Arrest of Islamic Cleric Sparks Violent Protests

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000079 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/22 TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM KJUS JM SO KE SUBJECT: Arrest of Islamic Cleric Sparks Violent Protests CLASSIFIED BY: Mitch Benedict, Political Counselor, State, Political; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The arrest of radical Islamist cleric Adullah el-Faisal in Kenya on December 31, 2009 sparked a violent protest in which some demonstrators waved al Shabaab flags. As the GOK has attempted and failed to deport Faisal over the past two weeks interfaith tensions have escalated, and the GOK has initiated a crackdown on the ethnic Somali community in Kenya. There are unconfirmed reports January 22 that Faisal has finally been deported. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Jamaican-born Islamist cleric Sheikh Abdullah el-Faisal entered Kenya on December 24, 2009. Faisal entered by land from Tanzania at the Lunga Lunga border crossing in Coast Province, an entry point which does not utilize the PISCES system which would have flagged Faisal as a person of interest. Jailed in the United Kingdom from 2003 to 2007 for solicitation of murder due to sermons which urged followers to kill non-Muslims, Faisal arrived in Kenya following preaching engagements in Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, Malawi and Tanzania. ¶3. (S//NF) Following his arrival in Mombasa, Faisal established contact with known extremists. Faisal delivered several messages in Mombasa-area mosques before his arrest in by Anti-Terrorist Police Unit officers on December 31. Sheikh Hassan Kinyua, a member of the moderate Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), told us that Faisal had been preaching extremist messages in Kenya, telling listeners "if you call a Christian to convert three times and they refuse, then you have the right to kill them." ¶4. (C) Attempts by the GOK to deport Faisal over the following week were unsuccessful; Tanzania refused to receive Faisal by land, while Nigeria refused a transit visa necessary to transport Faisal to the Gambia, which had agreed to accept him. As the failed deportation attempts were reported in the press, activist Al Amin Kimathi of the Muslim Human Rights Forum filed an injunction on January 13 asking the courts to block Faisal's deportation. ¶5. (C) On January 15 Kimathi organized a demonstration to demand Faisal's release. The police ruled the demonstration illegal and SUPKEM asked Kimathi to desist, but the demonstration went ahead and quickly turned violent. Youth wearing masks and waving flags used by the Somali al Shabaab and Hizb ut-Tahrir movements pelted riot police with stones. The police then refused to intervene when hawkers occupying a plot of land owned by Nairobi's Jamia Mosque clashed with the Muslim protesters. In the ensuing conflict, one policeman was shot and a protestor killed when police fired upon the demonstrators. (Note: Muslim groups claimed as many as seven were killed, but now concede that only one protestor died. It is not clear whether the policeman was injured by armed protestors or from friendly fire. End note.) ¶6. (C) The violence of the protests, and particularly the presence of al Shabaab symbols, have unsettled the GOK and escalated interfaith tensions as some Kenyans believe the protest is indicative of encroaching influence by extremist Somalis. Police launched an ongoing dragnet in the heavily Somali Eastleigh region of Nairobi on January 17 that has so far resulted in the arrests of as many as several thousand individuals of Somali origin. Among those arrested were an AMCIT Somali MP, Asha Abdalla, and 11 other members of the Somali Parliament. (Note: Abdalla was released the next day; Post's Consular section interviewed her and took a statement, and we are following up with appropriate actions, including a formal protest note. End Note.) Kimathi was arrested on January 18 and is being charged with incitement of violence and resisting arrest. In an attempt to defuse tensions, SUPKEM has reiterated its opposition to the protests, asked Muslims to desist from further protests, and called for the immediate deportation of Faisal. ¶7. (C) Kenyan human rights organizations have criticized the police's use of deadly force during the protests, and have accused the police of inciting the hawkers to clash with the Muslim demonstrators. The AMCIT Somali MP has alleged physical and verbal NAIROBI 00000079 002 OF 002 abuse at the hands of the police, and post has received numerous reports of physical abuse and police demands for bribes in return for release. Kenya's High Court has ordered the government to produce Faisal in court on February 18; immigration minister Otieno Kajwang has stated that the government will not honor the court order. ¶8. (C) The GOK, meanwhile, is actively seeking to expel Faisal as soon as possible. Kajwang has blamed the U.S. for failing to support Faisal's deportation, and is now reportedly considering sending Faisal to Jamaica by chartered aircraft or by sea. There are unconfirmed reports that on January 22 that Faisal finally been deported. ¶9. (C) Comment: The Faisal saga has brought to the surface long-running inter-religious and ethnic tensions. Following independence, the GOK fought a twenty year "Shifta war" with Somali rebels along the border, and many leaders have expressed concerns that the chaos of Somalia will spill into Kenya. The 1998 Embassy bombing and events of 9/11 exposed the presence of radical Islamists in Kenya; the GOK's heavy-handed response over the years has generated resentment and suspicions between the government and Muslim community. With the recent advent of profitable Somali piracy, Kenyans are increasingly worried that the flow of ransom payments are empowering Somali businessmen to buy key properties and exert undue influence in the Kenyan government. The protest and its response are further developments in a worrying cycle of xenophobia against the Somali community, though the fears are driven by legitimate concerns about extremism and security threats. ¶10. (C) Comment continued: It is clear that no side is free of blame in its handling of the Faisal controversy. Kimathi and the Muslims for Human Rights organization pursued what was almost certain to be a violent demonstration, against the counsel of SUPKEM. The participation of al Shabaab sympathizers shocked the Kenyan public and GOK, who were alarmed to see extremist flags flying in downtown Nairobi; anti-Muslim rhetoric is now common in online discussions of the clash. The police responded to the demonstration with disproportionate force, and are now using the incident as an excuse to rough up the Somali community and made some money through the bribes required for release. We are reaching out to SUPKEM, Kimathi, and the GOK to urge all sides to act responsibly and seek to lower tensions. End Comment. RANNEBERGER