RUSHING TO RAPPROCHEMENT: BASSOLE SAYS CHAD-SUDAN

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000028 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF MARR SU LY CD SUBJECT: RUSHING TO RAPPROCHEMENT: BASSOLE SAYS CHAD-SUDAN PEACE IMMINENT, GOS-JEM DARFUR DEAL NEXT UP REF: A. NDJAMENA 021 ¶B. NDJAMENA 011 ¶C. NDJAMENA 004 ¶D. NDJAMENA 003 ¶1. (SBU) Visiting Chief Joint Mediator Bassole told me late Jan 14 that he was deeply involved in the final stages of negotiations between the GOC and the GOS for a definitive peace deal -- the denouement could be written agreements signed as early as this weekend -- and that he was at the same time trying to "integrate" the Chad-Sudan rapprochement with a GOS-JEM deal that could pave the way for real progress on Darfur at Doha. ¶2. (SBU) The CJM said he had been working for several days closely with Chad Pres Deby and his FORMIN, with Sudan lead negotiator Dr Ghazi, and with JEM's Khalil Ibrahim to facilitate implementation of both pieces of his diplomatic action plan. Bassole said he wanted to "informally but effectively" expand his role as mediator for Sudan to mediator for Chad and Sudan, based on the looming rapprochement between the two countries, and on the upcoming isolation of JEM. He said that he would leave one of his team in Chad, loosely attached to MINURCAT, to give him continued contact with Deby and the GOS, and another team member here to give him similar continuous contact with JEM. ¶3. (SBU) The CJM praised Deby's role in particular in the current negotiations, calling him a "good and trustworthy interlocutor." Bassole said that Deby had assured him that the GOC had given the JEM a firm deadline -- an "official notification" -- of Jan 21 to leave Chad. Bassole said he wanted to give JEM a "way out of its upcoming isolation" by facilitating a GOS-JEM deal. The CJM said that on the GOS-JEM piece he was aiming at a tete-a-tete between Ghazi and Khalil to reach at least preliminary agreement on "the conditions for a cease fire;" on JEM participation in Sudan elections; and on the "Status of Darfur" issue. ¶4. (SBU) If he were to achieve a "private" JEM-GOS deal -- he kept using the English word, "deal" in this regard -- in advance of the next Doha sessions, that could set the stage for "constructive" JEM participation at Doha by giving JEM confidence that it was the GOS's privileged negotiating partner, even though it would not be the only Darfur actor at the table or tables in Doha. The key "private" agreement between JEM and the GOS would be on a cease fire, at least "the conditions for a cease fire to be agreed at Doha." ¶5. (SBU) With an eventual cease fire, concrete progress could be made, especially on a UN-run DDR program. Bassole stressed he was trying to build GOS-JEM mutual trust by facilitating their agreement on "the big issues" so that JEM could go to Doha and feel confident that its interests were protected even as it participated -- apparently as one of many Darfur actors -- in discussion of the "little issues" there. ¶6. (U) Minimize considered. NIGRO