START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):

S E C R E T MOSCOW 000185

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2035
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):
(U) NEGOTIATOR MEETING WITH HER COUNTERPART, JANUARY 23,
2010

Classified By: Political M/C Susan Elliott. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d),and
(h).


1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-008.


2. (U) Meeting Date: January 23, 2010
Times: 12:15 - 1:30 P.M.
Place: MFA, Moscow

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Summary
--------------


3. (S) A/S Gottemoeller gave MFA DVBR Director Antonov a
checklist of action items to be discussed during the next
round of START Follow-On talks in Geneva (set to begin
February 1) and said that she was positive about progress
made during the January 22 meeting among CJCS Mullen, NSA
Jones, and CHOD Makarov. Antonov complained that the U.S.
was not taking seriously the GOR's concerns about U.S.
missile defense plans. He also said U.S. plans to place
Patriot training missiles in Poland was hurting the
U.S.-Russia relationship. Despite these negative comments,
Antonov and A/S Gottemoeller agreed that it should be
possible to reach agreement on the new START treaty in four
weeks or fewer.

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A/S Gottemoeller Impressed by Progress
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4. (S) A/S Gottemoeller passed to MFA DVBR Director Anatoliy
Antonov a checklist of items agreed during the meeting among
CJCS Mullen, NSA Jones, and CHOD Makarov on January 22.
(Note: This list is appended below at paragraph 11. End
note.) They would all require action during the upcoming
round of START Follow-On (SFO) talks in Geneva. She said she
was impressed by the progress made during the January 22
meeting. She was positive that draft Protocol language
regarding telemetry that the U.S. conveyed to the Russian
side on 18 January was agreed, with Russian changes. She
said she looked forward to receiving the GOR's proposed
additional language for the Protocol and an Annex on
telemetry, which was to be provided in Geneva when the next
round of talks opened on February 1.


5. (S) A/S Gottemoeller noted that the limit of 800 deployed
and non-deployed launchers, with the addition of deployed and
non-deployed nuclear-equipped heavy bombers, would mean that
the U.S. would have to eliminate more of its launchers than
it originally planned, ensuring that the treaty would result
in true reductions. She added that the U.S. now expected to
see movement on the Unique Identifier (UID) issue from the
Russian side, and stressed that U.S. agreement to count
bombers in the launcher limit and to accept the Russian limit
of 1550 on warheads was linked to the CJCS Mullen-CHOD
Makarov agreement in principle on UIDs.


6. (S) A/S Gottemoeller noted the good discussion that Ted
Warner had had with his Russian counterpart, Col Ilyin, on
monitoring the elimination of ICMBs, SLBMs, and mobile ICBM
launchers. The GOR is proposing to accumulate a substantial
number of eliminated items (solid fuel ICBMs or SLBMs) over a
six-month period. These eliminated items would have large
holes cut in them to confirm elimination. They would be sent
to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of
conducting one of its eight Type 2 inspections of them. The
U.S. would also have the option of conducting a Type 2
inspection of eliminated TELs. The details of these


arrangements will be negotiated in Geneva, and will be
recorded in Section 7 of the Protocol.

-------------- --
Antonov Still Linking START and Missile Defense
-------------- --


7. (S) Antonov told A/S Gottemoeller that, even though CHOD
Makarov did not raise the linkage between the SFO treaty and
U.S. missile defense (MD) plans, it was still an issue that
concerned him. He said that MD concerns influence "all the
GOR does" regarding the treaty. Gottemoeller noted that in
fact the U.S. delegation had noted that the MD issue had not
arisen, and had commented on it. Antonov retorted that he had
advised CHOD Makarov to raise the issue in plenary session,
but he had said that he would instead take it up with Mullen
in a one-on-one setting. Antonov confirmed that in fact CHOD
Makarov had raised the issue in a one-on-one meeting with
Mullen. He complained that the GOR accommodated the U.S. in
its telemetry concerns, and that the U.S. was ignoring
Russia's concerns about MD. "The U.S. will not remove
brackets," he said. Antonov said this was causing people
"behind the scenes" to direct local press to criticize him
personally.


8. (S) A/S Gottemoeller argued that the U.S. had "come a long
way" toward meeting GOR concerns about MD and she warned
Antonov not to "crowd the treaty" with language about MD.
She also argued that the U.S. was ready to talk to Russia
about MD cooperation, but not within the framework of this
treaty, which is about strategic offensive armaments. The
U.S. had already offered a separate venue to talk about
missile defense issues with Russia, and was ready to pursue a
bilateral missile defense cooperation agreement. "Why do we
get no answer to our proposals on this matter?" she asked.

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Patriots Missiles in Poland
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9. (S) Antonov said that U.S. plans to station a battery of
Patriot training missiles in Poland were hurting U.S.-Russia
relations by stoking a "The Russians are coming!" attitude in
Poland. A/S Gottemoeller countered that NSA Jones had
suggested to CHOD Makarov during their lunchtime conversation
that, if the GOR was concerned by these Patriot training
missiles, Russia should take steps to increase joint military
cooperation with the United States and Poland. This
suggestion, however, was discounted. A/S Gottemoeller
commented that the U.S. is open to working together with
Russia and its neighbors to improve mutual confidence, but
Russia needed to learn to cooperate better with NATO states.

-------------- --
Agenda and Schedule for Upcoming Round of Talks
-------------- --


10. (S) Turning to the checklist, Antonov commented that it
looked correct to him, but of course he would have to check
it with the technical experts on his negotiating team. A/S
Gottemoeller acknowledged the point, and mentioned that U.S.
and Russian conforming teams will continue their work in
Geneva beginning on Thursday, January 28, with the goal of
producing a new Joint Draft Text for the beginning of the new
round on February 1. Antonov said that in his personal view,
work on the treaty could be completed in Geneva within two
weeks of February 1. A/S Gottemoeller replied that she
thought that at least three weeks would be required. Antonov
commented that if an agreement is not reached by February 28,


then the two sides should return to their respective capitals
to take stock of the situation and get political guidance on
how to proceed.


11. Checklist from NSA Jones-CJCS Mullen-CHOD Makarov
Meeting, 22 January 2010:

--Telemetry. Draft protocol language that the U.S. conveyed
to the Russian side on 18 January was agreed, with Russian
changes. Russia proposing additional language for the
Protocol and an Annex on telemetry, to be provided in Geneva
when new round opens.

--Limit of 800 on Deployed and Non-Deployed Launchers.
Agreed, with the addition of deployed and non-deployed
nuclear-equipped heavy bombers.

--Counting one nuclear warhead for each nuclear-equipped
heavy bomber: agreed.

--Central limit of 1550 warheads: agreed.

--UIDs. CHOD Makarov-CJCS Mullen agreement in principle;
details in Treaty and Protocol to be negotiated and agreed in
Geneva. (Note: U.S. agreement to counting bombers in the
launcher limit and the 1550 limit on warheads is linked to
the agreement in principle on UIDs.)

--Monitoring Elimination. Russia to accumulate a substantial
number of eliminated items (solid fuel rocket motors) over a
six-month period. These eliminated items would have large
holes cut in them to confirm elimination. They would be sent
to Votkinsk, where the U.S. would have the option of
conducting a Type 2 inspection of them. The U.S. would also
have the option of conducting a separate Type 2 inspection of
eliminated TELs, which would be accumulated in batches at
Pibanshur. For each of these facilities, Votkinsk and
Pibanshur, the U.S. would have to option of conducting two
Type 2 inspections per year, within the quota of eight Type 2
inspections annually. (The quota for Type 1 inspections is
ten.) The details of these arrangements will be negotiated
in Geneva, and will be recorded in Section 7 of the Protocol.


--New round will open in Geneva on February 1. U.S. and
Russian conforming teams will continue their work in Geneva
beginning on Thursday, January 28, with the goal of producing
a new Joint Draft Text for the beginning of the new round on
February 1.


12. (U) A/S Gottemoeller cleared this cable.
Beyrle