GON VIEWS: LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000037 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EFIN AF NO SUBJECT: GON VIEWS: LONDON CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN REF: SECSTATE 6355 OSLO 00000037 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM James T. Heg for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On January 25 MFA Af/Pak Director Ambassador Janis Bjorn Kanavin told PolOff and MoD Deputy Director of Security Policy General Bjorn Solberg told DCM, A/DATT and PolOff that the GoN was supportive overall of the US objectives for the London Conference. Kanavin did note that the communiqu required additional "refinements." In regards to the reintegration trust fund, Kanavin said that the GoN was not prepared to commit funds to an as-yet-unestablished, ill-defined fund and would likely be more inclined to make a pledge at the upcoming Kabul Conference once details are more fleshed out. Kanavin provided key recommendations to improve the communiqu points on the reintegration fund, and had questions about the points on fighting corruption. Solberg said the GoN was taking a pragmatic approach to London, given the that the Afghan government remains a work in progress and Afghan leadership was required for a successful outcome. Solberg and MoD Afghanistan Desk Officer Lt. Col. Borre Rikardsen asked for additional details on U.S. troop deployments in Regional-Command North (RC-North) in order to allow for the MoD to plan accordingly, and also noted that the Afghan security plan remains worryingly short on details. Solberg reported one Norwegian Killed In Action (KIA) in Faryab today, bringing the total of Norwegian KIA in Afghanistan to five. End Summary. Overall Reaction and Corruption -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Kanavin told PolOff that the GoN overall supported reftel message. However, he quickly shifted to addressing the draft communiqu he had received from the UK's Foreign Office late evening January 22. He said the GoN would request several "refinements" to ensure the text adequately reflected Afghanistan's reality in order to avoid a repeat of the London Compact, which contributed to "an unrealistic understanding of the situation in Afghanistan." Kanavin brought up three concerns regarding the communiqu's point on fighting corruption: 1) reference to a monitoring group that would provide reports against agreed benchmarks; Kanavin asked, what benchmarks? 2) reference to a "district delivery program" which he believed is a U.S. bilateral program, so may not be appropriate for the communiqu. and 3) reference to a single framework for the priority programs: Kanavin said he understood what was meant by priority program, but did not understand the single framework concept. ¶3. (C) Solberg explained that given the need for an Afghan lead to achieve success, combined with the reality that the Karzai government remains a work in progress, the GoN would take a pragmatic approach and had somewhat reduced expectations as to what the conference would deliver. He added that the host UK government was "suprisingly stumbling" in the conference run-up, which could provide both disadvantages and opportunities, although he did not specify which. In regards to GoN support for reftel points, Solberg said that Norway supported the NATO decisions that were to be endorsed in London, but that he would appreciate details on OSLO 00000037 002.2 OF 003 security planning: how realistic was the security plan at this point, he asked. The GoN was aware of the challenges in cooperation between the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior, he said, and noted it was "too early" to see strategic thinking from the Afghan side. No Pledges Now for Reintegration Fund -------------- ¶4. (SBU) When asked if the GoN would pledge funds for the reintegration fund, Kanavin responded "it will not happen" given that the fund does not yet exist and the program remains unfinalized. He said that the upcoming Kabul Conference would be a more likely venue for a GoN pledge. He mentioned the US - UK discussions on whether to include a Kabul Conference date, noting with a bit of concern the U.S. push not to include a time frame more specific than 2010. He said the communiqu text lacked details on how the fund would work, and did not emphasize what was "important." Kanavin specified the following elements as key for Norwegian participation: 1) clear reference to the Afghan role and responsibility for the Fund; 2) recognizing the need to address strategic and political elements of reintegration, including reconciliation, to ensure the Fund has the strength and capacity to accomplish the job; 3) reference to a national and transparent program; 4) recognizing the need to avoid parallel structures and to use existing tools such as the National Solidarity Program for implementation, and 5) reference to the inclusion of women in the reconciliation process. He also emphasized that the communiqu listed reintegration under the security sub-title, which he said was unnecessarily restrictive. His recommendation to the UK was to simply take out sub-titles entirely, he said. ¶5. (C) Solberg said that reintegration required political leadership to be successful, and that it remained unclear as to whether or not GoA wanted to engage, in particular the Afghan parliament. He noted that the Norwegian MFA had previous reintegration experience and remained skeptical about "wrong incentives" such as "giving cash." He wouldn't want the funds to be used instead as a recruiting tool, he said, and emphasized again the need for Afghan leadership and ownership of the reintegration agenda. Security Transition and U.S. Forces arriving in RC-North -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Solberg expressed optimism for increased opportunities for mentoring, training, and partnership in 2010 for Norwegian forces in Faryab, but asked whether this would entail a shift away from the PRT model, and if so, what type of criteria would be established for the transition. He noted that Norway was already engaged daily in "serious partnerships," but anticipated additional details on the Afghan security roll-out. He noted that the increase in US troops coming into RC-North would be welcome, adding that details on troop roll-out would be highly appreciated, to allow for the GoN to plan appropriately. He said that according to the COMISAF FRAGO, 700 U.S. troops would be arriving in Faryab, and would therefore outnumber the 500 Norwegians troops currently deployed there. He noted that it OSLO 00000037 003.2 OF 003 was important for the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) roll-outs to "complement each other," adding that the NATO Chief of Defense discussion taking place this week in Brussels could help address this issue. ANSF Build-up -------------- ¶7. (C) Rikardsen said that he was "somewhat puzzled" by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approval of ANP and ANA increases and the long-term implications of such an increase in force size. He said he understood that the USG had agreed to fund the troop increase over two years, but what would happen when the two years are up, he asked? He said that as the GoN did have a seat at the table when the ISAF Ambassadors discussed the initiative and also on JCMB that they would not raise this issue, but said he expected other ISAF partners to express concern over the implications. He said it seemed that the UK and the US pushed through the increases with limited consultations. Solberg added that it appeared due to pressure for a deliverable at London, which would have been unlikely if full NATO consultations on the increases had taken place. Norwegian KIA and several wounded today -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Solberg reported that the MoD received news of a the death of a Norwegian soldier in Faryab today, which may affect the attendance of Deputy Minister of Defense Espen Barth Eide at London, as he may need to stay in Oslo to attend the return of the soldier's remains to Norway. (Note: Press reports indicate that the cause of the death was an IED, and that two Norwegian soldiers were injured. With today's casualty, Norway has 5 KIA in Afghanistan since operations began. End Note.) WHITE