SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 4 U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000226 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR ONDCP DIRECTOR DIRECTOR KERLIKOWSKE FROM AMB. BEYRLE EUR-RS FOR CAROLINE SAVAGE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM RS AF SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 4 U.S.-RUSSIA BILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL DRUG TRAFFICKING WORKING GROUP MEETING This information is Sensitive But Unclassified. Do Not Release to Public Internet. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The U.S. and Russia have powerful reasons to work together to combat illicit trafficking of narcotics. As you heard in September from your counterpart on the working group, Viktor Ivanov, Director of Russian Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN),his priority is engaging you on Afghanistan and specifically suppressing the flow into Russia of Afghan-origin heroin. Heroin from Afghanistan floods Russia leading to high rates of addiction; money from the heroin trade finances terrorist organizations fiercely hostile to the U.S. and Russia. Ivanov and others in the Russian government take issue with the new U.S. whole-of-government approach which emphasizes interdiction over eradication of poppy fields to reduce the production and distribution of Afghan heroin. The U.S. and Russia also have different approaches on how to best reduce demand for heroin within Russia. Although our principal policies on combating the Afghan narcotics trade differ, however, the establishment of this inter-agency working group has provided new opportunities to discuss counternarcotics cooperation in Afghanistan as well as prevention and treatment of substance abuse, financial controls, and international best practices. In addition, the working group has paved a political opening for increased peer-to-peer exchanges and cooperation on the enforcement front. The adverse consequences of inaction or non-cooperation are too severe, particularly for Russia. End Summary. -------------- Heroin Trafficking into Russia -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Trafficking in opiates from Afghanistan (primarily opium and heroin) and their abuse are major problems facing Russian law enforcement and public health agencies. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in October 2009 that Russia has become the largest single market for Afghan-origin heroin, consuming approximately 75,000-80,000 kilograms per year (20 percent of the annual production of Afghan heroin). Russia has one of the highest rates of opiate abuse in the world. Opiates (and hashish to a lesser degree) from Afghanistan are smuggled into Russia through the Central Asian states along the "Northern Route." Russians at all levels routinely blame the U.S. for its failure to curb opium production in Afghanistan, some even seeing in this failure a plot to undermine Russia. FSKN Director Ivanov has repeatedly and publicly called on the U.S. to carry out broad eradication of poppy fields in Afghanistan. -------------- -------------- Scope of Drug Addiction Problem and the Treatment of Drug Offenders -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Russian Ministry of Health estimates that up to six million people (4.2 percent of the population) take drugs on a regular basis in Russia; according to official estimates, 30,000-40,000 people die annually of drug overdoses and another 70,000 deaths are considered drug-related. Health experts estimate that nearly 65 percent of newly detected HIV cases can be attributed to drug use and that, among HIV-positive injecting drug users, about 85-90 percent are Hepatitis C positive. The FSKN reports that there are 400,000 officially registered drug addicts in Russia's treatment centers. A Human Rights Watch study concluded, however, that the effectiveness of treatment offered at state drug treatment clinics "is so low as to be negligible" and constitutes a "violation of the right to health." New models of cognitive therapy are being implemented in treatment centers in St. Petersburg, but substitution therapy (such as programs using methadone, buprenorphine, and naltrexone) has not been fully explored. Methadone remains illegal and politically sensitive. ¶4. (SBU) Director Ivanov has expressed interest in studying the drug court systems used in the U.S. to divert non-violent, substance abusing offenders from prison and jail MOSCOW 00000226 002 OF 004 into treatment. A decade of research indicates that drug courts reduce crime by lowering re-arrest and conviction rates, improving substance abuse treatment outcomes, and reuniting families, and also produces measurable cost benefits. Court reform is an extremely complex subject, and Russia lacks the social service infrastructure that supports drug courts in the U.S. However, Ivanov's interest in drug courts is encouraging, and your working group can foster cooperation and information exchanges between judges, lawyers, public health experts and social service professionals to assist Russia in moving towards alternatives to the criminal prosecution of drug addicts and substance abusers. -------------- -------------- Domestic and International Drug Enforcement Policy and Activities -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The State Anti-Narcotics Committee is a governmental steering body for developing proposals for the President on national anti-narcotics policy, coordinating the activities of various government agencies, and participating in international drug enforcement cooperation efforts. The Committee is chaired by Director Ivanov and comprises seven federal ministers, 14 heads of federal services, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative, members of the Duma and the Federation Council, and other officials. The State Anti-Narcotics Committee was tasked with developing a new national drug control strategy by President Medvedev in 2009. A draft of a ten-year strategy was recently released; once finalized and adopted, it will be in force through 2020. The strategy takes its own whole of government approach as it calls on regional anti-narcotQ commissions, local governmenQ community organizations, and religious associations to be involved. Its objectives: reduce the supply of illegal Qugs, develop and strengthen intQational cooperation in counternarcotics, create and implement nationwide measures to curb the illegal distribution of narcotics, develop effective measures to counter drug trafficking, ensure reliable state control over the illicit movement of drugs and their precursors, and drug abuse prevention. ¶6. (SBU) The FSKN is Russia's only law enforcement agency dedicated solely to enforcing the narcotics laws. The FSKN, which has approximately 35,000 employees and branch offices in every region of Russia, has the responsibility of coordinating the narcotics enforcement activities of other Russian law enforcement agencies. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has a working relationship with the FSKN, but cooperation on cases and sharing information is sporadic and needs to be improved. Despite FSKN's size and coordinating authority over other police agencies, it has not conducted significant cases of heroin distribution organizations within Russia. In addition, although FSKN has publicly stressed the importance of addressing money laundering and other financial aspects of the drug trade, its relationship with Rosfinmonitoring has not been productive. Seizures and forfeitures of drug proceeds are insignificant compared to the volume of heroin sales within Russia. However, FSKN's participation in December in the Illicit Finance Working Group, whose work compliments that of the Drug Trafficking Working Group, is a positive development which may lead to more effective financial investigations of drug trafficking organizations. The FSKN has made efforts to implement effective monitoring of the chemical industry. Prior to the creation of the FSKN, precursor chemicals and pharmaceuticals were governed by a patchwork of regulations enforced by different agencies. Production, transportation, distribution, and import/export of controlled substances now require licensing from the FSKN. ¶7. (SBU) The Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC),based in Almaty, serves as a regional focal point for communication, analysis, and exchange of operational information in "real time" on cross-border crime, as well as a center for the organization and coordination of joint operations. In September 2009, President Medvedev agreed to Russian participation at CARICC, MOSCOW 00000226 003 OF 004 which may encourage greater commitment from Central Asian nations. However, Russia sees the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),comprising Russia and Central Asian countries as an alternative to CARICC and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC),and has spoken of establishing a coordination center like CARICC within CSTO. Twice per year, the CSTO conducts operation "Canal", a week-long interdiction blitz on the Northern route based on shared intelligence among member states. The effectiveness of this approach is questionable. The U.S. believes that multilateral efforts through the NATO-Russia Council and CARICC should be the primary means for advancing our shared goals though we are willing to consider proposals made by the CSTO. ¶8. (SBU) In 2006, then-President Putin authorized the FSKN to station 50 officers in foreign states to facilitate information sharing and joint investigations. The FSKN has opened, or plans to open, liaison offices in at least ten countries, including four of the five Central Asian republics. Russia has indicated that its drug liaison officer in Kazakhstan will also work with CARICC. ¶9. (SBU) Since 2006, roughly 1,000 officials from Central Asia and Afghanistan have been trained on various aspects of counternarcotics work through the NRC. While Russia has been reluctant to pursue practical cooperation with NATO in many areas, this program has consistently stood out as an area where NATO and Russia can work together to achieve common objectives. This joint training initiative is one of the most practical and useful of the Council's various activities. The Russian training center at Domodedovo Airport is an important, but not principal, forum for providing training. Russia has asked the U.S. to encourage Afghan drug enforcement personnel to train at Domodedovo. While the U.S. is supportive of the training, whether to send Afghan Police agents for counternarcotics training at Domodedovo is a decision for the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior. -------------- -------------- U.S. Support for Russia's Anti-narcotics Activities -------------- -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The U.S. government provides foreign assistance to expand Russia's ability to combat narcotics trafficking, especially along Afghan drug routes, reduce drug abuse, and increase access to drug prevention and treatment facilities for those at risk of or infected by HIV/AIDS, the majority of whom are injecting drug users. The U.S. has contributed at least $100,000 for several years for direct participation of DEA trainers at the Domodedovo training center and $2.8 million to support CARICC. Programs like those of the Healthy Russia Foundation, a Russian NGO funded by State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and USAID, contribute to preventing drug abuse by Russian youth, by raising awareness, knowledge, and understanding on drug use prevention and mitigating risks of contracting HIV/AIDS. With support from USAID, the Healthy Russia Foundation is also working to help expand the spectrum of drug treatment services available and to improve the treatment outcomes in select facilities in St. Petersburg and Orenburg. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The Drug Trafficking Working Group provides an opportunity to establish constructive relationships leading to real cooperation and information exchanges to further the interests of the U.S. and Russia in fighting the Afghan heroin trade and the scourge of drug addiction in Russia. Director Ivanov, as the head of FSKN and the State Anti-narcotics Committee, has broad authority over Russia's domestic drug treatment and demand reduction policies and its drug enforcement operations domestically and internationally. While he appears open to discussing drug courts and other approaches to dealing with the problems of drug addiction in Russia, it is not yet clear whether he is prepared to offer significant operational and intelligence cooperation to the U.S. for combating the Afghan heroin trade. Progress toward MOSCOW 00000226 004 OF 004 this objective would be a significant outcome of your visit. I look forward to welcoming you to Moscow February 3. Beyrle