A/S FELTMAN WITH OMANI FM - YEMEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000107
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/20
TAGS: PREL YM MU
SUBJECT: A/S FELTMAN WITH OMANI FM - YEMEN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Schmierer, Ambassador, Department of State,
Embassy Muscat; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

1. (C) Summary: Discussions about Yemen during a February 17
meeting between Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs
Yusef bin Alawi (YbA) and NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman
revealed that the U.S. and Oman are on the same page regarding both
internal politics and external influences. YbA believed that al
Qaida was the key threat; and he emphasized that there was no
alternative to President Saleh. He explained that although Yemeni
tribes historically venture right up to the brink of disaster, they
usually pull back before going over the precipice, meaning the
Houthi struggle was likely to be contained. YbA thought that Saleh
would need strong international engagement to do the right thing,
particularly in regard to al Qaida. End Summary.

2. (C) The one and a half hour meeting, which also focused on
Middle East Peace and Iran (septels),was attended by DCM Victor
Hurtado, poloff (notetaker),Staff Assistant Jason Ullner, Omani
MFA Secretary General Sayyid Badr bin Hamad al Busa’idi, and Omani
notetakers. (Note: It is unusual for Sayyid Badr to attend a
meeting with YbA. End Note.)

3. (C) AL QAIDA AND EXTREMISM: YbA expressed concern about al
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),although he did not believe
it was independently powerful, instead remaining dependent on the
tribes for its support. He did not think that Saleh was trying to
build relationships with the tribes to counter AQAP. The issue
with the Houthis was manageable, he added, noting that
historically, the tribes regularly push themselves to the edge, but
usually settle to avoid the worst outcomes. He noted that the
Houthis wanted the Salafists out, adding that while religion was
"feeding the whole thing," the struggle was not really about
faith, but political power.

4. (C) INTERNAL POLITICS: YbA said that a few months ago, Saleh
was paralyzed by his increasingly small inner circle. The "young
boys" had taken over all the security matters and effectively tied
the President’s hands. He thought that Saleh had regained some of
that power recently, at least in part because of Saudi support. He
speculated that both the Bakil and Hashid tribes had their eye on
the presidency, but that Saleh was outmaneuvering them, "using
democracy as an umbrella to play games." YbA said that there were
no viable alternatives to Saleh; without him there "would be civil
war."

5. (C) INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE: YbA suggested that President Saleh
needed to be strongly encouraged to re-engage his old group of
advisors and reduce the power given to the security forces. A
concrete suggestion would be to involve his son in politics, and
not just security. He emphasized that Saleh would need the cover
of international pressure to push his inner circle to combat AQAP
as a priority. The message should emphasize that he will need to
do so in order to be accepted in the region.

6. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Feltman.
Schmierer