Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10NEWDELHI155
2010-01-28 12:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIA SUPPORTS NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT, FURTHER

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PARM KNNP ENRG PK IN AORC CDG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0284
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #0155/01 0281210
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281210Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9272
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8213
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7218
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3895
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2105
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6654
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1841
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8838
RHMCSUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000155 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM KNNP ENRG PK IN AORC CDG
EAID, IAEA, MNUC, TBIO, UNGA, NPT
SUBJECT: INDIA SUPPORTS NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT, FURTHER
WORK ON EXPORT CONTROLS AND EXBS

REF: A. STATE 07493

B. STATE 05891

Classified By: A/POL Les Viguerie for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000155 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM KNNP ENRG PK IN AORC CDG EAID, IAEA, MNUC, TBIO, UNGA, NPT SUBJECT: INDIA SUPPORTS NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT, FURTHER WORK ON EXPORT CONTROLS AND EXBS REF: A. STATE 07493 ¶B. STATE 05891 Classified By: A/POL Les Viguerie for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Director of Disarmament and International Security Affairs (DISA) Amandeep Singh Gill stated January 27 that the Government of India (GOI) was looking forward to a positive and productive Nuclear Security Summit and confirmed that Prime Minister Singh planned to attend. The government supports the Summit as an opportunity to reassure the world that the Indian government takes safety and security seriously. The Government of India is also optimistic about being able to announce a joint Center of Excellence initiative at the summit. The GOI understands that the United States is treating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (RevCon) as a separate issue and agrees that broad nonproliferation discussion do not belong in the Summit. On export controls, Gill said that a response to the export controls roadmap was complete and should be passed to Washington at appropriate levels in the coming days, but he cautioned that export controls policy was a sensitive political issue for the Indian government. He supported a resumption of the Export Controls and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, adding that the government had work to do on its own interagency coordination. End Summary. INDIA TO ATTEND SOUS-SHERPA MEETING - - - ¶2. (SBU) PolOffs met with Director of Disarmament and International Security Affairs Amandeep Singh Gill January 27 to discuss the February 2010 Sous-Sherpa Summit in the Netherlands, the April Nuclear Security Summit and the proposed Center of Excellence. In response to ref A demarche, Gill confirmed that an Indian delegation planned to attend the February 9-11 Sous-Sherpa Meeting and had already discussed participation with the Hague. The Indian delegation to the Summit will consist of Foreign Secretary Rao as Sherpa, Dr. Ravi Grover as Sous-sherpa, Venkatesh Varma from Geneva, and DISA,s Amandeep Singh Gill. (Note: Immediately following the Summit, Gill departs his current post for the Indian Embassy in Geneva, where he will play a key role on negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). End No
te.) NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT: LOOKING FORWARD TO POSITIVE OUTCOMES - - - ¶3. (SBU) Gill confirmed that Prime Minister Singh planned to attend the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. Gill said the Indian government was comfortable with the Summit, and appreciated its strategic importance. He stressed that India has been actively participating in the lead-up to the Summit and contributing substantive input into the draft Communique and work agenda. He felt that the Communique was close to completion. Remaining issues, mostly in terms of scope, would likely be ironed out at the Hague in February. India regards the Summit as the start of a process to draw international attention to the issue of nuclear security. Gill underscored the importance of building "a platform for cooperative action on nuclear security, both diplomatically and internally." He said India supported efforts to build broad international and national awareness to the issue, but that the Summit should also aim to strengthen existing legal frameworks such as IAEA and the UN. While nuclear terrorism -- particularly by non-state actors -- is India's overarching concern for the conference, Gill stressed that India did not want to lose the confidence of its public or the world community in the face NEW DELHI 00000155 002 OF 003 of its ambitious plans for expansion of its civil nuclear sector. 4.(SBU) Gill appreciated and understood the message of Ref B demarche on the distinction between the Nuclear Security Summit and the May NPT RevCon. He expressed confidence that India and the U.S. were on the same page with regards to keeping broad nonproliferation issues off the Summit agenda. Gill acknowledged that there would be some inevitable overlap of these issues, but as long as the NPT regime was not brought into the discussion -- and instead discussion focused on the IAEA, G8 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism -- India did not expect any problems. ¶5. (SBU) Despite the overall positive outlook on the Nuclear Security Summit, Gill acknowledged that many of the 43 countries taking part in the Summit, including India, still had minor, yet important differences. He stressed that the Summit would not be the appropriate place to address or resolve issues related to the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC 549),which India was not in a position to endorse at this time. Gill shared that Foreign Secretary Rao had expressed this concern in a recent email to the President,s Sherpa, Gary Samore. NUCLEAR SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE - - - ¶6. (C) Gill said DISA has had extensive discussions following up on the U.S. Delegation's "excellent presentation" on the Center of Excellence proposal discussed on the margins of the U.S.-India Strategic Security Dialogue last November. Though there was still much to sort out in terms of focus, structure and presentation, he felt confident that the United States and India would be able to announce their intentions for a joint initiative at the Summit. Gill reported that the Indian delegation had done a great deal of work internally thinking about what would be the most valuable way to focus the center. He also said that they were considering how such a center should be presented at the Nuclear Security Summit, cautioning that it would be very important not to make other countries feel excluded from this bilateral initiative. He also acknowledged that a lot of work would need to be done to figure out how to operationalize such a center, though he acknowleged that some of that work could be done in future meetings. The Department of Atomic Energy, with Dr. Grover as lead, would be prepared to present India's ideas for a center on the margins of the Civil Nuclear Working Group in Mumbai February 2-4. EXPORT CONTROLS: ROAD MAP AND EXBS - - - ¶7. (SBU) Gill said that the government would share India's formal response to the export controls roadmap in the coming days. The document was complete, but needed to be passed at the appropriate level, possibly between National Security Advisors. On a proposed technical delegation led by the Department of Commerce to discuss export controls in advance of the High Technology Cooperation Group, Gill stressed that the U.S. should wait to receive the Indian response to the export controls paper before planning to send such a group. He stressed that while there may be technical issues that could be examined, the export controls issue was of broad political concern and thus needed to be handled at high levels. "Bogging export controls down in technical details," he cautioned, could further complicate the already complex bilateral relationship our countries share on these issues. Like the civil nuclear agreement, he explained, export controls was a barometer of a broader relationship and NEW DELHI 00000155 003 OF 003 discussions needed to be worked out on that level. ¶8. (SBU) Gill was more positive on resumption of Export and Border Security (EXBS) cooperation, agreeing that the time was ripe to discuss resuming the EXBS program. Gill confirmed the government expected to welcome the proposed visit of a Megaports/EXBS delegation from Washington in February or March. Gill asked for patience as the GOI worked out its interagency process to facilitate such a program. The challenge for the GOI would be to coordinate their own interagency process to ensure that the appropriate agencies that would facilitate the EXBS program were fully on-board. ROEMER

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -