END OF THE AFFAIR? DEBY AND KHALIL GO THEIR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000109 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY CD SUBJECT: END OF THE AFFAIR? DEBY AND KHALIL GO THEIR SEPARATE WAYS REF: A. KHARTOUM 282 ¶B. NDJAMENA 102 -------------- SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Working overnight February 19 and into the afternoon February 20, Chadian President Deby brokered an agreement between his erstwhile JEM client, Khalil Ibrahim, and Sudan Presidential Envoy Ghazi Salahhudin, potentially ending fighting between the JEM and GoS. Deby is now en route for Doha, where he hopes to meet with President Bashir February 23 and where the JEM-GoS agreement is set to be signed that same day. In addition to encouraging peace between the GoS and one of the main rebel movements in Darfur, the February 20 agreement represents a diplomatic coup for Chad and apparently completes the long and complicated process of Chadian disengagementwith the JEM, begun last summer. The seeming "en of the affair" between Deby and Khalil helps tosatisfy one of our own strategic objectives in Cad, hat of encouraging normalization between Chd and Sudan and cessation of the five-year proxy wr involving respective rebel movements. Deby is ow en route for Doha (via Riyadh, where we understand he plans to see ailing Nigerian President Yar Adua) with FM Faki and other members of his foreign policy team. Text of press communique on the weekend JEM-GoS agreement is at para 3 below. ¶2. (SBU) The Chadian government has accomplished a kind of high-stakes diplomatic trifecta over the past two years. Since rebel attacks on N'Djamena in February 2008, the GoC has ended its diplomatic isolation by exploiting multilateral opportunities offered by the UN, AU and third parties including Libya and Qatar, and more recently bilateral opportunities afforded by Khartoum's changed priorities. At the same time, the GoC has attracted rebel chiefs (e.g., Al Jineidi and Soubiane),the rebel rank and file (several thousand),and regime opponents in exile (e.g., Goukouni Oueddei) back to Chad, enhancing Deby's claims on statesman status. The Deby-brokered JEM-GoS deal is not only an aditional step forward for Chad-Sudan relations but also a successful attempt at intra-Zaghawa diplomacy involving a politically sensitive "divorce" from the JEM, which may yet put Deby at risk from his own Zaghawa brethren (but which scores one for national over ethnic identity). Meanwhile, the February 21 deadline for remaining rebel movements on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border either to return home or to accept refugee status abroad has passed with no local word on the circumstances of remaining Chad rebels in Sudan (e.g., Timan Erdimi's troops),and with the SLA/AW still evidently not ready to settle (Ref A). END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. -------------- TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL PRESS COMMUNIQUE -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Begin informal Embassy translation: Presidency of the Republic Press Communique At the commendable initiative of His Excellency, President Idriss Deby Itno, President of the Republic of Chad, and with his assistance, consultations took place between a delegation of the Government of Sudan headed by Doctor Ghazi Salahhudin Atabani, special adviser to President Oumar Hassan Ahmat Al Bashir and a delegation from the Movement for Justice and Equality (JEM) headed by Doctor Khalil Ibrahim. These consultations occurred on the basis of efforts to broker peace in Sudan undertaken in Doha, Emirate of Qatar. The two parties achieved significant results including agreement on an immediate cease-fire and the start of negotiating efforts to put it into effect on the ground. NDJAMENA 00000109 002 OF 003 The two parties agreed on the necessity of the immediate participation of the JEM in Doha negotiations, with the aiming of a definitive peace agreement to be based on a final accord that will be signed before March 15, 2010. They also expressed their willingness to pursue efforts and consultations in the aim of bringing about definitive peace in Darfur, integrating all political forces support and offering hope and aspirations for all of the people of Darfur and Sudan. N'Djamena, February 20, 2010 End translation. -------------- THREE PATHS REACHING GOALS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Over a protracted period, the Deby regime has taken part in various international and bilateral processes aimed at regional stabilization, normalization of relations with Sudan, return of respective rebels, and integration of opponents into political processes here. As part of efforts with the Government of Sudan, Chad hosted a Contact Group meeting under the Dakar Accord process in November 2008. Since that time, it has taken part in other international mediation efforts sponsored by the UN, AU, Libya, Qatar and U.S., under S/USSES Gration. The GoC has been in close direct contact with the GoS since this fall, when FM Faki and Sudan Presidential Adviser Ghazi met on the margins of the UNGA in New York. Deby himself went to Khartoum two weeks ago, in breakthrough meetings reported to SE Gration (Ref B). ¶5. (SBU) At the same time, Chad's National Mediator has helped to woo some Chad rebels home, in keeping with the terms of the Sirte Accords of 2007. The GoC has given many former rebels amnesty and incorporated political opponents into the government of Prime Minister Youssef Saleh Abbas, himself a former member of the politico-military opposition. The GoC remains acutely nervous that Chad rebels still in Sudan will prove more than the GoS can handle. ¶6. (SBU) Deby began disengaging with the JEM, his fellow Zaghawas and erstwhile clients, last year, having told S/E Gration in the summer that he had advised Khalil Ibrahim to abandon armed struggle and seek a political settlement with Khartoum. Via a series of increasingly firm interventions, culminating in a multiple-ministerial "ultimatum" to the JEM seven weeks ago, the Deby regime has made clear that it has chosen good relations with a neighboring state over a relationship of convenience with Sudanese nationals who share ethnic affiliation with Deby's own group (and who helped Deby in his armed struggle against Habre). The dangers to Deby of breaking with the JEM, should the mercurial Khalil go back on his word, include the possibility of armed conflict between the Chadian Army and JEM on Chadian soil, as well as the possibility that Zaghawa notables will seek to unseat Deby himself in response to his having "abandoned" key clan brothers. ¶7. (SBU) As reported in Ref B, Deby son-in-law and Ambassador to the U.S. Adoum Bechir was sent to the former JEM redout in Eastern Chad at Am Jarras last week to meet Khalil -- said to be traveling from Sudan -- and persuade him to come to N'Djamena for talks with GoS Presidential Advisor Ghazi. Bechir succeeded February 19, with meetings here running overnight and well into the next day before agreement was reached. GoC officials who remain in N'Djamena advised us February 22 that Deby has now left for Doha, via Riyadh, where he apparently plans to see ailing Nigerian President Yar Adua. Deby plans to be in Doha February 23 for the signing of a GoS-JEM cease-fire agreement and to meet with Sudanese President Bashir. -------------- COMMENT NDJAMENA 00000109 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Chadian government has accomplished a kind of high-stakes diplomatic trifecta over the past two years. The GoC has ended its diplomatic isolation by exploiting multilateral opportunities offered by the UN, AU and third parties including Libya and Qatar, and more recently bilateral opportunities afforded by Khartoum's changed priorities. At the same time, the GoC has attracted rebel chiefs (e.g., Al Jineidi and Soubiane),the rebel rank and file (several thousand),and regime opponents in exile (e.g., Goukouni Oueddei) back to Chad, enhancing Deby's claims on statesman status. As a third negotiating string, the Deby-brokered JEM-GoS deal represents a potentially successful attempt at intra-Zaghawa diplomacy, so long as the JEM itself and Deby's Zaghawa brethren remain accepting. Deby's breaking with the JEM is of course a score for nationhood over tribal identity. ¶9. (SBU) Additional challenges to what we essentially see as a series of good-faith efforts on both Chad's and Sudan's parts in recent months to achieve stabilization in Darfur and Eastern Chad include the status of the as-yet unrepentant Chadian rebellion in Sudan, including troops under Timan Erdimi, and the apparent unwillingness to be part of Doha of the SLA/AW. Handling these players will require more work in the coming days and weeks. ¶10. (U) Minimize considered. BREMNER