FOCUSING OUR EFFORTS TO ENGAGE RUSSIA ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000410

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR RS AF
SUBJECT: FOCUSING OUR EFFORTS TO ENGAGE RUSSIA ON
AFGHANISTAN

REF: MOSCOW 00239

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Cooperation on Afghanistan remains a top
item on the U.S.-Russia agenda. We have achieved success in
gaining Russia's public, rhetorical support for our efforts
(despite private skepticism) and concrete help on transit
issues. Efforts to have Russia contribute substantial
economic and military assistance have stalled. Going
forward, Embassy Moscow recommends concentrating on three
priorities: strategic-level dialogue; counternarcotics
cooperation; and transit. Focusing on these three areas will
better leverage Russia's concerns about Afghanistan and give
us the best chance for successfully achieving our objectives.
Russian economic or military assistance may be possible, but
we should not have exaggerated expectations. End summary.

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Improved Tone, Limited Capabilities
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2. (C) Russia's posture towards international stabilization
efforts in Afghanistan has continued to improve during recent
months thanks to the overall improvement in U.S.-Russian
relations and high-level attention from SRAP Holbrooke and
other senior officials. The Russian attitude has paid
dividends: improved implementation of the over-flight
agreement, cooperation on improving UNSCR 1267 and a more
positive public tone on counternarcotics issues.


3. (C) Despite these advances, Russia's ability and
willingness to participate in Afghanistan is limited by three
factors. Although the GOR shares our perception of the
dangers posed by an unstable Afghanistan, many senior
officials are skeptical about the prospects for American
success and believe the GOR should avoid associating too
closely with our efforts. Second, Russia's ambition to
transition from an aid-recipient to an aid-donor country
remains largely an aspiration. GOR institutions are not yet
able to deliver development assistance abroad, let alone in
an environment as challenging as Afghanistan. Finally, the
memories of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan remain raw,
making the GOR (particularly the military and security
forces) skittish about anything suggesting a military
contribution. As a result, Russia prefers an arms-length
approach, such as support for transit, donations through
international relief agencies and the use of private
companies on a fee-for-services basis.

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Synergy: U.S. Goals and Russian Interests
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4. (C) Given these limitations, Embassy Moscow recommends
focusing our efforts with Russia on three priorities:

--Strategic-level dialogue. To the extent possible, we
should treat Russia as a senior partner and consult with them
prior to announcing key decisions. The recent visit by
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Director
Kerlikowske, which led to a narrowing of differences on
counter-narcotics strategy, highlighted the value of this
approach.

--Counternarcotics. Given Russia's deep concern about this
issue, U.S.-Russian cooperation in interdicting drug
trafficking on Afghanistan's periphery or enhancement of
Afghanistan's indigenous counternarcotics capabilities is a
win-win for both Russia and Afghanistan.

--Transit. While the Northern Distribution Network and
overflights are functioning better, we can make additional
improvements to serve ISAF better.


5. (C) These priorities unite Russia's
interests/capabilities with top U.S. priorities. While we
should remain open to opportunities for military equipment
donations and economic development assistance, we should
understand that such aid will be modest -- any value would be
largely symbolic with minimal impact on the ground in
Afghanistan. In this regard, we should encourage the GIROA
to approach the GOR directly to double-track assistance
requests in order to foster improved Kabul-Moscow
communication and to demonstrate to Russia that Kabul values

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it as a partner.

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Strategic-Level Dialogue
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6. (C) Beginning with the July 2009 Presidential Statement
on Afghanistan, we have seen the benefits of strategic-level
dialogue on Afghanistan. Presidential impetus enabled us to
conclude the over-flight agreement. Subsequent Moscow visits
by NSA Jones and SRAP Holbrooke gave the Russians an advance
look at the soon-to-be-released Afghanistan and Pakistan
strategy, raising the level of confidence on which to build
further cooperation.


7. (C) We have an opportunity to continue this effort in
2010 as regional diplomacy intensifies following the London
Conference. During DSRAP Jones' March visit to Moscow, we
recommend extending invitations to DFM Borodavkin and Russian
SRAP Kabulov to visit Washington. When Russian Federal Drug
Control Service (FSKN) Director Ivanov visits Washington
mid-year, he should meet with SRAP Holbrooke. Additionally,
at every opportunity, talking points on Afghanistan should
continue to be included in Presidential- and Ministerial-
level meetings. Finally, we should consider marking the July
anniversary of the joint statement with a second bilateral
Presidential statement on Afghanistan, noting our successes
and how we plan to cooperate in the future.

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Counternarcotics
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8. (C) As of October 2009, the United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that roughly 30 percent of
Afghanistan's heroin exports go through the "Northern
Route", with a total of 75-80 metric tons consumed in Russia
itself. GOR officials claim Afghan heroin kills over 30,000
Russians annually and that Afghan exports have increased
eight-fold since the fall of the Taliban. For domestic
reasons, these statistics provide irresistible temptation for
some Russian leaders to assign blame for their domestic drug
addiction problem to Afghanistan and -- by extension -- the
U.S. FSKN Director Viktor Ivanov and others have regularly
beat this drum and will likely do so in the future. Regular,
high-level dialogue with the GOR (including the Duma and
Federation Council) on our Afghan counternarcotics strategy
will help reduce the frequency of such statements. ONDCP
Director Kerlikowske's commitment to monitor the effects of
our counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan on drug flow into
Russia was a welcome gesture and consultation should continue
regularly.



9. (C) Director Kerlikowske's visit also facilitated
enhanced cooperation on interdiction of drugs in Central Asia
and the prosecution of drug traffickers and financiers. In
addition to the names of eight Drug Trafficking Organizations
(DTOs) DEA provided to their Russian counterparts, we should
look for additional avenues of information and intelligence
sharing, such as the participation of a Russian official in
the Afghan Finance Threat Center and encouraging stepped-up
Russian participation in CARICC. Russia will likely continue
to press for U.S. and NATO counternarcotics cooperation with
the CSTO; our position should be that we are open to
counternarcotics proposals from CSTO while deflecting
Russia's desire for formal recognition of the organization.
The Drug Trafficking working group of the Bilateral
Presidential Commission will play a key role. This forum
provides an opportunity for real cooperation in law
enforcement and intelligence sharing, not only at senior
levels but also at the working level. The recent decision to
include the Counternarcotics Financing Sub-Working Group
under the Drug Trafficking group demonstrates the commitment
by both sides to make this working group an effective forum
for results-oriented law-enforcement.


10. (C) Finally, we should encourage the GOR to increase its
support for training Afghan security and counternarcotics
forces in Russia and Central Asia. Winning GOR buy-in for
more OSCE projects, possibly inside Afghanistan, is also
possible in the coming year.

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Transit

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11. (C) Both air and rail transit are broadly recognized as
successful areas of cooperation, despite the continuing
challenges we face implementing the over-flight agreement.
Depending on DOD needs, we believe expanded our cooperation
in both of these areas is possible.


12. (C) On air transit, we now are averaging about one
flight per day under the agreement. We expect to resolve the
ICAO standards issue (reftel) in the near term, allowing
charter flights to carry hazardous cargo in the same way
military flights now do. We believe Moscow would be
receptive to opening polar routes; while the current routes
create savings of approximately 25-40 minutes on each trip,
using polar routes would typically save 2-3 hours per flight,
and in some cases could save as much as 15 hours. Second, we
are working with the GOR to streamline processing for
clearances and increasing the clearance window from 24 to 72
hours in certain circumstances, making the clearances more
flexible to changes or delays.


13. (C) The current arrangement allowing commercial rail
shipment of non-hazardous materials via the Northern
Distribution Network through Russian territory operates
effectively and is being expanded to use the Trans-Siberian
route from the Pacific in addition to cargo shipped through
Europe. The next step is to approach the Russians requesting
the ability to use this route to transport certain categories
of hazardous materials. We understand that work is ongoing
to determine which items would be included and such requests
are also being coordinated with the Central Asian
governments. We believe that seeking an amendment to the
existing NATO-Russia rail agreement offers the best path to
success.

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Comment
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14. (C) Cooperation on Afghanistan has emerged as one of the
most visible successes of the "reset" of U.S.-Russian
relations during the past year. To build effectively on this
foundation in ways that will materially advance our goals in
Afghanistan, we should concentrate efforts on transit, where
we have a track record, and counter-narcotics, Russia's
number one priority. These efforts and our regional
diplomacy goals will be well served by continued
strategic-level dialogue. All three of these prongs will
gain Russian buy-in for more activities that help make
Central Asia a force for political stability and economic
growth along Afghanistan's northern tier.

Beyrle