
increases with limited consultations. Solberg added that it
appeared due to pressure for a deliverable at London, which
would have been unlikely if full NATO consultations on the
increases had taken place.
Norwegian KIA and several wounded today
--------------
8. (SBU) Solberg reported that the MoD received news of a
the death of a Norwegian soldier in Faryab today, which may
affect the attendance of Deputy Minister of Defense Espen
Barth Eide at London, as he may need to stay in Oslo to
attend the return of the soldier's remains to Norway. (Note:
Press reports indicate that the cause of the death was an
IED, and that two Norwegian soldiers were injured. With
today's casualty, Norway has 5 KIA in Afghanistan since
operations began. End Note.)
WHITE
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN AF NO
SUBJECT: GON VIEWS: LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN
REF: SECSTATE 6355
OSLO 00000037 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: DCM James T. Heg for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: On January 25 MFA Af/Pak Director
Ambassador Janis Bjorn Kanavin told PolOff and MoD Deputy
Director of Security Policy General Bjorn Solberg told DCM,
A/DATT and PolOff that the GoN was supportive overall of the
US objectives for the London Conference. Kanavin did note
that the communiqu required additional "refinements." In
regards to the reintegration trust fund, Kanavin said that
the GoN was not prepared to commit funds to an
as-yet-unestablished, ill-defined fund and would likely be
more inclined to make a pledge at the upcoming Kabul
Conference once details are more fleshed out. Kanavin
provided key recommendations to improve the communiqu points
on the reintegration fund, and had questions about the points
on fighting corruption. Solberg said the GoN was taking a
pragmatic approach to London, given the that the Afghan
government remains a work in progress and Afghan leadership
was required for a successful outcome. Solberg and MoD
Afghanistan Desk Officer Lt. Col. Borre Rikardsen asked for
additional details on U.S. troop deployments in
Regional-Command North (RC-North) in order to allow for the
MoD to plan accordingly, and also noted that the Afghan
security plan remains worryingly short on details. Solberg
reported one Norwegian Killed In Action (KIA) in Faryab
today, bringing the total of Norwegian KIA in Afghanistan to
five. End Summary.
Overall Reaction and Corruption
--------------
2. (SBU) Kanavin told PolOff that the GoN overall supported
reftel message. However, he quickly shifted to addressing
the draft communiqu he had received from the UK's Foreign
Office late evening January 22. He said the GoN would
request several "refinements" to ensure the text adequately
reflected Afghanistan's reality in order to avoid a repeat of
the London Compact, which contributed to "an unrealistic
understanding of the situation in Afghanistan." Kanavin
brought up three concerns regarding the communiqu's point on
fighting corruption: 1) reference to a monitoring group that
would provide reports against agreed benchmarks; Kanavin
asked, what benchmarks? 2) reference to a "district delivery
program" which he believed is a U.S. bilateral program, so
may not be appropriate for the communiqu. and 3) reference
to a single framework for the priority programs: Kanavin said
he understood what was meant by priority program, but did not
understand the single framework concept.
3. (C) Solberg explained that given the need for an Afghan
lead to achieve success, combined with the reality that the
Karzai government remains a work in progress, the GoN would
take a pragmatic approach and had somewhat reduced
expectations as to what the conference would deliver. He
added that the host UK government was "suprisingly stumbling"
in the conference run-up, which could provide both
disadvantages and opportunities, although he did not specify
which. In regards to GoN support for reftel points, Solberg
said that Norway supported the NATO decisions that were to be
endorsed in London, but that he would appreciate details on
OSLO 00000037 002.2 OF 003
security planning: how realistic was the security plan at
this point, he asked. The GoN was aware of the challenges in
cooperation between the Afghan Ministries of Defense and
Interior, he said, and noted it was "too early" to see
strategic thinking from the Afghan side.
No Pledges Now for Reintegration Fund
--------------
4. (SBU) When asked if the GoN would pledge funds for the
reintegration fund, Kanavin responded "it will not happen"
given that the fund does not yet exist and the program
remains unfinalized. He said that the upcoming Kabul
Conference would be a more likely venue for a GoN pledge. He
mentioned the US - UK discussions on whether to include a
Kabul Conference date, noting with a bit of concern the U.S.
push not to include a time frame more specific than 2010. He
said the communiqu text lacked details on how the fund would
work, and did not emphasize what was "important." Kanavin
specified the following elements as key for Norwegian
participation: 1) clear reference to the Afghan role and
responsibility for the Fund; 2) recognizing the need to
address strategic and political elements of reintegration,
including reconciliation, to ensure the Fund has the strength
and capacity to accomplish the job; 3) reference to a
national and transparent program; 4) recognizing the need to
avoid parallel structures and to use existing tools such as
the National Solidarity Program for implementation, and 5)
reference to the inclusion of women in the reconciliation
process. He also emphasized that the communiqu listed
reintegration under the security sub-title, which he said was
unnecessarily restrictive. His recommendation to the UK was
to simply take out sub-titles entirely, he said.
5. (C) Solberg said that reintegration required political
leadership to be successful, and that it remained unclear as
to whether or not GoA wanted to engage, in particular the
Afghan parliament. He noted that the Norwegian MFA had
previous reintegration experience and remained skeptical
about "wrong incentives" such as "giving cash." He wouldn't
want the funds to be used instead as a recruiting tool, he
said, and emphasized again the need for Afghan leadership and
ownership of the reintegration agenda.
Security Transition and U.S. Forces arriving in RC-North
-------------- --------------
6. (C) Solberg expressed optimism for increased
opportunities for mentoring, training, and partnership in
2010 for Norwegian forces in Faryab, but asked whether this
would entail a shift away from the PRT model, and if so, what
type of criteria would be established for the transition. He
noted that Norway was already engaged daily in "serious
partnerships," but anticipated additional details on the
Afghan security roll-out. He noted that the increase in US
troops coming into RC-North would be welcome, adding that
details on troop roll-out would be highly appreciated, to
allow for the GoN to plan appropriately. He said that
according to the COMISAF FRAGO, 700 U.S. troops would be
arriving in Faryab, and would therefore outnumber the 500
Norwegians troops currently deployed there. He noted that it
OSLO 00000037 003.2 OF 003
was important for the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan
National Army (ANA) roll-outs to "complement each other,"
adding that the NATO Chief of Defense discussion taking place
this week in Brussels could help address this issue.
ANSF Build-up
--------------
7. (C) Rikardsen said that he was "somewhat puzzled" by the
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approval of
ANP and ANA increases and the long-term implications of such
an increase in force size. He said he understood that the
USG had agreed to fund the troop increase over two years, but
what would happen when the two years are up, he asked? He
said that as the GoN did have a seat at the table when the
ISAF Ambassadors discussed the initiative and also on JCMB
that they would not raise this issue, but said he expected
other ISAF partners to express concern over the implications.
He said it seemed that the UK and the US pushed through the
increases with limited consultations. Solberg added that it
appeared due to pressure for a deliverable at London, which
would have been unlikely if full NATO consultations on the
increases had taken place.
Norwegian KIA and several wounded today
--------------
8. (SBU) Solberg reported that the MoD received news of a
the death of a Norwegian soldier in Faryab today, which may
affect the attendance of Deputy Minister of Defense Espen
Barth Eide at London, as he may need to stay in Oslo to
attend the return of the soldier's remains to Norway. (Note:
Press reports indicate that the cause of the death was an
IED, and that two Norwegian soldiers were injured. With
today's casualty, Norway has 5 KIA in Afghanistan since
operations began. End Note.)
WHITE