CHAD AND UN NEGOTIATING MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000063 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY UN CD SUBJECT: CHAD AND UN NEGOTIATING MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL OPTIONS: IMPACT ON USG INTERESTS IN CHAD REF: A. PARIS 084 ¶B. NDJAMENA 049 ¶C. NDJAMENA 048 ¶D. NDJAMENA 043 Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). -------------- SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) MG Cammaert, head of the UN Technical Assessment Mission to discuss MINURCAT extension with the GOC, told Perm Five ambassadors here Jan 28 that his initial conversations with his GOC counterparts indicated that the GOC insisted on a framework of "MINURCAT withdrawal in accordance with UNSC 1861" for their discussions, and that he was prepared to discuss "options for withdrawal" on that basis. The French and U.S. ambassadors offered advice on how best to approach the Chadians on MINURCAT issues, noting President Deby's personal protagonism on these issues, the need to respect the GOC's sovereign engagements under UNSC 1861, the inadvisability of trying to defend MINURCAT's shortcomings, and the wisdom of presenting the MINURCAT case positively with the GOC. SRSG Angelo "summed up" the briefing by saying that the question was no longer "the future of MINURCAT" but "the withdrawal of MINURCAT," which required "the drawdown of MINURCAT forces," while managing the withdrawal scenario to consolidate results. "We are passing the ball to the Chadians," Angelo said, and called special attention to the CAR, which depended on MINURCAT for an important element in its national security in NE CAR. FORMIN Faki departed the morning of Jan 28 for Paris, where we expect that the GOF will be pressing French concerns regarding MINURCAT on him. Cammaert is scheduled to outbrief the Perm Five, including the non-resident UK ambassador, on February 1. ¶2. (C) USG interests in Chad would be served by a well-planned and well-executed graduated withdrawal over a timeline sufficient to consolidate MINURCAT goals regarding security of civilians in eastern Chad, human rights, and judicial and penal reform. A timeline of six to 12 months would be adequate, especially if there were flexibility regarding the longer limit. The future of the DIS is in doubt, partly because of its funding from the Trust Fund rather than assessed contribution. If there is a way that the DIS could be preserved in the context of a negotiated MINURCAT withdrawal, at least until MINURCAT's definitive departure, this would be desirable. A mechanism for extending DIS's institutional life beyond that limit would be even more useful. ¶3. (C) The Cammaert Mission's best chances for success here lie in finding a formula for withdrawal that respects the goals of UNSC 1861 and provides for the most orderly handing over of MINURCAT responsibilities to the Chadian Government. If Cammaert can convince the GOC that the UN is acting in good faith to make the transition to a MINURCAT-less Chad a positive outcome for the UNSC and the GOC, the timeline established for that transition could be long enough to ensure that MINURCAT's goals under UNSCR 1861 have been advanced as far as the situation in eastern Chad permits. ¶4. (C) We do not agree completely with the GOF view (Ref A) that "significant numbers of NGOs and their personnel might consider leaving Chad if MINURCAT disappeared." NGOs in Chad appear to us to be indicating that, while reductions in activities and personnel may be in order, it is not MINURCAT,s departure that is driving the calculation, but rather the inability or unwillingness of any security force, foreign or Chadian, to confront the primary threats they face, namely, armed robbery, armed carjacking, kidnapping, and other deadly threats. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. -------------- CAMMAERT MISSION -------------- NDJAMENA 00000063 002 OF 004 ¶5. (C) Major General Patrick Cammaert, head of the UN Technical Assessment Mission to discuss MINURCAT extension with the GOC, told Perm Five ambassadors here January 28 that his initial conversations with his GOC counterparts indicated that the GOC insisted on a framework of "MINURCAT withdrawal in accordance with UNSC 1861" for their discussions and that he was prepared to discuss "options for withdrawal" on that basis. Cammaert said that he could envisage several scenarios, all with more or less favorable consequences for the GOC and the situation in eastern Chad, including security there. Cammaert said that he would stress to the Chadians the importance of a well-planned handover of MINURCAT's responsibilities to the GOC in any withdrawal scenario. Cammaert said that an "immediate withdrawal" would create the most problems, but that he had not detected a desire for such an immediate scenario from his initial discussions with GOC interlocutors. Cammaert said some sort of "progressive withdrawal" would be a preferable scenario, perhaps with MINURCAT's civilian- and police-related functions becoming more important than military ones as the withdrawal proceeded. -------------- PERM FIVE VIEWS -------------- ¶6. (C) The French and U.S. ambassadors offered Perm Five perceptions of the current situation to Cammaert. They noted that the question of MINURCAT extension was from the Chadian side a presidential initiative, which limited the GOC side's flexibility in any talks. They stressed that the GOC was represented by Chadian military chiefs, who were increasingly effective in defending the country's security from external threat. They said that the GOC had legitimate grievances regarding MINURCAT's performance which would have to be weighed carefully against Chad's sovereign engagements under UNSCR 1861. They cautioned against trying to defend MINURCAT's shortcomings, and stressed the wisdom of presenting MINURCAT's case positively with the GOC, that is, underlining the benefits that an orderly and well-planned withdrawal scenario would bring to the GOC. ¶7. (C) The French ambassador stressed his view that the GOC was greatly underestimating the chances for a stable relationship with Sudan, which was entering a period of potentially huge internal instability to begin with. He also underlined that the Chadian police component of MINURCAT, the DIS, could cease to exist without MINURCAT's support. Finally, he said that additional troop deployments should cease after March 15, 2010, because that would be a GOC sine qua non in any "withdrawal scenario." ¶8. (C) The positive side of the issue, the French ambassador continued, was that the GOC wanted to avoid a disorganized MINURCAT withdrawal and that the Chadian side understood the technical challenges that even a well-planned and structured withdrawal would present. The French ambassador said that Cammaert's mission could be successful if it kept in mind the broader political framework in which it conducted its technical discussions. This meant exploiting the room that the GOC had left for maneuver carefully by stressing the benefits that would accrue to the GOC from a well-planned and "progressive" withdrawal scenario with a timeline sufficiently long to permit effective implementation of good planning. It meant also to present the preferred option as a "win/win" scenario in which the GOC would be "guaranteed" that legitimate Chadian grievances were addressed. -------------- SRSG ANGELO -------------- ¶9. (C) SRSG Angelo "summed up" the briefing by saying that the issue for decision was no longer "the future of MINURCAT" but "the withdrawal of MINURCAT," which required "the drawdown of MINURCAT forces." For the UN and MINURCAT, the important thing should now be "results," rather than "force NDJAMENA 00000063 003 OF 004 figures," he continued. "Our numbers must start to come down," Angelo announced, with his Force Commander at his side, visibly unhappy at this prospect. The task now was to manage the withdrawal scenario as effectively as possible, with timing and consolidation key elements. "We are passing the ball to the Chadians," Angelo said, and called special attention to the CAR, which depended on MINURCAT for an important element in its national security in NE CAR. -------------- SEEKING HUMANITARIAN VIEWS -------------- ¶10. (C) The Cammaert Mission also met January 27 with agency heads and deputies from the UN Country Team, followed separately by members of the Interagency Steering Committee (IASC),led by OCHA, with participation from humanitarian NGOs and non-UN IOs, as well as invited donors, including State/PRM. In the meeting with IASC, Cammaert declined to brief on the current situation, asking instead for humanitarians' views on "what will happen if MINURCAT leaves." NGOs declined to be drawn into speculation, noting only that the simple size of MINURCAT,s force meant its absence would be felt, though they could not predict how. MSF noted that it had been working along the Sudan border in areas where MINURCAT did not operate, and so the PKO,s presence or absence had not been relevant to the organization's activities. The International Committee of the Red Cross pointed out that its staff had been victims of kidnappings despite MINURCAT,s deployment to Chad. NGOs working in refugee and IDP camps within MINURCAT,s areas of operation noted that a more reasonable understanding of MINURCAT,s real capacities, faced with the threat of entrenched criminality vice rebel incursion, had led them to reassess their deployment in the field; some were planning to reduce activities and staffs regardless of MINURCAT,s fate. -------------- FORMIN FAKI TO PARIS -------------- ¶11. (C) We learned after the meeting that GOC FORMIN Faki departed the morning of Jan 28 for Paris, where we expect that the GOF will be pressing French concerns regarding MINURCAT to him. -------------- MISSION OUTBRIEF FEBRUARY 1 -------------- ¶12. (U) General Cammaert is scheduled to brief the Perm Five, including the non-resident UK ambassador, on February 1, at the end of his mission. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) USG interests in Chad: Our interests would be served by a well-planned and well-executed graduated withdrawal over a timeline sufficient to consolidate MINURCAT's goals regarding security of civilians in eastern Chad, human rights, and judicial and penal reform. A timeline of six to 12 months would be adequate, especially if there were flexibility regarding the longer limit. The future of the DIS is in doubt, partly because of its funding from the Trust Fund rather than assessed contributions. If there is a way that the DIS could be preserved in the context of a negotiated MINURCAT withdrawal, at least until MINURCAT's definitive departure, this would be desirable. A mechanism for extending DIS's institutional life beyond that limit would be even more useful. ¶14. (C) Success for Cammaert: The Cammaert Mission's best chances for success here lie in finding a formula for withdrawal that respects the goals of UNSC 1861 and provides for the most orderly handing over of MINURCAT NDJAMENA 00000063 004 OF 004 responsibilities to the Chadian Government. If Cammaert can convince the GOC that the UN is acting in good faith to make the transition to a MINURCAT-less Chad a positive outcome for the UNSC and the GOC, the timeline established for that transition could be long enough to ensure that MINURCAT's goals under UNSCR 1861 have been advanced as far as the situation in eastern Chad permits. ¶15. (C) Humanitarian Assistance Equities: We do not agree completely with the GOF view (Ref A) "significant numbers of NGOs and their personnel might consider leaving Chad if MINURCAT disappeared." NGOs in Chad appear to us to be indicating that, while reductions in activities and personnel may be in order, it is not MINURCAT,s departure that is driving the calculation, but rather the inability or unwillingness of any security force, foreign or Chadian, to confront the primary threats they face, namely, armed robbery, armed carjacking, kidnapping, and other deadly threats. END COMMENT. ¶16. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO