CHAD-SUDAN: DEBY BRIEFS GRATION ON KHARTOUM TRIP,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NDJAMENA 000102 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/C STATE FOR S/USSES OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON NSC FOR GAVIN LONDON FOR POL - LORD PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY CD SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN: DEBY BRIEFS GRATION ON KHARTOUM TRIP, MINURCAT, CHAD REBELS, JEM REF: NDJAMENA 97 NDJAMENA 00000102 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Charge d'affaires a.i. Sue Bremner, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno received S/USSES General Scott Gration and Embassy officials February 16 for a friendly and wide-ranging discussion of Chad-Sudan relations, including Deby's visit the previous week to Khartoum. Deby expressed concern that Sudan might not in the end be in a position to manage anti-Chad rebels according to the recent Chad-Sudan agreement, whereby rebel movements were to go home, stay put as refugees, or choose third countries by February 21. Deby advised that he and Sudan President Omar Al Bashir had agreed on a "hotline" arrangement for mutual telephonic alerts if one side felt that rebels on the other's territory were threatening attack. Deby asserted that he had broken definitively with the JEM, and asked for U.S. help in pressing home the notion that transformation into a political entity was the only course left for the Sudan rebel movement. ¶2. (C) Gration and Deby spoke about the need for political and economic development, and international assistance to that end, both in Darfur and in Eastern Chad, once stability returned to the region. Gratio raised MINURCAT's mandate, making similar pointsto those he had deployed with Chadian Ministers he previous day (reftel). Deby emphasized that thre was no possibility of renewing MINURCAT's curent mandate," but acknowledged that neither didhe intend "to evict the PKO in a brutal manner," hich would harm Chad's interests. (FM Moussa Faki Mahamat informed Charge that he had presented written U.S. points on MINURCAT to Deby in a pre-brief following Gration's meeting with Faki February 15.) On domestic matters, Gration stressed that the U.S. was watching Chad's electoral preparations closely, in the hope that votes later this year and next would give further evidence that Chad was making progress toward democratic standards. END SUMMARY. -------------- U.S. GOALS FOR SUDAN, REGION -------------- ¶3. (SBU) General Gration described his upcoming trip to Sudan, including locations in the South, stressing U.S. aspirations for the Sudan electoral process, for regional stabilization and for political development and dialogue throughout the nation. He thanked President Deby and FM Faki for their leadership and willingness to take risks, not only in helping to broker improved relations between Chad and Sudan, but also in demonstrating commitment to the possibility of durable peace in the region and an end to human suffering in both nations affected by the Darfur crisis. -------------- DEBY'S MISSION TO KHARTOUM -------------- ¶4. (C) Deby agreed that political processes seemed to be on track in South Sudan, and emphasized that the time had clearly come to put an end to the huge waste of human and other capital that continued in Darfur. Deby claimed that he had reached the decision to travel to Sudan February 8-9 "to give my brothers in Khartoum a way out" of their supposed previous strategy of diverting attention from Sudan-internal questions by pursuing regime change in Chad. Deby indicated that his primary message for Al Bashir had been that Chad and Sudan shared strategic interests, and that they therefore had no reason to fight. Chad wanted good bilateral relations with Sudan, said Deby, to the point where he himself had decided to cut the JEM loose, despite complications that doing so had caused within in his Zaghawa clan. NDJAMENA 00000102 002.2 OF 005 ¶5. (SBU) Deby described his series of meetings in Khartoum as generally good, adding that he believed Chad and Sudan were now on a productive bilateral path. But he offered that political decisions still needed to be made by Khartoum with respect to management of remaining Chadian rebels on Sudanese territory. Many agreements had been signed in the past between Chad and Sudan, and among the various rebel movements, but they had not come to fruition. Chad had the political will to do its part to bring the January 15 Accord into being, as witnessed by its decision to break with the JEM. Whether Sudan would be able to take similar action with Chad rebels remained to be seen -- Chad was waiting for Sudan to turn the page and put relations with these groups in the past. Chad very much wanted the goals of the January 15 Accord to be reached. But vigilance would be necessary no matter what happened. -------------- CHAD REBELS -------------- ¶6. (C) The Chad rebels inside Sudan were not yet dismantled, said Deby. Some had simply been moved from south to north Darfur. They might prove very hard for Sudan to control, and one day they might again try to attack Chad. Chad wanted them to come home and join the reconciliation process here, in keeping with the October 2007 Sirte Agreement between the GoC and Chadian armed opposition. One of the agreements reached in Khartoum the previous week with Al Bashir, said Deby, was establishment of a mechanism whereby either president could call the other to pass information about rebel movements that appeared determined to attack from the neighboring state. The mechanism would allow for discussion and intervention before problems became severe. ¶7. (C) Gration pointed out that only five days remained before the February 21 deadline for rebels to return home or accept refugee status. Deby reiterated that he would welcome continued rebel returns to Chad, particularly returns of rebel commanders. If some rebels chose to go to third countries, so be it -- several nations would likely make room for them. Chad would rather that rebels return home or go to third countries than remain in Sudan, where they had received support and training in the past. In particular rebel leaders would cause problems if permitted to remin in Sudan. Gration made clear that he would continue to press Sudan to demobilize and disarm remaining Chadian rebels by the February 21 deadline. --- JEM --- ¶8. (C) Gration asked Deby whether he thought the JEM could be persuaded to lay down its arms and transform itself into a political movement. Gration added that although he had not spoken with Khaili Ibrahim in some time, he would be willing to do so, including in N'Djamena, if an opportunity arose in the course of Chad's efforts to bring Khalil to the city to meet with Sudanese Presidential Adviser Ghazi Salahhudin. Gration reminded Deby that when news of JEM military activity in Darfur reached international ears, a portion of listeners automatically assumed that Chad was involved. Some believed that Chad was continuing to assist the JEM. ¶9. (C) Deby interjected, "How could this possibly be the case?" Gration acknowledged that the relationship between Chad and the JEM was at this stage more of a perceived one than a current reality. Deby pointed out that prior to 2006, he had not permitted either the JEM or SLA factions to enter Chadian territory. "I knew that these guys would cause problems, and I didn't want them wandering around Chad," he said. "I personally disarmed an SLM faction in Adre and gave the weapons back to Sudan," Deby continued, referring to an incident from earlier in the decade. "I only started helping the JEM after N'Djamena was attacked." Deby then recounted an incident from several weeks previously, which he said he NDJAMENA 00000102 003.2 OF 005 had also told Al Bashir, where a group of wounded JEM fighters sought entry into Chad and were refused, with the exception of one individual whose life appeared to be in danger and who received treatment in medical facilities in Abeche. Deby provided his own version of a description of the GoC ultimatum to JEM in mid-January, where Khalil was told by a variety of Chadian ministers and other influence-makers that he "needed to leave Chad, taking with him his logistic structures, vehicles, prisoners, and would-be government organs." (NOTE: Subsequent to the Deby meeting, Embassy received word from Chadian Ambassador to the U.S. Adoum Bechir that he (Bechir) had been instructed to "pick up" Khalil from Am Jarras and deliver him to N'Djamena, but Khalil in the end did not appear in Am Jarras as scheduled. We will report septel if there are developments on this front. END NOTE.) -------------- NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Gration asked Deby what the international community could do to help with the bilateral normalization process, and what Deby felt might be the biggest challenge in implementing the January Accord. Deby indicated that Chad and Sudan had a certain amount of work to do on a bilateral basis before determining what sort of international assistance might be helpful. The two nations were capable of protecting their bilateral border. Technical work was already under way on details for a border monitoring force, whose aim was to prevent any armed groups from continuing to travel back and forth. The biggest challenge would be maintaining positive momentum -- the key would be to continue to hope. The biggest risk was that the Chad rebels would refuse to accept reality and would try to resume attacks on Chad. ¶11. (SBU) In the medium term, Deby continued, Chad welcomed the involvement of friends in the international community, whom he listed as including the U.S., UN, EU and AU, among others. This group could assist by helping all those on the Sudan side -- some of whom were not firmly committed to peace -- realize that the current plan was the most likely means of achieving regional stability, and that it therefore deserved full support. The IC should also keep in mind that both Sudan and Chad had paid a high price in recent years, with the commercial sector and in some cases even governmental organs destroyed by fighting. Development assistance was badly needed on both sides of the border. ¶12. (SBU) Gration noted that many influential individuals were interested in encouraging stabilization in Darfur, including Thabo Mbeki, Ibrahim Gambari, Haile Makarios and others. With Sudan's elections scheduled for April, the next two months would be critical if the various rebels were to be taken out of the equation once and for all. A cease-fire would enhance local stability and would allow refugees and IDPs an opportunity to return home. Returns would in the longer-term improve economic prospects. The Darfur fighting had after all begun over resources, so economic solutions would be needed. People deserved jobs, social stability, water, health care infrastructure, governmental structures and a justice system, so that they would see that their leadership was accountable to their wishes. The United States was currently thinking about what a more stable region would require from the economic perspective. We wanted Eastern Chad to contribute to regional stability and development. ¶13. (SBU) Deby seized the topic, pointing out that developmental assistance was essential to Eastern Chad as well as to Darfur. Redistribution of wealth was necessary in Sudan, as was power-sharing, he noted. Both Chad and Sudan needed international help with reconstruction and infrastructure. But economic development had to occur in tandem with provision of justice. And even more basically, the fighting had to stop. All sides needed to lay down their NDJAMENA 00000102 004.2 OF 005 arms and engage in dialogue. The international community should make this point as widely as possible. The United States should press the GoS to negotiate with all rebel movements, especially JEM, in order to facilitate successful conclusion of the DOha process and addrss the rights of the people of Darfur. ¶14. (SBU) Deby announced that he was skeptical of the Doha process, in part because all the players on theC(TQ!Ge(9>B Qocess with its political opposition and conveyed U.S. appreciation for the efforts that Chad was making on the electoral front. We wanted the Chadian people "to have a genuine voice," and for elections to move Chad in the direction of democracy, he emphasized. In Darfur, some armed movements were not currently permitted by the Sudan constitution to take part in the upcoming electoral process, but we were working with the GoS to see if constitutional changes might be possible to allow rebel leaders to become part of the government -- assuming that peace prevailed. Deby avowed that constitutional change would not be a high price for Sudan to pay for peace. -------------- MINURCAT -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Gration raised the issue of MINURCAT's future, along the lines he had used with Chadian ministers a day previously, stressing that Chad's generally improving international image -- based on the many right steps the nation was taking -- would suffer if it were perceived as being preemptory with the UN. ¶17. (C) Deby, who laughed when the subject came up, said that MINURCAT as it had originally been conceived had a limited mandate, up on March 15. This had been the case with EUFOR a year previously. As had been the case with EUFOR, when MINURCAT's mandate was up, it could not be renewed. This said, Chad was flexible in discussing the PKO's future, and very much wanted a political-level team from the UN to visit Chad to discuss next steps. MINURCAT had a number of initiatives under way, including training the DIS, that Chad wanted to continue. Chad did not intend to "evict MINURCAT in a brutal manner." A troop draw-down schedule would need to be determined, in consultation with the UN. MINURCAT's civilian projects in the East needed to be completed. MINURCAT had not been operationally effective from the military standpoint, but this did not mean that Chad wanted nothing further to do with the UN. Chad was ready to discuss and negotiate, with the caveat that MINURCAT should not attempt to get involved in the Chad-Sudan normalization process. ¶18. (C) (NOTE: Prior to the meeting with Deby, FM Faki told Charge that he had passed the U.S. written points on MINURCAT to President Deby the day before, following his own meeting with Gration. Faki said that Deby's comments to Gration would be made in light of the U.S. position contained in the points. Subsequent to the meeting with Deby, Gration gave a brief read-out of the state of play to Rima Saleh, Acting MINURCAT SRSG. Charge will brief Saleh in more detail February 17, including to A/S Carson's telcall with Deby and to AF efforts to reach out to the UN leadership. END NOTE.) -------------- NDJAMENA 00000102 005.2 OF 005 CONCLUSION -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Gration reiterated that the U.S. very much wanted Deby to be successful in his efforts with Sudan and domestically in Chad. We wanted Chad-Sudan bilateral dialogue to succeed, to see JEM at the negotiating table, to see the Chadian rebels disarmed and dismantled, and to help contribute to lasting peace in the region. Deby thanked Gration for U.S. interest and willingness to be a part of a durable solution to the Darfur crisis. ¶20. (U) Minimize considered. BREMNER