MEDVEDEV: ELITE SUPPORTERS WANT ACTION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000199 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PMAR PHUM PINR ECON EFIN RS SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV: ELITE SUPPORTERS WANT ACTION ON MODERNIZATION REF: MOSCOW 175 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle; reasons 1.4(b/d). ¶1. Summary: Behind the scenes of the January 22 State Council session, Medvedev supporters and observers are looking for signs that the President is willing to implement the political ideals he publicly advocates. Some United Russia insiders sympathetic to Medvedev reportedly pledged the President their fidelity and promised to use their various positions and authority to push his modernization agenda. Medvedev supporters have reportedly sought assurances from the President that he is ready to take action on his public statements. The latest State Council session, however, has left some disappointed and concerned that the true political reform they see as critical to building public and elite support for change will not be championed from above. End Summary. CAMPAIGN TO STRENGTHEN MEDVEDEV'S IMAGE ¶2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, United Russia member, and Kremlin consultant XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that President Medvedev is gradually placing people loyal to him at the lower levels of bureaucracy, but has yet to make an impact at the higher levels. President Medvedev has also not been able to rely on the top United Russia leadership -- Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov and party leaders Vyacheslav Volodin and Andrey Vorobyev - who have not been enthusiastic about Medvedev's modernization and political reform proposals, especially those that involve greater engagement and debate with opposition political forces. ¶3. (C) Key members of Medvedev's team -- Presidential Administration First Deputy Chief Vladislav Surkov and Foundation for Effective Government President Gleb Pavlovskiy -- are well aware of these sentiments inside United Russia, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. The President has no solid constituencies among the elite or general public; therefore, Surkov and Pavlovskiy have begun a campaign to spin Medvedev as able to demonstrate authority, outline the key tasks for the country (economic modernization) and make United Russia more genuinely competitive by engaging the opposition. XXXXXXXXXXXX that this is the plan, but argued that personnel placements in 2010 and 2011 are more critical to any future Medvedev political success than policy decisions. He discounted modernization as nothing more than rhetoric, too amorphous to inspire support from the general public, and too destabilizing to the status quo to garner significant elite backing. ¶4. (C) Medvedev's team has begun 2010 with a media blitz emphasizing the President's modernization agenda and its importance to Russia's future. Leading the charge has been Pavlovskiy, who has not missed a chance to praise Medvedev. Recently he characterized Medvedev as almost "unstoppable" in the unofficial campaign to become the power candidate for presidency in 2012. Others give Medvedev credit for launching the January 22 State Council session, which gave a brief public platform to vocal critics of United Russia and the current political system. Though disappointed that Medvedev joined Putin's defense of the status quo, some more liberally-inclined Medvedev supporters see the event as the start, not the end, of a more public debate on political reform (reftel). ¶5. (C) We understand Medvedev supporters privately are encouraging him to be more aggressive in the pursuit the central theme of his presidency -- modernization of Russia's economy. They maintain that economic modernization is not possible without significant political reform. Although few observers expect any public splits in the tandem during 2010, Kremlin and White House insiders tell us that modernization (defined generally as improving Russia's ability to compete in the world and to provide citizens an improving standard of living) is emerging as the argument both for those who seek political change now, and also for those who believe political reform will only impede economic change. "NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO BE AN APOLITICAL EXPERT" ¶6. (C) Member of the liberal November 4 club of United Russia XXXXXXXXXXXX described to us the contents of a letter that he and other prominent elites wrote to Medvedev declaring their strong support for his modernization agenda. They stated their readiness to organize the work of the Public Chamber to support his policies, his presidency, and his re-election. They reportedly encouraged Medvedev to take concrete steps to implement political and economic reform. They called for allocation of additional resources for regional health, education and infrastructure, and declared their readiness to reorient the work of the Chamber. ¶7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that he and the others involved - Pavlovskiy, Valeriy Fadeyev and Iosif Diskin - went further in their letter, urging Medvedev to move forward on modernization before the 2012 elections. They reportedly declared that Medvedev's re-election would ensure continuation of the process, but that were PM Putin to become president again, the country would stagnate. XXXXXXXXXXXX was frank that sending such a letter to Medvedev was risky, but he and the others felt they had no choice. "We can no longer be apolitical experts in the Chamber," he said. "Everything has become politicized, so it is time to declare which side one is for." ¶8. (C) Fadeyev, chair of the November 4 club of United Russia, friend of Surkov and a strong supporter of Medvedev, fought a fierce campaign for the leadership of the Public Chamber. White House insider (and former Public Chamber member) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us January 21 that when allies of Prime Minister Putin found out about Fadeyev's efforts to use the Chamber to support the President's modernization pronouncements, they gave their support to another candidate, Yevgeniy Velikhov (who won the election). Fadeyev was re-elected chair of the economic committee, from where he can still steer discussions and debate in favor of modernization, though not to the detriment of interests of those loyal to the White House. Fadeyev participated in public meetings January 26 to evaluate Russian economic policy in which he reiterated the need for modernization. COMMENT ¶9. (C) The fact that some experts with influence on regional development (XXXXXXXXXXXX),business (XXXXXXXXXXXX),and politics (XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX) are encouraging Medvedev to implement his modernization and political reform agenda may explain the apparent sensitivity of the White House. Permitting liberal United Russia leaders to use institutions such as the Public Chamber, relatively unknown to the general public but significant for elites, to serve as a forum for discussion of reform threatens the more hard-line supporters of the "status quo." The experts' readiness to encourage Medvedev to make good on his rhetoric is a promising sign. Their reputation and their willingness to declare their support for Medvedev's agenda may encourage other elites to back Medvedev's reforms, building a stronger political support base to press for a second term. Beyrle