CSTO SYG TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT FUTURE PLANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000260 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER MARR MASS MCAP SNAR RS AF, TX, BO, ZK, XH SUBJECT: CSTO SYG TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT FUTURE PLANS REF: A. 09 MOSCOW 2562 ¶B. 09 MOSCOW 2811 ¶C. 09 MOSCOW 1469 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha told the Ambassador that the CSTO would be prepared to participate in UN peacekeeping missions in the future. He complained that NATO has ignored CSTO overtures. Bordyuzha said CSTO priorities are focused on political and military cooperation among member states, combating drugs, terror, and other threats. He praised the CSTO's Operation Canal, and discussed the Collective Rapid Reaction Force. Bordyuzha said there were no plans to admit Turkmenistan as a CSTO member in the near future. End summary. -------------- -------------- CSTO Plans to Participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a February 2 meeting at CSTO headquarters, Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha told the Ambassador that the CSTO in the future would like to send troops to serve as UN peacekeepers. He said that the majority of CSTO member states have ratified documents to permit this, and in the future the CSTO could conduct peacekeeping operations by itself and/or within the framework of UN Security Council operations. SYG Bordyuzha predicted the CSTO would soon be able to send peacekeepers to places such as Haiti. -------------- CSTO Wants to Work With NATO -------------- ¶3. (C) SYG Bordyuzha complained to the Ambassador that not having formal contact with NATO complicated the CSTO's counternarcotics (CN) and counterterrorism (CT) efforts, and added he hoped NATO's attitude toward the CSTO would soon change. He also complained that nothing came of a letter the CSTO sent to NATO proposing CN cooperation. SYG Bordyuzha agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that mutual distrust was a problem, and said (with a slight smile) that he could not understand why the Zapad 2009 exercises caused such consternation in Poland. When the Ambassador characterized Zapad 2009 as reminiscent of the Cold War, SYG Bordyuzha replied that only politicians saw things that way. Military officers, he said, saw military exercises as formulaic, "red versus blue" affairs that afforded opportunities for training. 
 -------------- Priorities of the CSTO -------------- ¶4. (C) Bordyuzha said that the CSTO works to encourage political cooperation among member states. Foreign Ministers of the member states sometimes meet in closed sessions to coordinate policy, he said. The CSTO focused its attention on maintaining stability in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. ¶5. (C) SYG Bordyuzha said the CSTO also emphasized military cooperation among member states. Russia, he said, sold arms to CSTO states at Russian domestic prices, rather than at prices set for the international arms market. (Note: Russia's domestic prices for arms can sometimes be more expensive than the international price. End note.) Russia also offered free training to militaries of CSTO member states, SYG Bordyuzha said. CN, CT, illegal migration, natural disasters, and cyber security also presented challenges to the CSTO, he iterated. SYG Bordyuzha touted the CSTO's cooperation with the EU and OSCE to fight these problems, and added that the CSTO did a good job coordinating member states' efforts in these areas. -------------- Operation Canal -------------- ¶6. (C) SYG Bordyuzha praised the CSTO's main CN effort, Operation Canal, which in 2009 seized over 116 tons of narcotics (ref A and B). He said Operation Canal was a forum MOSCOW 00000260 002 OF 002 where even representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan could cooperate to counter the drug threat. Drug seizures occurred along CSTO member states' and observer countries' borders, at airports, in train stations, at ports, and at various checkpoints. -------------- Collective Rapid Reaction Force -------------- ¶7. (C) According to SYG Bordyuzha, the CSTO's Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) has about 20,000 personnel from member states (ref C). He said there is a brigade of soldiers trained for combat operations, personnel from the ministries of interior of the member states, CT forces, and personnel from the states' ministries of emergency situations who would respond to natural disasters. SYG Bordyuzha said that CSTO member states should sign agreements regarding the status of forces for KSOR to function on their territory by this summer. He pointed out that the 2009 Rubezh exercises were conducted by KSOR. Bordyuzha then handed the Ambassador a 30-minute video about KSOR exercises. -------------- No Plans For Turkmenistan to Join CSTO -------------- ¶8. (C) SYG Bordyuzha told the Ambassador that the CSTO has no plans to admit Turkmenistan as a member. Berdymukhammedov has continued Niyazov's policy of neutrality, he argued. "Turkmenistan is not prepared to cooperate with the CSTO," SYG Bordyuzha posited. He said this was unfortunate because Turkmenistan, with its largely unguarded borders, was a major transit route for Afghan drugs headed for Russia. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite the high-level nature of the meeting, it was clear that SYG Bordyuzha was prepared to read only from his talking points. He talked up the CSTO's capabilities, but neither his statements nor the video he gave us provided anything more than propaganda. Bordyuzha's condescending disdain for discussion of Zapad 2009 (and the Polish reaction to it) were true to his background as a career KGB/FSB official. If the Russian government is serious about promoting the possibilities of CSTO cooperation with NATO, they will need a better front man than Bordyuzha. Beyrle