PEACE TALKS FACILITATOR SAYS PHILIPPINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 000350 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2010 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KISL RP SUBJECT: PEACE TALKS FACILITATOR SAYS PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT, MILF INTENT ON INTERIM AGREEMENT REF: MANILA 251 (PARTIES SHARE DRAFT PEACE ACCORDS BUT POSITIONS ARE FAR APART) Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Leslie A. Bassett, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Malaysian facilitator for peace talks between the Philippine government and the insurgent Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) told the Charge d'Affaires February 18 that the parties had agreed to pursue an interim agreement before the end of President Arroyo's term, in lieu of a more extensive comprehensive pact, in an effort to commit the next Philippine administration to a prescribed course toward a negotiated peace settlement. Facilitator Datuk Othman Bin Abdul Razak told the Charge there would still be challenges in negotiating an interim agreement, but the parties were intent on progress by the end of June. The mechanisms supporting the peace process, notably the International Contact Group and the International Monitoring team, added value and confidence to the peace talks, Othman noted, although he criticized the Philippine government for lacking creativity. Othman suggested the U.S., to support the peace process, could support the creation of a management institute to train future Moro leaders, and increase support to internally displaced persons (IDPs). ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Separately, a Philippine official told POLOFF the government received a draft interim agreement from the MILF outlining a path to autonomy, which the official described as a "creative solution" that was more realistic than the MILF's initial peace proposal (reftel). The new text provides for an MILF-led "Transition Council" operating over a six-year period while GRP-MILF joint teams negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, including contentious territorial and constitutional issues. The official said the government seeks a meeting with the MILF the week of March 1 in Kuala Lumpur to ask questions about the draft text, and aims to formulate a counterproposal by the end of March. END SUMMARY. PARTIES INTENT ON NEGOTIATING INTERIM AGREEMENT -------------- -- ¶3. (C) At a February 18 breakfast meeting with the Charge d'Affaires, the Malaysian facilitator for the Philippine government and MILF peace talks, Datuk Othman Bin Abdul Razak, said that the parties had agreed to pursue an interim agreement before the end of President Arroyo's term in an effort to commit the next Philippine administration to a prescribed course toward a negotiated peace settlement. While Othman acknowledged there would still be challenges in negotiating an interim agreement, he said he and the parties were nonetheless intent on achieving what progress they could by the end of June. The parties had originally intended to meet in Kuala Lumpur the week of February 18-19, he said, but the MILF asked to postpone the meeting to ensure that the International Monitoring Team (IMT) would redeploy to Mindanao before the end of this month, as the MILF had previously demanded. The Charge thanked Othman for his perseverance and creativity, noting that he played a vital role in helping to bring the two sides back to the negotiating table during a very difficult period. The U.S. appreciated and supported Malaysia's role as facilitator, the Charge continued, and did not seek to duplicate Malaysia's efforts. Othman expressed appreciation for the Charge's comments, and said he was uncertain what role Malaysia would play in peace talks after the next Philippine administration takes over. BINDING THE NEW PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT TO THE PROCESS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Othman said he was seeking to "commit the next Philippine administration to a process" that would ensure the government's cooperation in peace negotiations, regardless of the outcome of the May national elections. He said it was important to maintain the "negotiating infrastructure" that the parties had developed thus far, primarily the IMT and the International Contact Group (ICG),which were helping to build confidence among the parties. The ICG, in particular, possessed a moral authority that both parties could respect -- and without which there could have been a walkout during the January talks. The two parties should remain creative in their approaches, he said, and the international community should continue to support them. The Charge noted that Secretary Clinton delivered a strong message of support to MANILA 00000350 002 OF 003 the parties during her November visit to the Philippines, encouraging them not to miss a chance for peace. CRITICIZING PHILIPPINES FOR ITS LACK OF INITIATIVE -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) While pleased that the parties were continuing to engage each other, Othman nonetheless criticized the Philippine government for its lack of initiative on peace talks and in resolving the internally displaced persons (IDPs) situation in Mindanao. The government, he said, demonstrated a lack of creativity in negotiations and was not interested in learning from other peace processes, unlike the MILF, which had learned much from the Northern Ireland example. The U.S., he suggested, could help the Philippine government be more flexible and creative in negotiations. Othman further criticized the Philippine government for neglecting the needs of the remaining IDPs in Mindanao, many of whom still had no livelihoods to return to. The Charge said that the U.S. remained concerned about IDPs, and would look at ways to augment existing U.S. relief programs. SEEKING U.S. SUPPORT FOR TRAINING CENTER -------------- ¶6. (C) Asked how the U.S. might provide additional support to the peace process, Othman suggested that the U.S. could "build capacity" by helping to create a leadership and management institute for future Moro leaders, a concept he said President Arroyo had promised but failed to support, and that he had pitched unsuccessfully to the international donor community. Capacity-building should be in parallel to peace negotiations, he said, to avoid the mistakes made in the late 1990s by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) when Governor Nur Misuari led the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. The MNLF had failed to govern properly, Othman said, and Misuari neglected his governance duties. MILF PROPOSES AN INTERIM AGREEMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) In a separate February 18 meeting with Poloff, Philippine Peace Panel Director Ryan Sullivan said the government received and was reviewing a draft interim agreement from the MILF. (He provided the text, which we have scanned and emailed to EAP/MTS.) The draft text outlined a three-phase path to Moro autonomy through a pre-interim period, an interim period, and an implementation period. The text provides for the creation of an MILF-led "Transition Council" that would operate over six-and-a-half years and exercise its authority through executive bodies with administrative powers on education and culture, social welfare and health, agriculture and agrarian infrastructure, public works and transportation, as well as trade, industry, and taxation. A separate set of GRP-MILF "priority joint task teams" would simultaneously negotiate the components of a comprehensive peace agreement, including the contentious issues of territory, resources, finances, and constitutional reform -- in effect outsourcing the most difficult subjects to technical teams. The MILF's draft text would commit the government to move toward amending the Philippine Constitution, but stops short of requiring this -- a modification of the MILF's earlier position, likely intended to address GRP concerns about circumventing constitutional processes (reftel). The draft text also calls for the U.S., the EU, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and other unspecified countries to participate in an Independent Assessment Evaluation Mission to monitor implementation of the interim agreement. GRP TO REVIEW MILF'S "REALISTIC" PROPOSAL -------------- ¶8. (C) Sullivan said the government was seeking a meeting with the MILF the week of March 1 in Kuala Lumpur to ask about the MILF's draft text, and would aim to formulate a counterproposal by the end of March. Sullivan described the MILF proposal as a "creative solution" more based in reality than the MILF's detailed proposal in January for a comprehensive compact. The government was particularly pleased to see the MILF drop its outright demand for constitutional reform to establish a federal/state relationship with the new autonomous region, although Sullivan said that the GRP would still aim to pass constitutional reforms by the end of the six-year interim period. With regard to the governance of the autonomous MANILA 00000350 003 OF 003 region, Sullivan also noted that the MILF would not require elections for a Bangsamoro Assembly until the implementation period (although this is not explicitly described in the MILF's draft text). The MILF would have governing authority for "essential responsibilities" during the interim period, Sullivan said, at which time it would likely bring in outside experts to help it manage the region's affairs. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Othman's determined effort to keep negotiations moving forward -- which he said he would continue right up until the new Philippine administration takes over -- appears to have helped the parties' sustain their interest in negotiation. Visibly tired and mumbling, Othman did not come across as decidedly optimistic or pessimistic about the peace talks in the coming months. Instead, through his soft-spoken manner, he seemed resigned to the prospect that, despite difficulties and uncertainty, he would remain closely engaged in moving the parties toward a substantive interim agreement, which they appeared intent on negotiating. BASSETT