Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10NDJAMENA83
2010-02-08 16:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:
EU UPGRADES ITS MISSION TO CHAD: THE EU'S "NEW
how-toVZCZCXRO0852 OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHNJ #0083/01 0391621 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 081621Z FEB 10 ZDK ZUI RUEHFR 0740 SVC. VOL ALL OTHERS FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7667 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000083
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV EU FR PHUM PREF CD
SUBJECT: EU UPGRADES ITS MISSION TO CHAD: THE EU'S "NEW
DIPLOMACY" AND COEXISTENCE WITH FRANCE'S "OLD DIPLOMACY"
Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1,.4 (B) AND (D).
-----------
SUMMARY AND
COMMENT
-----------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000083
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV EU FR PHUM PREF CD
SUBJECT: EU UPGRADES ITS MISSION TO CHAD: THE EU'S "NEW
DIPLOMACY" AND COEXISTENCE WITH FRANCE'S "OLD DIPLOMACY"
Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1,.4 (B) AND (D).
--------------
SUMMARY AND
COMMENT
--------------
1. (C) The EU delegation in N'Djamena has been chosen as
one of 54 of the Union's 136 overseas missions to be endowed
with new, embassy-like functions derived from the Lisbon
Treaty. The delegation, headed by an Ambassador of French
nationality, is empowered to speak on behalf of the 27 EU
members of the EU, rather than relying on a presidency-nation
embassy as it did in the past. The EU delegation's size has
increased as a result of having been selected for
embassy-like status, and its new staff have advised us that
they will be adopting a higher political profile than
previously. The EU is already a major actor in Chad,
investing about USD 149.5 million annually -- 60 percent for
development, 30 percent for humanitarian assistance to
refugees, and 10 percent to the MINURCAT Trust Fund. Its
activities have wide "democracy and development" scope -- it
is currently the largest international contributor to the
Chadian electoral process. The EU Mission's formal
assessment that Chad's democracy and development performance
is "satisfactory," currently under discussion in Brussels,
generally comports with Embassy N'Djamena's.
2. (C) Only two EU states are represented here bilaterally:
a minimal German Embassy and a very robust and activist
French mission, with full diplomatic, cooperation, and
development functions, plus a major French military
deployment. We believe that France's long-term goal is to
reduce its footprint in Chad across the board and to
relinquish its role of sponsor to the Chadian client. The
French push to get first EUFOR and then MINURCAT into Chad
was part of this strategy. But French fears of leaving a
"power-vacuum" in Chad may be reinforced by the prospect of
MINURCAT's probable early departure and what the French see
as growing potential for cataclysmic destabilization of Sudan
in the next two years. In any case, it will be interesting
to see whether the two European "diplomacies" in Chad --
France and the EU -- will coexist peacefully or
contentiously. The French will surely welcome more EU
financial assistance of all kinds, but may bridle at an EU
political rival. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
--------------
A MORE VISIBLE EU PRESENCE
--------------
3. (SBU) Our EU delegation colleagues, long key
collaborators with us, have taken considerable pride in
describing their mission's selection as one of the Union's
new embassy-like entities. Their diplomatic note announcing
the delegation's change of status reads in part that "the
delegation will: exercise all the functions of
representation, coordination and negotiation in the name of
the European Union that were formerly exercised by embassies
of member states locally representing the rotating Presidency
of the Union." Considering the relatively small size of the
diplomatic community here, any increase in international
personnel from democratic partners of the U.S. is welcome, as
is the EU's increasing activism. The EU Ambassador is an
outspoken proponent of media freedom and responsibility. He
has proposed an oversight role for his organization with
respect to some aspects of the Chadian electoral process --
which we support. The EU delegation is well-organized in
terms of briefing the international community on the
activities of visiting technical experts, who have recently
included experts in public revenue management from AFRITAC.
4. (SBU) The EU's overall strategic goals for Chad resemble
those of the U.S., although the EU's focus on development is
stronger than ours (as evidenced in part by lack of a
bilateral USAID mission here since 1995). Pillar 1 goals are
described as including promotion of peace, security, and good
***********************
* Missing Section 002 *
***********************
***********************
* Missing Section 003 *
***********************
***********************
* Missing Section 004 *
***********************
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV EU FR PHUM PREF CD
SUBJECT: EU UPGRADES ITS MISSION TO CHAD: THE EU'S "NEW
DIPLOMACY" AND COEXISTENCE WITH FRANCE'S "OLD DIPLOMACY"
Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1,.4 (B) AND (D).
--------------
SUMMARY AND
COMMENT
--------------
1. (C) The EU delegation in N'Djamena has been chosen as
one of 54 of the Union's 136 overseas missions to be endowed
with new, embassy-like functions derived from the Lisbon
Treaty. The delegation, headed by an Ambassador of French
nationality, is empowered to speak on behalf of the 27 EU
members of the EU, rather than relying on a presidency-nation
embassy as it did in the past. The EU delegation's size has
increased as a result of having been selected for
embassy-like status, and its new staff have advised us that
they will be adopting a higher political profile than
previously. The EU is already a major actor in Chad,
investing about USD 149.5 million annually -- 60 percent for
development, 30 percent for humanitarian assistance to
refugees, and 10 percent to the MINURCAT Trust Fund. Its
activities have wide "democracy and development" scope -- it
is currently the largest international contributor to the
Chadian electoral process. The EU Mission's formal
assessment that Chad's democracy and development performance
is "satisfactory," currently under discussion in Brussels,
generally comports with Embassy N'Djamena's.
2. (C) Only two EU states are represented here bilaterally:
a minimal German Embassy and a very robust and activist
French mission, with full diplomatic, cooperation, and
development functions, plus a major French military
deployment. We believe that France's long-term goal is to
reduce its footprint in Chad across the board and to
relinquish its role of sponsor to the Chadian client. The
French push to get first EUFOR and then MINURCAT into Chad
was part of this strategy. But French fears of leaving a
"power-vacuum" in Chad may be reinforced by the prospect of
MINURCAT's probable early departure and what the French see
as growing potential for cataclysmic destabilization of Sudan
in the next two years. In any case, it will be interesting
to see whether the two European "diplomacies" in Chad --
France and the EU -- will coexist peacefully or
contentiously. The French will surely welcome more EU
financial assistance of all kinds, but may bridle at an EU
political rival. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
--------------
A MORE VISIBLE EU PRESENCE
--------------
3. (SBU) Our EU delegation colleagues, long key
collaborators with us, have taken considerable pride in
describing their mission's selection as one of the Union's
new embassy-like entities. Their diplomatic note announcing
the delegation's change of status reads in part that "the
delegation will: exercise all the functions of
representation, coordination and negotiation in the name of
the European Union that were formerly exercised by embassies
of member states locally representing the rotating Presidency
of the Union." Considering the relatively small size of the
diplomatic community here, any increase in international
personnel from democratic partners of the U.S. is welcome, as
is the EU's increasing activism. The EU Ambassador is an
outspoken proponent of media freedom and responsibility. He
has proposed an oversight role for his organization with
respect to some aspects of the Chadian electoral process --
which we support. The EU delegation is well-organized in
terms of briefing the international community on the
activities of visiting technical experts, who have recently
included experts in public revenue management from AFRITAC.
4. (SBU) The EU's overall strategic goals for Chad resemble
those of the U.S., although the EU's focus on development is
stronger than ours (as evidenced in part by lack of a
bilateral USAID mission here since 1995). Pillar 1 goals are
described as including promotion of peace, security, and good
***********************
* Missing Section 002 *
***********************
***********************
* Missing Section 003 *
***********************
***********************
* Missing Section 004 *
***********************