FORMIN ON CHAD-SUDAN XMAS DIPLOMACY: KHARTOUM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000003 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PRELGOV PGOV MARR PHUM PREF SU CD SUBJECT: FORMIN ON CHAD-SUDAN XMAS DIPLOMACY: KHARTOUM TALKS PRODUCTIVE, BUT MORE TOUGH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE REF: A. KHARTOUM 003 ¶B. NDJAMENA 621 -------------- SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (SBU) FORMIN Faki told Ambassador Dec 31 that he considered his "Xmas Visit" to Khartoum last week a success; that he was encouraged by the frankness and seriousness of conversations he had with President Bashir, Dr Ghazi, and others; and that he was satisfied that the GOS had indeed moved most but not all Chad rebels far from the border. Faki said that "we have broken a psychological barrier by speaking so frankly to one another." But the GOC was still not fully convinced that the GOS was committed to matching the GOC commitment to a definitive end to the proxy war and that the GOS must make clear to the Chad rebels still in Sudan that they must soon renounce armed action against the GOC and prepare for a different, peaceful future. For its part, Faki affirmed, JEM was getting a clear GOC message at all levels: "Make peace in Darfur -- or get out of Chad." Faki made two other points with more much more emphasis than usual: Deep GOC appreciation for USG diplomatic and political support throughout the bilateral detente process; and linked to this strong USG support, what he described as his own personal commitment to do everything he could to make the bilateral detente process succeed and result in a peaceful, "normal," and durable Chad-Sudan relationship, reflecting the GOC's awareness of the necessity of peace between Chad and Sudan and a definitive end to the "proxy war" as preconditions to achieving peace in Darfur. ¶2. (SBU) Faki's take on the latest Khartoum talks tracks closely with Chad Ambassador Bechir's (Ref B) view, as well apparently with Dr Ghazi's (Ref A). But Faki was much more explicit regarding the GOC's readiness to break definitively with JEM than he has been previously, although he still conditions it with something like absolute surety that the Sudanese will have broken equally definitively with the Chad rebels. Faki's meeting with President Bashir, on which the Chadians insisted as a condition of the visit, seems to have been in itself a confidence building measure of major significance. We support Faki's idea that the GOS should send Dr Ghazi to NDjamena this month along with its technical delegation, to continue the "political conversation" even as the technical implementation of the protocol is discussed. We should urge the GOS to do so, and we should tell the GOC that we have done so. President Deby's highlighting of the GOC's peace efforts both with the GOS and Chad rebels in his Dec 30 "Liberation Day" speech (Septel) are welcome confirmation that the GOC is at least as serious as the GOS in reaching a peaceful solution to their differences. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. -------------- FAKI'S "XMAS VISIT" TO KHARTOUM -------------- ¶3. (SBU) FORMIN Moussa Faki Mahamat told Ambassador Dec 31 that he considered his "Xmas Visit" to Khartoum Dec 24-25 a success and that he was encouraged by the frankness and seriousness of conversations he had with President Bashir, Dr Ghazi, the DEFMIN, and INTEL Chief Atta. Faki said that "we have broken a psychological barrier by speaking so frankly to one another." Faki said that Ghazi had asked for the agreed-on sequence on CBMs to be changed: Instead of a Sudanese delegation to Chad next, would Faki come to Khartoum? Faki said the GOC was quite willing to accommodate Ghazi in this. Faki said that the visit has definitely moved the bilateral process forward and that the Chadians were satisfied that the GOS had fulfilled its pledge to move Chad rebels far (c. 400KMs) from the border, but that there were still issues to be worked out. Principal among these was the willingness of the GOS to match GOC commitment to a NDJAMENA 00000003 002 OF 003 definitive end to the proxy war. This meant, according to Faki, that the GOS must make clear to the Chad rebels still in Sudan that they must eventually renounce the goal of armed overthrow of the GOC and prepare for a different, peaceful future, either back in Chad or elsewhere. -------------- PRESIDENT BASHIR -------------- ¶4. (SBU Faki said that his dialogue with Pres Bashir was completely frank and open: Bashir reviewed the history of the Chad-Sudan relationship, with its ups and downs, blamed Darfur for the downs, said that Sudan was ready for a change of course; and reaffirmed his approval of the Faki-Ghazi bilateral track and its agreements. But all actions must be reciprocal, Bashir emphasized. Faki said he rejected the "absolute parallelism" of the Chad-Sudan proxy war. Chad was suffering unfairly for what Khartoum had done in Darfur: refugees, war, rebellion, instability. All Chad rebels were in Sudan and all were Sudan's clients and "creatures," having been "created" by the GOS . Faki argued that JEM was "tolerated" by the GOC, not created and maintained by NDjamena. The GOC permitted only a few JEM leaders to stay for long in Chad; the rest of JEM could only come for short visits. Faki said that the Sudanese contested all his arguments, but still showed what he interpreted as a serious interest in resolving bilateral problems in a bilateral way. Faki said that this might be because the GOS was playing for time, or because it wanted an authentic and durable peaceful settlement, or perhaps both, as the GOS had internal divisions with different agendas. Faki said he believed that Ghazi was sincere, but that the DEFMIN and Atta were perhaps less so. -------------- THE GOC AND JEM -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Faki claimed that the GOC had been distancing itself from JEM for some time and had told JEM that they had "no future" as an armed group in Chad and that they should be pursuing peaceful paths to peace in Darfur. The JEM, Faki intimated, understood that GOC tolerance of them as an armed group in Chad was not eternal and that the GOC was itself prepared to break definitively with JEM as soon as it could be sure of reciprocal action by Sudan. Faki said that JEM was getting a clear GOC message at all levels: "Make peace in Darfur or get out of Chad." Faki said that Chadian intelligence was aware of what the GOS was telling its Chad rebel clients, and that the GOS had not yet been so clear with them. This would be the "sticking point" for the GOC, Faki suggested. -------------- GHAZI SHOULD COME TO NDJAMENA JAN 7 -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The next step, Faki said, was a Sudanese technical delegation of military and intelligence officers to Chad to discuss concrete implementation of the 2006 bilateral protocol, which called for border monitoring posts and "mixed border surveillance units," composed of Chad and Sudan military personnel. Faki said that he had suggested to Dr Ghazi that Ghazi accompany the technical delegation so that the Faki-Ghazi "political conversation" could be continued. "We must keep talking," Faki said. Ambassador said that the USG supported this idea, to maintain the momentum generated by the Khartoum talks. -------------- STAYING BILATERAL -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Faki said that he had always believed that a bilateral track would be more realistic and more successful NDJAMENA 00000003 003 OF 003 than any multilateral track, given the deep history and close relation between Chad and Sudan. As such, the GOC was not interested in seeking multilateral assistance or support from "international organizations" for the implementation of the 2006 bilateral protocol, although the GOC was always appreciative of diplomatic and political support for its peace efforts. The GOC and the GOS could at some point consider asking bilateral partners to play a role in "witnessing" future agreements, but this was not certain. -------------- FAKI AND THE USG -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Faki made two points with more much emphasis than usual. First, he emphasized that the GOC was deeply appreciative of USG diplomatic and political support throughout the bilateral detente process, begun last summer between himself and Dr Ghazi. Faki said the GOC was grateful for public, visible USG support, such as the Dec 29 USG press statement, as well as for more private USG actions in support of the process, such as SE Gration's efforts and others to make clear USG goals and expectations for the sub-region. Second, he linked this USG support to what he described as his own personal commitment to do everything he could to make the bilateral detente process succeed and result in a peaceful, "normal," and durable Chad-Sudan relationship. The GOC, he said, was fully aware of the necessity of peace between Chad and Sudan and a definitive end to the "proxy war" as preconditions to achieving peace in Darfur. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Faki's take on the latest Khartoum talks tracks closely with Chad Ambassador Bechir's (Ref B) view, as well apparently with Dr Ghazi's (Ref A). But Faki was much more explicit regarding the GOC's readiness to break definitively with JEM than he has been previously, although he still conditions it with something like absolute surety that the Sudanese will have broken equally definitively with the Chad rebels. Faki's meeting with President Bashir, on which the Chadians insisted as a condition of the visit, seems to have been in itself a confidence building measure of major significance. We support Faki's idea that he GOS should send Dr Ghazi to NDjamena this month along with its technical delegation, to continue the "political conversation" even as the technical implementation of the protocol is discussed. We should urge the GOS to do so, and we should tell the GOC that we have done so. President Deby's highlighting of the GOC's peace efforts both with the GOS and Chad rebels in his Dec 30 "Liberation Day" (Septel) are welcome confirmation that the GOC is at least as serious as the GOS in reaching a peaceful solution to their differences. ¶10. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO