CHAD AND UN NEGOTIATING MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000063

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY UN CD
SUBJECT: CHAD AND UN NEGOTIATING MINURCAT WITHDRAWAL
OPTIONS: IMPACT ON USG INTERESTS IN CHAD

REF: A. PARIS 084

B. NDJAMENA 049

C. NDJAMENA 048

D. NDJAMENA 043

Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

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SUMMARY AND
COMMENT
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1. (C) MG Cammaert, head of the UN Technical Assessment
Mission to discuss MINURCAT extension with the GOC, told Perm
Five ambassadors here Jan 28 that his initial conversations
with his GOC counterparts indicated that the GOC insisted on
a framework of "MINURCAT withdrawal in accordance with UNSC
1861" for their discussions, and that he was prepared to
discuss "options for withdrawal" on that basis. The French
and U.S. ambassadors offered advice on how best to approach
the Chadians on MINURCAT issues, noting President Deby's
personal protagonism on these issues, the need to respect the
GOC's sovereign engagements under UNSC 1861, the
inadvisability of trying to defend MINURCAT's shortcomings,
and the wisdom of presenting the MINURCAT case positively
with the GOC. SRSG Angelo "summed up" the briefing by saying
that the question was no longer "the future of MINURCAT" but
"the withdrawal of MINURCAT," which required "the drawdown of
MINURCAT forces," while managing the withdrawal scenario to
consolidate results. "We are passing the ball to the
Chadians," Angelo said, and called special attention to the
CAR, which depended on MINURCAT for an important element in
its national security in NE CAR. FORMIN Faki departed the
morning of Jan 28 for Paris, where we expect that the GOF
will be pressing French concerns regarding MINURCAT on him.
Cammaert is scheduled to outbrief the Perm Five, including
the non-resident UK ambassador, on February 1.


2. (C) USG interests in Chad would be served by a
well-planned and well-executed graduated withdrawal over a
timeline sufficient to consolidate MINURCAT goals regarding
security of civilians in eastern Chad, human rights, and
judicial and penal reform. A timeline of six to 12 months
would be adequate, especially if there were flexibility
regarding the longer limit. The future of the DIS is in
doubt, partly because of its funding from the Trust Fund
rather than assessed contribution. If there is a way that
the DIS could be preserved in the context of a negotiated
MINURCAT withdrawal, at least until MINURCAT's definitive
departure, this would be desirable. A mechanism for
extending DIS's institutional life beyond that limit would be
even more useful.


3. (C) The Cammaert Mission's best chances for success here
lie in finding a formula for withdrawal that respects the
goals of UNSC 1861 and provides for the most orderly handing
over of MINURCAT responsibilities to the Chadian Government.
If Cammaert can convince the GOC that the UN is acting in
good faith to make the transition to a MINURCAT-less Chad a
positive outcome for the UNSC and the GOC, the timeline
established for that transition could be long enough to
ensure that MINURCAT's goals under UNSCR 1861 have been
advanced as far as the situation in eastern Chad permits.


4. (C) We do not agree completely with the GOF view (Ref A)
that "significant numbers of NGOs and their personnel might
consider leaving Chad if MINURCAT disappeared." NGOs in Chad
appear to us to be indicating that, while reductions in
activities and personnel may be in order, it is not
MINURCAT,s departure that is driving the calculation, but
rather the inability or unwillingness of any security force,
foreign or Chadian, to confront the primary threats they
face, namely, armed robbery, armed carjacking, kidnapping,
and other deadly threats. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

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CAMMAERT MISSION
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NDJAMENA 00000063 002 OF 004




5. (C) Major General Patrick Cammaert, head of the UN
Technical Assessment Mission to discuss MINURCAT extension
with the GOC, told Perm Five ambassadors here January 28 that
his initial conversations with his GOC counterparts indicated
that the GOC insisted on a framework of "MINURCAT withdrawal
in accordance with UNSC 1861" for their discussions and that
he was prepared to discuss "options for withdrawal" on that
basis. Cammaert said that he could envisage several
scenarios, all with more or less favorable consequences for
the GOC and the situation in eastern Chad, including security
there. Cammaert said that he would stress to the Chadians
the importance of a well-planned handover of MINURCAT's
responsibilities to the GOC in any withdrawal scenario.
Cammaert said that an "immediate withdrawal" would create the
most problems, but that he had not detected a desire for such
an immediate scenario from his initial discussions with GOC
interlocutors. Cammaert said some sort of "progressive
withdrawal" would be a preferable scenario, perhaps with
MINURCAT's civilian- and police-related functions becoming
more important than military ones as the withdrawal
proceeded.

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PERM FIVE VIEWS
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6. (C) The French and U.S. ambassadors offered Perm Five
perceptions of the current situation to Cammaert. They noted
that the question of MINURCAT extension was from the Chadian
side a presidential initiative, which limited the GOC side's
flexibility in any talks. They stressed that the GOC was
represented by Chadian military chiefs, who were increasingly
effective in defending the country's security from external
threat. They said that the GOC had legitimate grievances
regarding MINURCAT's performance which would have to be
weighed carefully against Chad's sovereign engagements under
UNSCR 1861. They cautioned against trying to defend
MINURCAT's shortcomings, and stressed the wisdom of
presenting MINURCAT's case positively with the GOC, that is,
underlining the benefits that an orderly and well-planned
withdrawal scenario would bring to the GOC.


7. (C) The French ambassador stressed his view that the GOC
was greatly underestimating the chances for a stable
relationship with Sudan, which was entering a period of
potentially huge internal instability to begin with. He also
underlined that the Chadian police component of MINURCAT, the
DIS, could cease to exist without MINURCAT's support.
Finally, he said that additional troop deployments should
cease after March 15, 2010, because that would be a GOC sine
qua non in any "withdrawal scenario."


8. (C) The positive side of the issue, the French ambassador
continued, was that the GOC wanted to avoid a disorganized
MINURCAT withdrawal and that the Chadian side understood the
technical challenges that even a well-planned and structured
withdrawal would present. The French ambassador said that
Cammaert's mission could be successful if it kept in mind the
broader political framework in which it conducted its
technical discussions. This meant exploiting the room that
the GOC had left for maneuver carefully by stressing the
benefits that would accrue to the GOC from a well-planned and
"progressive" withdrawal scenario with a timeline
sufficiently long to permit effective implementation of good
planning. It meant also to present the preferred option as a
"win/win" scenario in which the GOC would be "guaranteed"
that legitimate Chadian grievances were addressed.

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SRSG ANGELO
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9. (C) SRSG Angelo "summed up" the briefing by saying that
the issue for decision was no longer "the future of MINURCAT"
but "the withdrawal of MINURCAT," which required "the
drawdown of MINURCAT forces." For the UN and MINURCAT, the
important thing should now be "results," rather than "force

NDJAMENA 00000063 003 OF 004


figures," he continued. "Our numbers must start to come
down," Angelo announced, with his Force Commander at his
side, visibly unhappy at this prospect. The task now was to
manage the withdrawal scenario as effectively as possible,
with timing and consolidation key elements. "We are passing
the ball to the Chadians," Angelo said, and called special
attention to the CAR, which depended on MINURCAT for an
important element in its national security in NE CAR.

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SEEKING HUMANITARIAN VIEWS
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10. (C) The Cammaert Mission also met January 27 with agency
heads and deputies from the UN Country Team, followed
separately by members of the Interagency Steering Committee
(IASC),led by OCHA, with participation from humanitarian
NGOs and non-UN IOs, as well as invited donors, including
State/PRM. In the meeting with IASC, Cammaert declined to
brief on the current situation, asking instead for
humanitarians' views on "what will happen if MINURCAT
leaves." NGOs declined to be drawn into speculation, noting
only that the simple size of MINURCAT,s force meant its
absence would be felt, though they could not predict how.
MSF noted that it had been working along the Sudan border in
areas where MINURCAT did not operate, and so the PKO,s
presence or absence had not been relevant to the
organization's activities. The International Committee of
the Red Cross pointed out that its staff had been victims of
kidnappings despite MINURCAT,s deployment to Chad. NGOs
working in refugee and IDP camps within MINURCAT,s areas of
operation noted that a more reasonable understanding of
MINURCAT,s real capacities, faced with the threat of
entrenched criminality vice rebel incursion, had led them to
reassess their deployment in the field; some were planning to
reduce activities and staffs regardless of MINURCAT,s fate.

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FORMIN FAKI TO PARIS
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11. (C) We learned after the meeting that GOC FORMIN Faki
departed the morning of Jan 28 for Paris, where we expect
that the GOF will be pressing French concerns regarding
MINURCAT to him.

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MISSION OUTBRIEF
FEBRUARY 1
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12. (U) General Cammaert is scheduled to brief the Perm
Five, including the non-resident UK ambassador, on February
1, at the end of his mission.

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COMMENT
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13. (C) USG interests in Chad: Our interests would be
served by a well-planned and well-executed graduated
withdrawal over a timeline sufficient to consolidate
MINURCAT's goals regarding security of civilians in eastern
Chad, human rights, and judicial and penal reform. A
timeline of six to 12 months would be adequate, especially if
there were flexibility regarding the longer limit. The
future of the DIS is in doubt, partly because of its funding
from the Trust Fund rather than assessed contributions. If
there is a way that the DIS could be preserved in the context
of a negotiated MINURCAT withdrawal, at least until
MINURCAT's definitive departure, this would be desirable. A
mechanism for extending DIS's institutional life beyond that
limit would be even more useful.


14. (C) Success for Cammaert: The Cammaert Mission's best
chances for success here lie in finding a formula for
withdrawal that respects the goals of UNSC 1861 and provides
for the most orderly handing over of MINURCAT

NDJAMENA 00000063 004 OF 004


responsibilities to the Chadian Government. If Cammaert can
convince the GOC that the UN is acting in good faith to make
the transition to a MINURCAT-less Chad a positive outcome for
the UNSC and the GOC, the timeline established for that
transition could be long enough to ensure that MINURCAT's
goals under UNSCR 1861 have been advanced as far as the
situation in eastern Chad permits.


15. (C) Humanitarian Assistance Equities: We do not agree
completely with the GOF view (Ref A) "significant numbers of
NGOs and their personnel might consider leaving Chad if
MINURCAT disappeared." NGOs in Chad appear to us to be
indicating that, while reductions in activities and personnel
may be in order, it is not MINURCAT,s departure that is
driving the calculation, but rather the inability or
unwillingness of any security force, foreign or Chadian, to
confront the primary threats they face, namely, armed
robbery, armed carjacking, kidnapping, and other deadly
threats. END COMMENT.


16. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO