CSTO SYG TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT FUTURE PLANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000260

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER MARR MASS MCAP SNAR RS
AF, TX, BO, ZK, XH
SUBJECT: CSTO SYG TELLS AMBASSADOR ABOUT FUTURE PLANS

REF: A. 09 MOSCOW 2562

B. 09 MOSCOW 2811

C. 09 MOSCOW 1469

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha told the
Ambassador that the CSTO would be prepared to participate in
UN peacekeeping missions in the future. He complained that
NATO has ignored CSTO overtures. Bordyuzha said CSTO
priorities are focused on political and military cooperation
among member states, combating drugs, terror, and other
threats. He praised the CSTO's Operation Canal, and
discussed the Collective Rapid Reaction Force. Bordyuzha
said there were no plans to admit Turkmenistan as a CSTO
member in the near future. End summary.

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CSTO Plans to Participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations
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2. (C) In a February 2 meeting at CSTO headquarters,
Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha told the Ambassador that
the CSTO in the future would like to send troops to serve as
UN peacekeepers. He said that the majority of CSTO member
states have ratified documents to permit this, and in the
future the CSTO could conduct peacekeeping operations by
itself and/or within the framework of UN Security Council
operations. SYG Bordyuzha predicted the CSTO would soon be
able to send peacekeepers to places such as Haiti.

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CSTO Wants to Work With NATO
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3. (C) SYG Bordyuzha complained to the Ambassador that not
having formal contact with NATO complicated the CSTO's
counternarcotics (CN) and counterterrorism (CT) efforts, and
added he hoped NATO's attitude toward the CSTO would soon
change. He also complained that nothing came of a letter the
CSTO sent to NATO proposing CN cooperation. SYG Bordyuzha
agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that mutual distrust
was a problem, and said (with a slight smile) that he could
not understand why the Zapad 2009 exercises caused such
consternation in Poland. When the Ambassador characterized
Zapad 2009 as reminiscent of the Cold War, SYG Bordyuzha
replied that only politicians saw things that way. Military
officers, he said, saw military exercises as formulaic, "red
versus blue" affairs that afforded opportunities for training.

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Priorities of the CSTO
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4. (C) Bordyuzha said that the CSTO works to encourage
political cooperation among member states. Foreign Ministers
of the member states sometimes meet in closed sessions to
coordinate policy, he said. The CSTO focused its attention
on maintaining stability in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and
Central Asia.


5. (C) SYG Bordyuzha said the CSTO also emphasized military
cooperation among member states. Russia, he said, sold arms
to CSTO states at Russian domestic prices, rather than at
prices set for the international arms market. (Note:
Russia's domestic prices for arms can sometimes be more
expensive than the international price. End note.) Russia
also offered free training to militaries of CSTO member
states, SYG Bordyuzha said. CN, CT, illegal migration,
natural disasters, and cyber security also presented
challenges to the CSTO, he iterated. SYG Bordyuzha touted
the CSTO's cooperation with the EU and OSCE to fight these
problems, and added that the CSTO did a good job coordinating
member states' efforts in these areas.

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Operation Canal
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6. (C) SYG Bordyuzha praised the CSTO's main CN effort,
Operation Canal, which in 2009 seized over 116 tons of
narcotics (ref A and B). He said Operation Canal was a forum

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where even representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan could
cooperate to counter the drug threat. Drug seizures occurred
along CSTO member states' and observer countries' borders, at
airports, in train stations, at ports, and at various
checkpoints.

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Collective Rapid Reaction Force
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7. (C) According to SYG Bordyuzha, the CSTO's Collective
Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) has about 20,000 personnel from
member states (ref C). He said there is a brigade of
soldiers trained for combat operations, personnel from the
ministries of interior of the member states, CT forces, and
personnel from the states' ministries of emergency situations
who would respond to natural disasters. SYG Bordyuzha said
that CSTO member states should sign agreements regarding the
status of forces for KSOR to function on their territory by
this summer. He pointed out that the 2009 Rubezh exercises
were conducted by KSOR. Bordyuzha then handed the Ambassador
a 30-minute video about KSOR exercises.

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No Plans For Turkmenistan to Join CSTO
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8. (C) SYG Bordyuzha told the Ambassador that the CSTO has no
plans to admit Turkmenistan as a member. Berdymukhammedov
has continued Niyazov's policy of neutrality, he argued.
"Turkmenistan is not prepared to cooperate with the CSTO,"
SYG Bordyuzha posited. He said this was unfortunate because
Turkmenistan, with its largely unguarded borders, was a major
transit route for Afghan drugs headed for Russia.

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Comment
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9. (C) Despite the high-level nature of the meeting, it was
clear that SYG Bordyuzha was prepared to read only from his
talking points. He talked up the CSTO's capabilities, but
neither his statements nor the video he gave us provided
anything more than propaganda. Bordyuzha's condescending
disdain for discussion of Zapad 2009 (and the Polish reaction
to it) were true to his background as a career KGB/FSB
official. If the Russian government is serious about
promoting the possibilities of CSTO cooperation with NATO,
they will need a better front man than Bordyuzha.
Beyrle