CHADIAN POLITICAL THEATER: SOUTHERN REBEL CHIEF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000031 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF MARR CA SU CD SUBJECT: CHADIAN POLITICAL THEATER: SOUTHERN REBEL CHIEF CAPTURED AS DEBY IS FETED IN SOUTHERN CAPITAL REF: A. NDJAMENA 004 ¶B. 09 NDJAMENA 602 ¶C. 09 NDJAMENA 503 -------------- SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The GOC's capture of rebel commander Djibrine Dassert and his top staff in Southern Chad January 4 was a big plus for President Deby's government, and provided an occasion for a bit of Chadian-style political theater. The Chad military's successful ambush of Dassert, who took part in Deby's military triumph over Habre's regime in 1990 and was later Deby's Defense Minister before attempting a military of overthrow Deby in 2005, serves many of Deby's purposes in this election year. Dassert's capture: -- burnishes the Chadian armed forces' (and Deby's own) credentials as protector of national security; -- decapitates the only major non-Sudan-based armed opposition group; -- eliminates the only politically-motivated armed rebellion based on Chadian soil; -- demonstrates the unwisdom of rejecting the GOC's efforts toward peaceful "national reconciliation"; -- shows Southern Chadians that the GOC is actively involved in their security; and, -- improves prospects for stability along the Chad-CAR border by eliminating a rogue armed group. ¶2. (SBU) Dassert was part of a web of southern oppositionists, some armed, some not, some in Chad, some in exile. An unarmed associate of Dassert, Dr. Nahor Mahamout Ngawara, long in exile in Paris, was wooed by Deby last fall and returned to Chad in December. The political symbolism of Dassert's capture was unmistakable: on January 2, Nahor sat on the dais with the President in the southern city of Sarh when Deby celebrated the 20th anniversary of his rule; two days later, Dassert was ambushed and captured by ANT troops near Sahr. Coincidence? Hardly. ¶3. (SBU) The GOC's decision to go very public regarding the status of Dassert and his cronies is smart politically and also provides some protection for Dassert and his men, because there is transparency on their physical and political conditions. How the GOC handles this case from now on will test the government's commitment to human rights and the rule of law, as well as give us an idea of just how politically sophisticated the GOC will be in managing a "national reconciliation" problem of a different sort from the negotiated and peaceful reentry to Chad of, say, Soubiane and Goukouni -- or Nahor himself. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. ¶4. (SBU) Following the failure of his coup attempt in 2005, Dassert retreated to his power base in the Guera, Moyen Chari and Chari Baguirmi regions of southwestern and southern Chad, where Deby's support has traditionally been weak. He was captured in Korbol, located very near Sahr, immediately following Deby's January 2 visit to Sahr. Deby chose that southern city to deliver his New Year's address as part of an effort to cultivate southern voters long suspicious of him and of the ability of his northern Zaghawa ethnic group to govern all of Chad impartially. ¶5. (SBU) Deby was accompanied on his early-January visit to Sahr by returned-exile Nahor, who decided to come back to Chad after having met with Deby in Paris in October. Some here have asserted that Nahor provided information that led to Dassert's capture -- Nahor has said that soldiers directly loyal to his movement are still being encouraged to surrender from inaccessible locations along the CAR border, where Dassert's troops have also been operating. ¶6. (SBU) Nahor has been quite visible since his return from France, engaging in interviews in which he describes his NDJAMENA 00000031 002 OF 002 rational for abandoning an opposition stance. Nahor has said that he does not see President Deby, with whom he continues to have political differences, as the root of Chad's many problems. He has made clear that he believes Deby's overtures to rebels and opposition figures, and willingness to have opposition party members play prominent roles in his government, are sincere. He has said that he appreciates the efforts of the National Mediator to guarantee the rights of returning rebels. Like former rebel leader Ahmat Soubiane, Nahor insists that he does not intend to take an active part in political life in the near term, other than to serve as a link between the GoC and disaffected groups in Chad, France and elsewhere. ¶7. (SBU) As for Dassert, the GoC is treating his capture as a major victory, having paraded both him and a stockpile of weapons captured with him before foreign military observers in recent days. Dassert's removal will lead to increased stability along the CAR border, as his troops stand accused of having staged raiding parties into CAR this past fall. Dassert's treatment in custody will be a test for the GoC's ability to adhere to human rights standards and rule of law, and also for Deby's skill at finessing relations with the Chadian South. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Chad military's capture of Dassert was a big plus for the government, serving many useful political purposes for Deby and company in this election year, including: burnishing the armed forces' (and Deby's own) credentials as protector of the national security; decapitating the only major non-Sudan-based armed opposition group; practically eliminated the only politically-motivated armed rebellion from Chad soil; demonstrating the unwisdom of rejecting the GOC's efforts toward peaceful "national reconciliation; showing Southern Chadians that the GOC is actively involved in their security; and improving the chances for stability along the Chad-CAR border by eliminating one more rogue armed group. ¶9. (SBU) Dassert's fall also provided the occasion for a bit of political theater, Chadian-style. Dassert was part of a loose web of southern oppositionists, some armed, some not, some in Chad, some abroad. Unarmed associate Nahor Mahamout Ngawara, long in exile in Paris, was wooed by Deby last fall and returned to Chad in December. The symbolism in this was unmistakable: Nahor was on the dais in Sarh when Deby celebrated the 20th anniversary of his rule on January 2; two days later Dassert was ambushed and captured by ANT troops near Sahr. ¶10. (SBU) The GOC's decision to go very public regarding the status of Dassert and his cronies was politically astute and also provides some protection for Dassert and his men, because there is transparency on their physical and political conditions. How the GOC handles this case from now on will test the government's commitment to human rights and rule of law, as well as give us an idea of just how politically sophisticated and supple the GOC will be in managing a "national reconciliation" problem of a different sort from the negotiated and peaceful reentry to Chad of, say, Soubiane or Goukouni -- or Nahor END COMMENT. ¶X. (SBU) Minimize considered. NIGRO