LEAHY VETTING REVERSAL AGAIN PUTS USG HUMAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000106 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF WYCOFF AND CARSON STATE FOR AF/C LOPEZ STATE FOR S/USSES GRATION STATE FOR DS/IP/AF MEEHAN AND ANDREWS STATE FOR DS/T/ATA STATE FOR DRL KRAMER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ASEC CD SUBJECT: LEAHY VETTING REVERSAL AGAIN PUTS USG HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS AT RISK REF: A. 09 N'DJAMENA 390 ¶B. 09 N'DJAMENA 433 AND PREVIOUS ¶C. N'DJAMENA 42 ¶D. 09 STATE 52763 ¶E. TD-314/023224-08 Classified By: Charge d'affaires Sue Bremner, for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (C) In September 2009, via Ref A, Ambassador Nigro sought the AF Bureau's assistance in resolving intra-Departmental disputes over sectoral issues, including management of the Leahy vetting process, that were hindering progress toward broad U.S. goals in Chad: regional stabilization, countering violent extremism, and most important in the context to which the Ambassador referred at the time, encouraging improved governance through targeted police and military training in human rights standards and rule of law. Following a period during which, on instruction, we asked the Chadian National Army to make repeated changes to placement in the military chain of command of a unit set up at USG behest to receive our training, we were elated that our many descriptions (Ref B and previous) of why training furthered U.S. goals, did not run counter to Leahy provisions, and should thus be permitted to take place without further ado seemed to be accepted by the Department as a whole. ¶2. (C) We have very much looked forward to resumption not only of mil-to-mil training for Chadian army officers, but also to police training through the ATA program. DS has planned five courses in the first six months of this year for selected Chadian law enforcement personnel, focused on rule of law, evidentiary law, forensic analysis, and instructor development. In preparing for the training courses, we have coordinated closely with French Embassy colleagues, as they also sponsor rule of law training programs for Chadian police and gendarmes, and as we and they want our respective efforts to be mutually reinforcing. ¶3. (C) On January 25, we sent in Ref C, with the names and reporting chains of a group of law enforcement officers whom we proposed training in evidentiary law, making clear that no derogatory information on any of them could be found locally. Many of the names were proposed to us by the French Embassy. On February 17, we received e-mail clearance from the Department to proceed with the training course. DS trainers arrived in N'Djamena February 18, along with seven pallets of training equipment. The instructors are set to begin the training course in evidentiary law on February 22, following an opening ceremony involving ranking national police officials and gendarmes. ¶4. (C) We were surprised that after COB on February 19, the last working day before the training course is scheduled to begin, we received a series of e-mails from the Department essentially rescinding DRL's earlier clearance on the e-instruction to us to go ahead with the course. DRL asserted that some of the individuals belonged to "units" on which "credible evidence of gross human rights abuses" existed. Apart from the procedural problems that the Department's latest e-instruction poses not only for Embassy personnel but also for approved TDY visitors from the Department, we do not believe that information presented by DRL constitutes evidence of gross human rights violations on the part of the units of those of our prospective trainees that are in question. ¶5. (C) DRL's stated concerns seem to center on some of the 18 individuals in various police units reporting to the Chadian Interior Ministry, not on the six gendarmes who are also slated to take part in the February 22 training group. The gendarmerie reports to the Ministry of Defense; we believe that our previous descriptions of chains of command there should be sufficient to render moot any notion that Ministry of Defense personnel are a priori unsuitable for USG training by virtue of Leahy provisions. The 18 individuals reporting through various chains of command to the Ministry of Interior consist of four immigration/border control agents with responsibilities for people-trafficking; three under-cover police inspectors who gather evidence and present it to uniformed police for law enforcement action; four forensic scientists working for the uniformed police; two drug enforcement agents; two members of Chad's "judiciary police," equivalent to French "huissiers," whose duties are explained in more detail below; and three uniformed police (equivalent to "beat cops" in U.S. parlance). All 18 of these individuals and their chains of command have as their broad mandate enforcing Chad's Civil and Penal Codes, French colonial-era documents whose laws closely resemble those of France. None are charged with managing the Chadian armed rebellion or individuals considered sympathetic to it -- these tasks fall to the DGSSIE, ANS and Chadian National Army. ¶6. (C) Ref D, from May 2009, states that "Past vetting has revealed credible allegations against, for example, the Police Intelligence and Immigration Police." We assume that this statement makes reference to Chad's under-cover police and to its border control agents. As specific evidence of wrongdoing on the part of the under-cover police, DRL's e-mail offers Ref E, although our reading of that item suggests that the entities accused of human rights violations were in fact the DGSSIE and ANS, "intelligence" bodies properly defined, not connected with the Chadian police, and as noted above generally charged with managing Chadian rebels and those associated with them -- who are, as pointed out in our Human Rights Report, sometimes subjected to extrajudicial detention and ill treatment. ¶7. (C) DRL's e-mail refers to claims by local human rights groups, which we have included in our Human Rights Report, that secret detention facilities exist under the control of "immigration police." The Koro Toro facility, said to be managed by highly-placed individuals in the Ministry of Interior but not/not under control of Chad's immigration/border control service, is indeed a blot on Chad's human rights record, and one that the Chadian media and even its Justice Ministry are trying to close. Detainees at the facility generally consist of those suspected of having ties to armed opposition groups and rebel military forces outside Chad. These individuals are usually the charges of the DGSSIE and ANS, although under-cover police sometimes gather information on them and provide it to others, and "judicial police" sometimes serve them with papers. Post knows of no evidence that Chad's immigration/border control agents, as distinct from the DGSSIE, ANS, and elements of the ANT patrolling near the border with Sudan looking for armed rebels, are responsible for managing secret detention facilities. ¶8. (C) As for the judiciary police, this force's mandate resembles that of "huissiers" in the French system and bailiffs in the British one. Judicial police study evidence gathered by other forces, make sure that it meets standards of law, serve papers to those suspected of crimes, and sometimes question suspects in connection with specific pieces of evidence. By law, they may only detain individuals for three days -- so it is likely that even if they collaborate with groups known to violate suspects'/prisoners' rights, they are not primary actors in this regard. DRL has included in our Human Rights Report a claim by a local human rights organization that a Chadian individual suspected of rebel sympathies was "detained without charge" by the "judicial police." Apart from the fact that the individual has now been set free for lack of evidence, we feel it is important to point out that he was held beyond the three days permitted to the judicial police by others in Chad's extensive law enforcement network, not by the judicial police. ¶9. (C) The large number of law enforcement entities in Chad obviously bespeaks suspicion of the Chadian population on the part of "authorities." Individuals in uniform are known to commit abuses against citizens on a regular basis. The segment of Chadian society that is most deficient in its understanding of human rights standards and rule of law is the uniformed sector writ large, both the military and law enforcement officials. This is precisely the reason for which we propose to engage with some of the more progressive elements in this sector. We want to give contacts whom our international partners believe are worth cultivating the tools to encourage their fellows to adhere to higher human rights standards in performance of duties. We want to become directly involved once again, after too long a hiatus, in encouragement of rule of law through direct action in addition to exhortation. We gain national credibility by doing so. ¶10. (C) We do not believe we have been presented with convincing arguments as to why we should take the highly unusual and visible step of canceling a long-planned training initiative. Nor do we believe we have been given an instruction that takes into account the practicalities of our situation this weekend. If Department as a whole wants us to cancel the training or withdraw invitations for some participants, we request instruction laying out what benefit will accrue to the USG in our undertaking this course of action, and including talking points for use with Chadian officials making clear what the rationale is for specifying it. BREMNER