MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL: NO AGREEMENT, BUT COMPROMISE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000070 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF UN PKO CT CD SUBJECT: MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL: NO AGREEMENT, BUT COMPROMISE SOLUTION STILL POSSIBLE, SAY SRSG AND GEN CAMMAERT REF: A. NDJAMENA 063 ¶B. NDJAMENA 049 ¶C. NDJAMENA 048 Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). -------------- SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) The Cammaert Mission prepares to leave Chad Feb 2 without having definite agreement from the GOC on a plan of withdrawal for MINURCAT that would satisfy UN goals and security requirements. The GOC wants MINURCAT's military component out soon but would permit its civilian component to stay until 2011, which is unacceptable to the UN. The UN wants an organized, phased withdrawal, with a timeline based on "benchmarks" related to the orderly "handover" of security and civilian responsibilities to Chadian authorities, over 12 to 18 months. The SRSG continues to see the possibility of a compromise solution to permit enough MINURCAT military to protect MINURCAT's civilians over an adequate withdrawal period because the Chadians wish to avoid an abrupt departure of MINURCAT. ¶2. (C) The compromise solution that Cammaert outlined and that the SRSG believes possible for the Chadians to accept would satisfy in principle both elements of the GOC's request for MINURCAT's withdrawal -- an actual drawdown, especially of MINURCAT's military strength, that conforms to UNSC 1861. As the action shifts to New York, it remains to be seen if the GOC have the political maturity and geopolitical prudence to grasp this "win-win" solution and justify SRSG Angelo's public optimism about its "flexibility." END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. -------------- MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL -------------- ¶3. (C) SRSG Angelo and GEN Cammaert told Perm Five ambassadors February 1 that they have discussed three options for MINURCAT withdrawal with the GOC over the past few days. -------------- GOC OPTIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) Cammaert said that CONAFIT head GEN Dagache, speaking for the GOC, had offered up two options. Option One would be for MINURCAT military component to depart Chad NLT 31 May 2010, while MINURCAT civilian components stay in Chad until March 2011 or beyond. (This was the GOC's preferred option, Cammaert said.) Option Two would be "immediate withdrawal" of all MINURCAT components from Chad NLT 31 July 2010. ¶5. (C) GEN Cammaert countered that Option One was impossible for the UN, because the civilian components could not stay after the military components departed, for security reasons and that Option Two was undesirable and did not conform to UNSC 1861, because it did not permit MINURCAT to "hand off" its security responsibilities to Chad security forces in any organized, structured manner: Option Two would result in effect in a security deficit in eastern Chad. -------------- A THIRD WAY -------------- ¶6. (C) GEN Cammaert explained that the best way to proceed was either an Option Three or a modification of the GOC's Option Two. Cammaert said that MINURCAT could stage an organized, phased withdrawal, with a timeline based not on fixed dates but on "benchmarks" related to the orderly "handover" of security responsibilities to Chadian security forces and of civilian responsibilities to Chad civil NDJAMENA 00000070 002 OF 002 authorities, both based on careful analysis of the GOC's security and other capQities. Such an organized, phased withdrawal, with a bench-mark-based timeline could be accomplished within 12 to 18 months, according to Cammaert. -------------- SRSG SEES GOC "FLEXIBILITY" -------------- ¶7. (C) SRSG said that he believed that the GOC understood that its preferred option was not possible and that the GOC was showing some flexibility in finding a way to maintaining MINURCAT's civilian activities while its military component drew down. The trick, Angelo surmised, would be in some compromise on how many MINURCAT military would remain in Chad to provide security for MINURCAT's civilian components as the organized, phased withdrawal proceeded. The GOC would have to accept a continued MINURCAT military presence if it wanted to retain the PKO's civilian presence over the withdrawal period. SRSG said he thought that the GOC was "uncomfortable" with a very abrupt departure of MINURCAT and wanted to avoid that. -------------- CAMMAERT TEAM DEPARTS FEB 2 -------------- ¶8. (C) GEN Cammaert said that his team would depart the night of February 2, but that he remained open to talking to the GOC until then. He said that he would report his mission's findings to the UNSYG as soon as possible. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) The compromise solution that Cammaert outlined and that the SRSG believes possible for the Chadians to accept would satisfy in principle both elements of the GOC's request for MINURCAT's withdrawal -- an actual drawdown, especially of MINURCAT's military strength, that conforms to UNSC 1861. As the action shifts to New York, it remains to be seen if the GOC have the political maturity to grasp this "win-win" solution and justify SRSG Angelo's public optimism about its "flexibility." END COMMENT. ¶10. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO