EU UPGRADES ITS MISSION TO CHAD: THE EU'S "NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000083 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019 TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV EU FR PHUM PREF CD SUBJECT: EU UPGRADES ITS MISSION TO CHAD: THE EU'S "NEW DIPLOMACY" AND COEXISTENCE WITH FRANCE'S "OLD DIPLOMACY" Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1,.4 (B) AND (D). -------------- SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) The EU delegation in N'Djamena has been chosen as one of 54 of the Union's 136 overseas missions to be endowed with new, embassy-like functions derived from the Lisbon Treaty. The delegation, headed by an Ambassador of French nationality, is empowered to speak on behalf of the 27 EU members of the EU, rather than relying on a presidency-nation embassy as it did in the past. The EU delegation's size has increased as a result of having been selected for embassy-like status, and its new staff have advised us that they will be adopting a higher political profile than previously. The EU is already a major actor in Chad, investing about USD 149.5 million annually -- 60 percent for development, 30 percent for humanitarian assistance to refugees, and 10 percent to the MINURCAT Trust Fund. Its activities have wide "democracy and development" scope -- it is currently the largest international contributor to the Chadian electoral process. The EU Mission's formal assessment that Chad's democracy and development performance is "satisfactory," currently under discussion in Brussels, generally comports with Embassy N'Djamena's. ¶2. (C) Only two EU states are represented here bilaterally: a minimal German Embassy and a very robust and activist French mission, with full diplomatic, cooperation, and development functions, plus a major French military deployment. We believe that France's long-term goal is to reduce its footprint in Chad across the board and to relinquish its role of sponsor to the Chadian client. The French push to get first EUFOR and then MINURCAT into Chad was part of this strategy. But French fears of leaving a "power-vacuum" in Chad may be reinforced by the prospect of MINURCAT's probable early departure and what the French see as growing potential for cataclysmic destabilization of Sudan in the next two years. In any case, it will be interesting to see whether the two European "diplomacies" in Chad -- France and the EU -- will coexist peacefully or contentiously. The French will surely welcome more EU financial assistance of all kinds, but may bridle at an EU political rival. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. -------------- A MORE VISIBLE EU PRESENCE -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Our EU delegation colleagues, long key collaborators with us, have taken considerable pride in describing their mission's selection as one of the Union's new embassy-like entities. Their diplomatic note announcing the delegation's change of status reads in part that "the delegation will: exercise all the functions of representation, coordination and negotiation in the name of the European Union that were formerly exercised by embassies of member states locally representing the rotating Presidency of the Union." Considering the relatively small size of the diplomatic community here, any increase in international personnel from democratic partners of the U.S. is welcome, as is the EU's increasing activism. The EU Ambassador is an outspoken proponent of media freedom and responsibility. He has proposed an oversight role for his organization with respect to some aspects of the Chadian electoral process -- which we support. The EU delegation is well-organized in terms of briefing the international community on the activities of visiting technical experts, who have recently included experts in public revenue management from AFRITAC. ¶4. (SBU) The EU's overall strategic goals for Chad resemble those of the U.S., although the EU's focus on development is stronger than ours (as evidenced in part by lack of a bilateral USAID mission here since 1995). Pillar 1 goals are described as including promotion of peace, security, and good *********************** * Missing Section 002 * *********************** *********************** * Missing Section 003 * *********************** *********************** * Missing Section 004 * ***********************