CHAD, MINURCAT EXTENSION, AND THE LOGIC OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000049 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY CD SUBJECT: CHAD, MINURCAT EXTENSION, AND THE LOGIC OF GEO-POLITICS REF: A. NDJAMENA 43 ¶B. NDJAMENA 35 ¶C. NDJAMENA 30 ¶D. NDJAMENA 29 ¶E. NDJAMENA 28 Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). -------------- SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) As the GOC nd the UN continue to negotiate seriously over te issue of the extension of MINURCAT's mandate (se Ref A),our analysis of the GOC's motivations leds us to cnclude that the GOC is attempting to chieve interlocking geo-political and domestic-plitical goals, as well as wringing concrete concssions from MINURCAT on bred-and-butter PKO-presence issues. President Deby and the GOC address five main goals in calling the future of MINURCAT in Chad into question, but the GOC's and Deby's overriding geo-political goal of ensuring a durable peace with Sudan predominates. It is impossible to overestimate the importance to Deby and his regime of the possibility that this peace deal will hold, at least into the middle-term, say 24 months or so. (Which is not the same as saying that Deby is completely convinced that it will hold.) The promise of a reasonably durable peace with Sudan via the Jan 15 accords, and the end of the proxy war that posed a constant and existential threat to the GOC, must be the highest of Deby's political and personal priorities, and worth making concessions such as we believe he did to Khartoum on MINURCAT. Zaghawa solidarity, especially among his military chiefs, must be assured absolutely in case he has to face down JEM or Chadian Zaghawa JEM-lovers, as a result of the Chad-Sudan peace deal, so concessions to them at MINURCAT's expense are tightly linked to the larger geopolitical imperative. ¶2. (C) According to our analysis, none of the GOC's and Deby's key geopolitical and domestic goals requires that Chad "break with" the UN by demanding an early withdrawal of MINURCAT from Chad, although that could conceivably be one of the possible results of the current negotiations. We think that all of Chad's and Deby's goals could be satisfied by a negotiated compromise with the UN that permits MINURCAT to continue to operate on the ground in pursuit of its mandated objectives until March 2011. Despite the GOC's professed grievances and the importance of its geo-political and intra-Zaghawa goals, MINURCAT's presence confers valuable benefits on Chad's overall security and in terms of the stability of its troubled eastern regions. Much will depend on the UN's ability approach to these negotiations skillfully so as to convince the Chadians that their balance sheet with MINURCAT has more pluses than minuses. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. -------------- CHAD-SUDAN -------------- ¶3. (C) The GOC position on MINURCAT extension is in part a GOC concession to Sudan: The GOC took a hard line against MINURCAT partly as quid pro quo to Sudan as (an undeclared) element in the recently concluded bilateral peace deal through agreements signed Jan 15 to normalize fully Chad-Sudan relations by ending their internecine proxy war (See Ref B-E). We do not know if the Jan 15 accords will hold and we doubt that Pres Deby and his closest advisors are 100 percent convinced that they will do so. But it is impossible to overestimate the importance to Deby and his regime of the possibility that this peace deal will hold, at least into the middle-term, say 24 months or so. In many ways the past five years of Deby's rule have been a geo-political nightmare, with active and well-resourced Sudanese clients persistently and violently seeking to overthrow him and (if possible) kill him. These clients got NDJAMENA 00000049 002 OF 003 within 500 yards or so of doing just in February 2008. A durable peace with Sudan, and the end of the proxy war that posed a constant and existential threat to the GOC, must be the highest of Deby's political and personal priorities, and worth making concessions such as we believe he did to Khartoum on MINURCAT. -------------- THE ZAGHAWA NATION -------------- ¶4. (C) The GOC position on MINURCAT extension is in part a Deby concession to the Zaghawa notables of his own ruling circle, especially his military chiefs, as a reward for their defense of the country in 2008-2009 and to assure their loyalty in the ethnically messy business of breaking and expelling the Zaghawa JEM from Chad (as part of the Chad-Sudan peace deal). (Remember that, when Deby when tried to use his military against JEM in 2005, his Zaghawa war chiefs balked at taking effective action against their Zaghawa "ethnic brothers." Remember, too, that Chad's proud Zaghawa-dominated military is jealous of its ability to protect Chad's sovereign territory, which MINURCAT's presence calls into question.) Zaghawa solidarity, especially among his military chiefs, must be assured absolutely in case he has to face down JEM or Chadian Zaghawa JEM-lovers, as a result of the Chad-Sudan peace deal, so concessions to them at MINURCAT's expense are tightly linked to the larger geopolitical imperative. -------------- A NOD TO THE GUIDE -------------- ¶5. (C) The GOC position on MINURCAT extension is in part a Deby nod to the Guide, by addressing Libyan sensibilities regarding non-African forces in the sub-regional neighborhood. (This is not to say that the Libyans made this a major issue, but that Deby found this a useful way to reassure the Guide regarding Chad's "African" bona fides.) -------------- DOMESTIC POLITICS -------------- ¶6. (C) The GOC position on MINURCAT extension is in part a Deby/GOC appeal to domestic political constituencies in an election year, by demonstrating Chad's sovereign vigilance and ability to defend Chadian national interests and integrity effectively, and by reassuring Chadians that the current situation in eastern Chad -- the presence of refugees from Sudan and Chad's own IDPs which requires UN "tutelage" of Chadian territory -- is not "eternal." It reminds Chadians that the end-state is the return of refugees and IDPs to their homes and the restoration of "normality" in eastern Chad. -------------- NUTS AND BOLTS -------------- ¶7. (C) The GOC position on MINURCAT extension is in part an attempt to take advantage of MINURCAT's manifest operational and organizational deficiencies to wring concrete concessions from the PKO -- including getting troop strength to mandated levels; more attention and resources to the Chadian police component of MINURCAT (the DIS); more attention to GOC demands for infrastructure transfers (airports, police stations, etc.),and more demonstrable respective for Chadian sovereignty. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) According to our analysis, none of the GOC's and Deby's goals we discern requires that Chad "break with" the UN by demanding an early withdrawal of MINURCAT from Chad, although that could conceivably be one of the possible NDJAMENA 00000049 003 OF 003 results of the current negotiations. We think that all of Chad's and Deby's goals could be satisfied by a negotiated compromise with the UN that permits MINURCAT to continue to operate on the ground in pursuit of its mandated objectives until March 2011. Despite the GOC's professed grievances and the importance of its geo-political and intra-Zaghawa goals, MINURCAT's presence confers valuable benefits on Chad's overall security and in terms of the stability of its troubled eastern regions. Much will depend on the UN's ability approach to these negotiations skillfully so as to convince the Chadians that their balance sheet with MINURCAT has more pluses than minuses. END COMMENT. ¶9. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO