NSA MENON DISCUSSES PAKISTAN AND CIVIL NUCLEAR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000205 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM KNNP ENRG PK IN SUBJECT: NSA MENON DISCUSSES PAKISTAN AND CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH AMBASSADOR REF: A. STATE 5891 ¶B. NEW DELHI 155 Classified By: Ambassador Timothy Roemer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request; see paragraph 11. ¶2. (S) SUMMARY. In his first meeting with Ambassador Roemer as National Security Advisor January 28, Shivshankar Menon asserted that his portfolio would remain "the same" as that of his predecessor. He touched on civil nuclear implementation issues, and echoed concerns raised by other senior Indian officials about U.S. export controls policy. Menon confirmed Prime Minister Singh's plan to attend the Nuclear Security Summit in April. Menon shared that Foreign Minister Krishna and Foreign Secretary Rao would each make another effort at dialogue with their Pakistani counterparts in the coming days. He expressed skepticism that the same Pakistani government that had elevated "a game to a bilateral issue" in a recent cricket player controversy could be a credible interlocutor, a theme they explored in greater detail in a 20 minute one-on-one session. Menon shared that the Home Ministry had agreed to review the new, more restrictive policy for multiple entry tourist visas in response to the concerns voiced by the United States and others. END SUMMARY. Menon's Role As NSA - - - ¶3. (C) Ambassador Roemer met Shivshankar Menon for the first time in his new role as National Security Advisor January 28. Ambassador Roemer congratulated Menon and welcomed the opportunity to work with him again. He passed Menon a letter outlining concerns about India's new, more restrictive rules for multiple entry tourist visas, an issue Menon had previously agreed to look into. Menon said the timing was perfect because he had just returned from a meeting at the Home Ministry in which they had agreed to review the policy. ¶4. (C) Ambassador Roemer asked if the press reports were accurate indicating a reformed and more narrow NSA structure. Menon bluntly asserted that his portfolio as NSA would remain "the same" as that of his predecessor, M.K. Naryanan. (Comment: His message and demeanor contrasted with that of two weeks ago when he told the Ambassador "change is going to happen" and that he would focus more on strategic issues. Menon appeared to be in the midst of an effort to consolidate his position and maximize his value to the Prime Minister. End Comment.) Menon was critical of the press' assumption that he would "be Foreign Secretary again." He clarified that as NSA he will "not be doing foreign policy," but as the PM's principal security advisor he planned to take a more strategic view and advise the PM on whatever security issues the PM involved himself in, including regional security, nuclear issues, and defense. Menon claimed the media has "overblown" the implications of Home Minister Chidambaram's proposed "structural reform" to set up an Indian version of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC). Menon suggested he would not busy himself with the day-to-day management of India's intelligence services. Ambassador Roemer attempted to target several specific questions at his intelligence and nuclear roles, but he would not be drawn out on what this would mean for his role on these issues. (Comment: While Menon is battling to preserve much of the territory and power of the NSA, he may well have capitulated to Chidambaram on some intelligence issues. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) Responding to rumors that former DAE Chairman Anil Kakodkar would join the Prime Minister's Office (PMO),Menon said Kakodkar would likely take on a role "associated NEW DELHI 00000205 002 OF 003 directly with India's nuclear program," much like the 'advisory' or 'emeritus' roles his predecessors had assumed upon retirement. Menon added that it would be a shame not to utilize Kakodkar's expertise, but he clarified that Kakodkar would not be in the PMO. Civil Nuclear Cooperation and Export Controls - - - ¶6. (C) Menon was busily "catching up" on developments since his retirement six months ago, but left little doubt that he planned to play the central role on civil nuclear implementation issues. Menon stressed that he had worked on the civil nuclear agreement since its inception, including "the hard times" when he helped pilot the deal through domestic processes in each of our systems in its final months. He looked forward to looking personally at the reprocessing negotiation text. His only fear was that "we must not create the impression we are going back on the 123 Agreement or undermining the creative ambiguities, we left deliberately unresolved." Ambassador Roemer and Menon agreed that reprocessing negotiations need to be concluded soon. Roemer mentioned compensation and suspention as issues that required greater "flexibility" on the part of the GOI, as well as the importance of passing appropriate liability legislation. Menon confirmed that it was the intention of the GOI to pass domestic legislation fully consistent with the CSC "because we can't bring the CSC into force without it." Menon was under the impression that we had received the necessary Part 810 assurances. Ambassador Roemer explained the need to list all the firms on both sides, and Menon agreed to examine the issue. Menon said we must be careful not to create the impression of linkages. ¶7. (C) When Ambassador Roemer stressed that the lack of Part 810 assurances inhibited Indian firms from pursuing business as well as American firms, Menon said he was hearing more "grumbling" from Indian companies about the entities list. He said, "Some things that were promised are not happening," and that "the longer we take to address it the harder it will get." (Note: Menon's concern about export controls echoed similar messages in virtually every recent interaction with senior GOI officials, including Minister Antony to Secretary Gates. End Note.) ¶8. (C) Menon said PM Singh planned to attend the Nuclear Security Summit in April and tasked him with making sure the Indian government was well coordinated with the United States. Consistent with ref A demarche, Ambassador Roemer stressed the distinction between the Summit and the NPT Review Conference. Menon appreciated the clarification and said he was aware that our two sides were coordinating extensively at the working level (ref B). Pakistan - - - ¶9. (S) Ambassador Roemer expressed his concern about growing tension in the Pakistan-India relationship. Menon said Foreign Minister Krishna and Foreign Secretary Rao would each make another effort with their respective counterparts "to get something going" on dialogue with Pakistan in the coming days. Menon cautioned that "talking with Pakistan was not the entire problem," and that developments in Pakistan were not encouraging. He stressed the unhelpful role the Pakistan government had played in the recent controversy over Indian cricket teams failing to hire Pakistani players -- "they elevated a game to a bilateral issue" -- which Menon characterized as the result of rational business decisions, not politics. It is another sign of the difficult domestic situation in Pakistan and the lack of a credible interlocutor NEW DELHI 00000205 003 OF 003 who speaks with authority. Menon expressed concern that infiltration attempts were rising this year, and messages passed to militants were harder to decipher. ¶10. (S) They continued for 20 minutes in a private session at Ambassador Roemer's request. Ambassador Roemer stressed that President Obama had encouraged Prime Minister Singh to reach out to Pakistan. While the United States had no formal role, we nevertheless wanted to be helpful behind the scenes, and asked Menon to tell him how we could help. Ambassador Roemer noted U.S. efforts to overcome Pakistan's objections to India attendance at the regional Afghanistan Conference in Istanbul on January 25. Menon confirmed that Krishna was seeking a meeting with Qureshi in London. Ambassador Roemer said he was worried that if India and Pakistan could not talk about cricket, how could they talk themselves back from the brink in the event of another terrorist attack. Menon confirmed that, fundamentally, the PM was frustrated and confused about who he could deal with in Pakistan. He said he had never seen "this degree of frustration from the Prime Minister." ¶11. (S) ACTION ITEM: It is an important and vital time for President Obama to telephone Prime Minister Singh to encourage continued efforts at dialogue with Pakistan; completion of 123 Agreement implementation; and selection of a U.S. recipient of the Medium Multiple Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract. ROEMER