GOM'S LOCAL POLICE REFORM PROPOSAL HAS POTENTIAL, BUT NOT A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000053 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/19 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX SUBJECT: GOM'S LOCAL POLICE REFORM PROPOSAL HAS POTENTIAL, BUT NOT A CURE-ALL CLASSIFIED BY: Gustavo Delgado, Political Minister Counselor; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary. The Calderon government has proposed a new local police model that would consolidate the 2000-plus municipal police forces into 32 entities run by the state and Federal District governments. The proposal enjoys more support from the political opposition than Calderon's earlier efforts to fully nationalize the country's police corporations. The initiative has the potential to ease the implementation of reforms, but reorganization without meaningful progress on the most critical issues, such as better oversight mechanisms and the creation of a real career service for police officers, will be merely cosmetic. End summary. The Proposal -------------- ¶2. (U) During the November 27 reunion of the National Public Security Council, President Calderon publicly backed Secretary for Public Security (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna's proposal to consolidate Mexico's approximately 2000 municipal police forces into 32 state-run entities. Calderon said the council would study the proposal as a potential model that could more effectively combat crime and make up for the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the municipal corporations. The GOM has billed the move as a means to streamline the unwieldy and fractured local structures (particularly in states with many municipalities -- Oaxaca alone has 570) and aid in efforts to professionalize, fund, and clean up the ailing corps. Such a reform would need congressional approval at a minimum and almost certainly a constitutional change requiring the support of two-thirds of the states' legislatures. The State of the Municipalities -------------- ¶3. (U) The GOM's reform proposal is an attempt to deal with what is clearly the weakest link in the policing chain -- the municipal corporations. Counting upwards of 160,000 officers and making up about 40 percent of the country's police forces, the municipal police are poorly staffed, underpaid, barely trained, and often untrustworthy. According to an SSP study released in October, over half the municipal forces counted under 30 officers, and almost 90 percent have staffs of less than 100, seriously limiting their resources to fight crime. The same study found local police to be 
"easy targets for corruption," with monthly salaries of about only 300 USD. In a study released in 2008 conducted by the Superior Auditor of the Federation, a budget oversight office attached to the Chamber of Deputies, over 50 percent of municipal police were found unfit for service. One in five police had less than an elementary education, and only three in ten surpassed that level. The more recently conducted SSP survey mirrors these results, indicating that 70 percent of municipal officers have below an eighth grade education and more than 50 percent are above 35 years of age. ¶4. (U) A separate, independent study released in December 2009 by the Justice in Mexico Project that surveyed some 80 percent of Guadalajara's 6,873 officers shed additional light on the plight of municipal forces. Respondents reported excessively long working hours, with 70 percent working more than 50 hours a week with no overtime, and 20 percent saying they worked extremely extended shifts. 67 percent of officers feel that raises and promotions are not based on merit despite civil service protections in the law, and 72 percent believe that procedures for raises and promotions are unfair. A third of the force perceived severe corruption problems, with 40 percent showing little trust in their superiors and 68 percent saying that corruption is concentrated at high levels of local departments. Even in a developed urban area, municipal forces appear to lack the ability to offer officers the kinds of incentives (such as better pay and more transparent promotion processes) that would insulate them against corruption. Corruption in some municipalities is so severe as to prompt standoffs between federal and local forces, and municipal officers are often implicated in serious criminal matters. The day after the Navy's takedown of Arturo Beltran Leyva in Cuernavaca, 35 municipal police officers failed to report for duty and allegedly "disappeared." Ten municipal officers in Michoacan State were arrested in connection with the murder of twelve federal officers in July. Mexico City daily "La Reforma" reported that 90 percent of the 358 officers arrested in Mexico in 2009 for suspected ties to drug trafficking were members of municipal forces. The Benefits -------------- ¶5. (C) Given the myriad deficiencies in Mexico's municipal police system, folding the 2,000-plus forces into 31 state entities (32 including the Federal District) would offer certain advantages. First, lack of continuity in local government -- mayors serve only 3 year terms and are ineligible for re-election -- has been an important obstacle to meaningful police improvement. Security expert Daniel Sabet noted that constant changes in municipal administrations mean frequent variations in procedures, priorities, and even police leadership. Knowledge is lost, and the opportunity for institutionalization of improvements is minimal. With their five year terms in office, governors at least have a bit more time to fully implement changes. Political and economic analyst Juan Pardinas, who has advocated for the total nationalization of the country's police corporations, told POLOFF in December that such a reform is the second best option considering the political impossibilities of creating a truly national police over the next several years. Combining municipal forces would allow for more streamlined procedures, more centralized and consistent oversight, and, proponents argue, more resources for professionalization. In theory, these improvements, including the regular application of more reliable vetting mechanisms administered by a more trustworthy central authority, would also make infiltration attempts more difficult for drug traffickers and organized criminal groups. The Drawbacks -------------- ¶6. (C) At the same time, some analysts view the proposal as merely a sop to Garcia Luna, a sort of consolation prize to compensate for his push for a national force under his authority coming to naught. David Shirk, Director of the Trans-Border Institute and professor at the University of San Diego, told POLOFF that centralization is often a knee jerk reaction to resolving institutional problems rather than the complete and viable solution. The problem with centralization in this case, he noted, is that state governments themselves are often plagued with corruption, and the state police forces are often nearly as resource-strapped and infiltrated as the municipal organizations. Moreover, Shirk argued that a more centralized control structure could simply serve as a more centralized corruption mechanism -- one-stop shopping for organized criminal groups. A larger state police force would also potentially provide governors, who enjoy a great deal of autonomy in states that function almost as fiefdoms, with a larger political control mechanism. Shirk pointed out that the precedent for state control of a municipal force was the 1960s takeover by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) Yucatan governor of the Merida police when the National Action Party (PAN) won the mayorship there. ¶7. (C) Experts also argue that the proposed model would not change the fundamental problems plaguing the municipal corporations and might instead simply distract from these deeply-rooted issues. Shirk and other experts say that developing a strong community police model -- which has met with some success in Mexico City and Queretaro -- is of key importance, and doing so in a meaningful way with a state-level organization would be more difficult. Moreover, experts point to the need for better recruitment, the creation of a genuine civil service for police with the right kind of incentive system, and more public oversight over security functions as among the most critical for developing stronger policing organizations and items at which most states have not excelled. Additionally, Benjamin Fuentes, Coordinator for Institutional Relations at the budget oversight agency Superior Auditor of the Federation, told Poloff that the municipal-to-state move alone will do little to address the very real budget and funding transparency problems that impede improvements to local security systems. He noted that both state and local governments chronically underspend security budget resources since they can keep unspent money in accounts that are not audited the next fiscal year. They then use the unspent money mostly for electoral purposes. State governments are often amongst the most guilty of such practices. Prospects -------------- ¶8. (C) With the Calderon government's proposal to nationalize the police dead in congress, the municipal-to-state model may offer an alternative parties can sink their teeth into. Governors reluctant to cede any authority to federal authorities have already indicated they are willing to discuss the new proposal. PRI Mexico State Governor Enrique Pena Nieto told the DCM in a meeting months before Garcia Luna's announcement that he was considering making a similar reorganization in his state. PRI governors from Veracruz and Oaxaca -- who in addition to Pena Nieto command powerful congressional blocs -- are reportedly warm to the idea. Nevertheless, the passage of legislation to alter the current police arrangement will be complicated and time-consuming regardless of party support, requiring constitutional amendments, approval by two-thirds of the states, and reforms to the fiscal code. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Folding municipal forces into a single state corporation has the potential to ease the implementation of reforms by centralizing the command structure and allowing local officers access to greater resources. A more central authority at the state level almost certainly would help correct the problems of ensuring effective vetting mechanisms and providing for more consistent salaries and benefits packages -- both of which are mandated through the new National Public Security System legislation. While such a reorganization could merely be cosmetic, if it takes into account the proper execution of internal control measures, the creation of a stronger civil service system, the appropriation of necessary resources and oversight of them, and the improvement of civilian participation in the security process, it could be a real step toward meaningful police reform in Mexico. FEELEY