NEW POLPRED FOR NORTH CAUCASUS MAKES LANDFALL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000176 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR KDEM RS SUBJECT: NEW POLPRED FOR NORTH CAUCASUS MAKES LANDFALL Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On January 19 Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev fulfilled a promise made during his November 12 address to name a new envoy for the North Caucasus. He carved a new federal district out of the existing Southern Federal Region and named Krasnoyarsk governor Aleksandr Khloponin as not only his PolPred there but also as Russia's newest Deputy Prime Minister. While commentators have generally been positive over his selection, given his management skills at both Norilsk Nickel and as governor of one of Russia's largest regions, most of our contacts have focused on the unenviable position Khloponin will be in answering to both Medvedev and Putin. He will also need to have both good counsel and enough resources from Moscow and influence in the North Caucasus to tackle the corruption and the simmering insurgency endemic to the region. Khloponin has already met twice with the presidents of the six North Caucasus republics under his purview, including Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov. End Summary. Dividing and Conquering Russia's Troublesome South -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Reaction to Medvedev's surprising gambit and his naming of Khloponin has been mostly positive. Both the carving out of the troublesome North Caucasus region from the rest of the Southern Federal District and the double-hatting of Khloponin as both PolPred and Deputy Prime Minister have been viewed as necessary, but without hidden dangers. With only four year before Russia hosts the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, the verdict by commentators has been almost unanimous that Medvedev's redrawing of the district was correct. Most agreed that setting up an entirely new federal district to be headquartered in nearby Pyatigorsk in Stavropol Kray, will give the troubled region the attention it has so sorely deserved for many years. Caucasus expert Sergey Markedonov told us January 21 that the region has been neglected by the Rostov-based southern polpreds ever since Dmitriy Kozak left the post in 2007 to take on the National Projects proposed by then-president Putin and the responsibility of then-deputy prime minister Medvedev. Kozak, who was reportedly offered the job as the new North Caucasus polpred, has remained deputy prime minister in charge of the 2014 Sochi Olympics. ¶3. (C) Markedonov and Caucasian Knot editor Grisha Shvedov warned, however, that the exclusion of the Republic of Adygea from the new North Caucasus Federal Region will stir up tension in the region because it now separates the Circassian diaspora there from fellow ethnic Cherkessk groups in Karachay-Cherkessk and Kabardino-Balkaria. (Note: Caucasian Knot reported that on January 20, immediately following Medvedev's decision to separate the group into two federal districts, the citizen's group "Adygea Khasa" stated its intention to organize protest meetings. Medvedev's decision was probably correct in that the Republic of Adygea is completely surrounded by Krasnodar Kray and does not border the new federal region. End Note). Shvedov went on to add that the exclusion of the neighboring Republic of Kalmykiya into the new region will mean that it will not benefit from any new investment or economic development that Moscow may provide to the new federal region. According to Shvedov, conditions in Kalmykiya will deteriorate even further and add to instability in the region. Its exclusion also divides the republic's ethnic minorities from members of similar groups in Dagestan. Khloponin Could Succeed, Anywhere But the North Caucasus -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Khloponin is seen as a good choice for the job, despite his admitted lack of experience in the region. Our contacts agreed that it was not possible to name a member of any of the region's ethnic groups to the new job. Shvedov said that it would be key for Khloponin to get good advice from specialists on the region, and not from members of the clans and corrupt groups currently in power there. Economic development in the region will be key to solving problems like corruption and the insurgency which have made the region the most dangerous in the Russian Federation. Sergey Arutyunov, head of the Caucasus section at the Russian Academy of Science, was less sanguine. He told us that even if Khloponin succeeds in setting up small and medium sized businesses, develops the regions agriculture section and gets control over the corrupt local governments, the political problems of Prigorodniy region in North Ossetia and demarcation of the border between Ingushetiya and Chechnya MOSCOW 00000176 002 OF 002 will still remain to keep the region on edge. Markedonov was also less optimistic, and noted the lack of transparency in Khloponin's selection and Moscow's failure to come up with a strategic plan for the region. ¶5. (C) The double-hatting of Khloponin as both Medvedev's personal representative to the region and a deputy prime minister under Putin has required a minor change to the law on government (which, as the first step, the State Duma dutifully passed on three readings on January 22) and sets up an interesting lens from which to view the workings of the Medvedev-Putin tandem. This formulation was also necessary, because without the financial resources available to him from Putin's government as well as his imprimatur, Khloponin would have had the minimal influence in the region as current southern region polpred Vladimir Ustinov has had. Interestingly, Khloponin has already met twice with the current presidents of the six North Caucasus republics -- first on January 20 in the company of Kremlin Administration head Sergey Naryshkin through whom he will report as the region's polpred, and then on January 23 alongside Putin in his role as deputy prime minister. Each of the presidents had publicly greeted Khloponin's selection, but during the meeting with Putin, Chechnya's troublesome president Ramzan Kadyrov publicly patronized him by patting him on the shoulder. ¶6. (C) Tatyana Stanovaya, Director of the Analytical Department at the Center for Political Technologies, told us January 26 that Khloponin's appointment is another example of the Presidential Administration and the White House having to come to a consensus. She had heard that the Presidential Administration had proposed Naryshkin (a Putin holdover) to the post in order to open up a spot for Justice Minister Konovalov, but the White House did not approve. It countered with Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov (who she noted does not really play an active role in the current government), but the Kremlin shot that down fearing that if he was even marginally successful he would emerge as a threat to Medvedev. According to Stanovaya, after the Presidential Administration blocked Ivanov, Khloponin (who had wanted to get out of Krasnoyarsk for five years) became the consensus choice. She added that while Khloponin was neither a Medvedev nor a Putin man, he was more likely to get along with Medvedev. (Note: Khloponin reportedly got his start in politics as a member of pro-business -- but now disbanded -- Union of Social Forces. End Note). Stanovaya said that both the Kremlin and the White House have tried to play up Khloponin's appointment, but in reality he probably will not have any say over how the republic's presidents govern. Stanovaya concluded that Khloponin has a good reputation, and his success would be guaranteed if he was anywhere but the North Caucasus. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Khloponin has a tough job ahead of him, made even tougher by the number of people both in Moscow and in the region, who probably want him to fail. Khloponin is Medvedev's second real experiment in local governance, after the naming of Nikita Belykh as governor of Kirov last spring, and will need to be given the tools (money and imprimatur) if he is to succeed. Beyrle