Somalia - Military Tactics in Beledweyne Appear to Reach

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000063 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/E, AF/RSA AND A/S CARSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/13 TAGS: PREL PGOV SO MOPS MARR SOCI SUBJECT: Somalia - Military Tactics in Beledweyne Appear to Reach Strategic Limits; Political Efforts Underway REF: NAIROBI 000052 CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Patterson, Counselor for Somalia Affairs, State Department, Somalia Unit; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Military activity in Hiraan region appears to have reached its strategic limits for now and must yield to stepped up political efforts on the part of local clan leaders and the TFG or risk entrenching a clan-based conflict that will energize al-Shabaab. January 12 saw an escalation of recent violence in Hiraan (reftel) when al-Shabaab forces lobbed mortars into the eastern side of the town, causing much of Beledweyne's eastside population to flee. As of January 13, however, fighting between al-Shabaab and clan militia in Beledweyne town had subsided. Clan and diaspora leaders from Hiraan on January 13 told us that multiple reconciliation efforts were underway in Hiraan communities and that there was growing suspicion in the region of Ayr support of the Hawaadle. Contacts said that their suspicions were piqued when the Ayr/ASWJ urged the Hawaadle to lob mortars into Western Beledweyne, a tactic Hawaadle leaders told us would be almost certain to cause greater long-term instability in Hiraan and energize al-Shabaab. ¶2. (C) Summary Continued: TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke on January 13 told us that the TFG planned on January 14 to transport Hiraan MPs to the troubled region. On January 13, we urged members of President Sharif's staff to have the President make a public statement that supported local efforts to date to confront al-Shabaab in Hiraan but urged forward movement on local reconciliation, as well as concern about the effects of the fighting on Beledweyne's civilian population. In addition, we will on January 14 meet with the Hawaadle ugas and on January 15 meet with a wider range of Galje'el and Hawaadle elders. End summary. ¶3. (C) As of January 13, fighting between al-Shabaab and a clan/ASWJ alliance in Beledweyne town (Hiraan region) had subsided, opening space for much-needed political negotiations between the Hawaadle and Galje'el clans. On January 10, a predominately Hawaadle clan alliance, sympathetic to the TFG but fighting under the name of ASWJ in order to receive some logistical support from the neighboring Ayr subclan, pushed Hisbul Islam out of the eastern part of Beledweyne (reftel). (Note: Hisbul Islam forces are predominately from the Hawiye/Murosade clan. Many Galje'el, resident on Beledweyne's western side, have allied with al-Shabaab in order to resist perceived Hawaadle subclan domination of Beledweyne. The Hawaadle control the eastern side of Beledweyne and dominate commerce in the town. End note.) On January 11, the alliance thwarted an HI counter attack, causing Hisbul Islam forces to flee to the western side of Beledweyne and align with al-Shabaab forces there. ¶4. (C) January 12 saw an escalation in violence when al-Shabaab forces lobbed mortars into the eastern side of the town, causing much of Beledweyne's eastside population to flee and reportedly damaging Beledweyne's hospital. As of January 13, fighting between al-Shabaab and the alliance in Beledweyne town had subsided. Multiple contacts tell us that military activity in Hiraan region has reached its strategic limits for now and must yield to stepped-up political efforts on the part of local clan leaders and the TFG or risk entrenching a clan-based conflict that will energize al-Shabaab. ¶5. (C) Clan and diaspora leaders from Hiraan on January 13 told us that multiple reconciliation efforts are underway and that there is growing suspicion in the region of Ayr "support" of the Hawaadle effort. Our contacts tell us that the Ayr-dominated faction of ASWJ in north Galgaduud on January 12 sent mortars to the Hawaadle and urged the Hawaadle to launch the mortars into the western part of Beledweyne. Hawaadle elders and commanders, however, reportedly refused because they did not want to injure civilians on the western side of the city. A widely respected Hiraan leader on January 13 told us that there was recognition on the part of the Hawaadle that mortaring the Galje'el side of the NAIROBI 00000063 002 OF 002 city would push more of the Galje'el into al-Shabaab's hands, making the clan conflict more intractable and closing space for political negotiation. ¶6. (C) The Hawaadle ugas and Galje'el ugas reportedly met two weeks ago to discuss tamping down tensions between the clans and our contacts tell us that diaspora and clan leaders since January 10 have also intervened. (Note: Somalis historically use the threat of force to open space for political negotiations. The tactic results in minimal losses on the battlefield and prevents the clans from entering a cycle of tit-for-tat clan retribution. Conflict in Beledweyne over recent months has fit this model and we would expect small scale skirmishes in the town to continue against the backdrop of any political negotiations. End note.) ¶7. (C) Many Hawaadle contacts tell us that, while they are happy to accept logistical support, they think Ayr-ASWJ ambitions need to be kept in check and fear that the rival Hawiye sub-clan may be faking an alliance in order to ultimately expand into Hawaadle territory. Contacts said that their suspicions were piqued when Ayr/ASWJ urged the Hawaadle to lob mortars into western Beledweyne, a tactic that Hawaadle leaders told us would be almost certain to cause greater long-term instability in Hiraan and energize al-Shabaab. Additionally, several Hawaadle contacts told us that they resented the fact that ASWJ attempted to take credit for local Hawaadle efforts. (Note: One contact told us that this demand was, in fact, being pushed by Ethiopia. End note.) According to our contacts, the Ayr involvement would likely be interpreted by the Galje'el as an alliance of rival Hawiye subclans intent on capturing and holding Galje'el territory rather than simply pushing out al-Shabaab. (Note: The Ayr, Hawaadle, and Galje'el are all subclans of the Hawiye. End note.) ¶8. (C) TFG Prime Minister Sharmarke told us that the TFG was sending five Hiraan MPs to Galcaio by air on January 14. The MPs would then travel overland to Hiraan region in order to encourage local reconciliation among the clans. Many contacts tell us that such a show of support from the TFG, while not enough, would be welcome. (Note: Some Hiraan MPs appear to have been involved in local governance efforts in Hiraan and hence are credible interlocutors there. End note.) ¶9. (C) Comment: We are encouraged by Sharmarke's decision to transport Hiraan MPs to Beledweyne. We have also urged President Sharif, who is in Nairobi, to make a public statement that supports local efforts to date to confront al-Shabaab in Hiraan but also urges forward movement on local reconciliation and expresses concern about the plight of Beledweyne's civilian population. In addition, we will on January 14 meet with the Hawaadle ugas and on January 15 meet with a wider range of Galje'el and Hawaadle elders. RANNEBERGER