SOMALIA - MASS TFG ARMY MOVEMENT SIGNALS IMPENDING OFFENSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000155 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/E AND AF/RSA ABUJA FOR A/S CARSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/09 TAGS: PREL PGOV SO PTER EAID MARR MOPS SUBJECT: SOMALIA - MASS TFG ARMY MOVEMENT SIGNALS IMPENDING OFFENSIVE CLASSIFIED BY: Robert Patterson, Counselor for Somalia Affairs, State Department, Somalia Unit; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary. On February 5 the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) deployed some 2,000 army troops from its training camp on the outskirts of Mogadishu into the city. With support from troops from the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM),four Somali battalions have taken up new positions that contacts tell us will facilitate an urban offensive designed to form a defensive cordon around Mogadishu. The cordon should hinder Islamists' ability to move around the city, and enable TFG police to enter previously held areas. The offensive's timing is a closely held secret. Al-Shabaab has not yet challenged the government troops in their new positions, and may not immediately challenge the offensive, if confronted with overwhelming forces arrayed against them. We are urging the TFG and AMISOM to prepare logistically to hold newly captured areas, and to engage the media to tout any resulting successes. We are also urging the government and international aid community to rush into newly opened areas of Mogadishu with humanitarian, economic and IDP returnee assistance. End Summary Four Battalions in Surprise Move -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On February 5, the Transitional Federal Government suddenly moved nearly 2,000 army troops (four battalions) from their camp in the Jazeera area of Mogadishu. Two battalions moved to the TFG-controlled, strategic intersection known as Ex-Control Afgoye, where Via Lenin and Industrial Boulevard meet in Mogadishu's Deynile district. A third battalion crossed the city to take up positions near the National Security Headquarters in Shingani district. A fourth battalion moved into position near the Old Port in Shingani. TFG and AMISOM officials said they had repositioned the troops to facilitate an offensive in the days or weeks to come. ¶3. (C) Multiple TFG and AMISOM sources tell us the offensive's objectives are key landmarks and intersections along Industrial Road (also known as 21 October Road),including the old Defense Ministry compound, the Soccer Stadium, and the Pasta Factory. The TFG will also reinforce Ex-Control Afgoye, which is a main avenue of approach for al-Shabaab into Mogadishu. Securing this key intersection is vital to prevent AS reinforcements. Other troops will form a defensive line near the Karan and Huriwa districts. ¶4. (C) The Somali national police commissioner told us the troops in Shingani district are a demonstration of force to Shabaab militia in the area and will bolster the TFG perimeter in this hotly contested zone of the city. According to the commissioner this TFG defensive perimeter is held by clan militia and cannot be completely relied upon. Of particular concern is a militia group affiliated with Abdi Jinow Alasso, the reportedly corrupt Mogadishu Port Manager, whom we are told the TFG has just forced out. During the planned offensive these troops will form a defensive line a near the Karan and Huriwa districts. TFG Planning to Provide Security Inside a Cordon -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) According to the police commissioner, the TFG and AMISOM forces hope to form a cordon around the city. Police and former Darawish militias will provide security inside this cordon, and will confront any remaining Islamist fighters there. (Note: In Somali vernacular, Darawish are special purpose paramilitary forces. In Southern Somalia, the Darawish was a 2,300 man paramilitary force loyal to the Islamic Courts Union that has recently been willingly disbanded and incorporated into the Somali police and army. End Note.) According to the police commissioner many of the Darawish share clan lineage with the Bakara Market neighborhood's Haber Gedir citizens. To take advantage of these clan affiliations the commissioner plans to use these forces to occupy the market during the offensive, hopefully to avoid direct military operations in the Bakara Market area. Shabaab Yet to Respond -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Over the past weeks, possibly in an attempt to disrupt TFG and AMISOM plans for the offensive, Al-Shabaab and allied Islamist fighters have intensified attacks, one Mogadishu-based NGO contact has told us . Since the TFG troop movement, however, there have been only sporadic skirmishes. Our contacts tell us Shabaab hastily moved their heavy weapons out of Mogadishu, and may have moved fighters out of their strong-hold at Bakara Market, as part of a plan to avoid confronting, or being cut off by TFG and AMISOM forces. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) We do not yet know when an offensive will occur, but when it occurs it will be supported by AMISOM armor, and calculated to deter an Islamist resistance. Tactical retreats are common in the Somali context. Shabaab commanders may have judged that they should withdraw rather than fight at this moment. Even if they choose not to contest the offensive, Shabaab will likely regroup, reinforce, and challenge the government's gains in Mogadishu in the days and weeks ahead. The government's and AMISOM's challenge will be to hold any new neighborhoods they may capture in the upcoming offensive, and exert control in newly captured areas. We are pushing the TFG and AMISOM to apply lessons learned in July 2009, when an offensive failed to hold newly-gained territory for lack of logistical support to advancing government troops. We are also urging the TFG to amplify any military success with a vigorous media campaign. ¶8. (C) Comment continued: We believe there may be a short, post-conflict window of opportunity in which to expand development and humanitarian programming in Mogadishu. We are urging that the TFG, AMISOM, and our UN, NGO, and international partners move quickly to supply government services, humanitarian aid, unexploded ordinance disposal, employment programs, and IDP returnee support to newly opened areas, so that Mogadishu's citizenry may see dividends from government control. ¶9. (SBU) Comment continued: USAID will work to assemble a broad package of interventions which will provide possible returnees and internally displaced in Mogadishu with much needed food and non-food relief. This package would include hygiene kits, blankets, chlorine tablets, jerry cans, kitchen sets and shelter material, as well as food rations. Further assistance that could be provided in conjunction with, or as a follow on to the reintegration package could include activities such as garbage pick up as a cash for work program, health and nutrition services and water and sanitation assistance, including activities such as water well rehabilitation. The provision of this assistance, commonly provided by Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food For Peace partners in conflict and post-conflict environments, will show the returnees that the stability provided by the TFG and AMISOM brings benefits. RANNEBERGER