TFHA01: AMBASSADOR PROTESTS ORTEGA HAITI STATEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000049 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/26 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS EAID OAS HA NU SUBJECT: TFHA01: AMBASSADOR PROTESTS ORTEGA HAITI STATEMENT REF: A) MANAGUA 158 CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C ) Summary: At a January 25 meeting with Foreign Minister Samuel Santos the Ambassador protested President Daniel Ortega's willful mischaracterization of U.S. humanitarian efforts in Haiti as a military occupation. He said that such statements have been noticed in Washington and are damaging to bilateral relations. For his part Santos questioned the need for "so many troops" in Haiti and suggested that the main obstacle to good relations is USG "interference" in Nicaragua (i.e. criticism of electoral fraud). The Ambassador has explained our role in Haiti to the media and criticized those who seek to politicize a humanitarian crisis. Ortega surrogates (including First Lady Rosario Murillo) have repeated his line; we expect they will continue to do so. End Summary. ¶2. (C ) On January 25, the Ambassador met with Foreign Minister Samuel Santos to discuss President Daniel Ortega's assertion (reftel) that U.S. operations in Haiti are aimed at "occupying" that country. The Ambassador was accompanied by the DCM, Santos by MFA Director General for the Americas Orlando Gomez. The Ambassador stated that Ortega's comment had no basis in fact, and that U.S. military had unique capabilities which were needed given the massive scale of the disaster. He noted the U.S. military's role in reopening Port-au-Prince's Airport, the use of helicopters to bring in supplies, and the work of U.S. soldiers in distributing food to key points. He also mentioned the presence of the USNS Comfort, the massive hospital ship which twice before has provided medical attention in Nicaragua, and should be well known to the GON. ¶3. (C ) The Ambassador described the assertions of a U.S. desire to take over Haiti as "absurd," saying that there was no strategic interest which would warrant such a step and that our motivations were purely humanitarian. Ortega's comment had been found offensive by the most senior members of the USG, and, in fact, the Secretary of State had raised it with the ambassadors during the recently concluded Western Hemisphere Chiefs of Mission Conference. He asked that Santos convey USG concerns directly to Ortega. Such statements, he added, further complicate bilateral relations, which are not good. ¶4. (C) Santos promised to report our concerns, but then made an effort to defend Ortega's statement. "Why are there so many troops? Why aren't they under the control of the 'Blue Helmets' (MINUSTAH)?" He added that he had returned from the Latin America-Asia Economic Cooperation Forum (FOCALAE) in Tokyo and that other (unnamed) nations shared Nicaragua's concerns. He agreed that bilateral relations were not good, but said that he always tries to suggest publicly that they are, and urged the USG to do the same. ¶5. (C) The principal bilateral problem, he claimed, was USG interference in Nicaragua's internal affairs (i.e. our complaints about electoral fraud in the November 2008 municipal elections), and sought, as he had in previous occasions, to argue that statistics proved increasing support for the FSLN in successive electoral events. While declining the opportunity to revisit GON arguments regarding the elections, which had been criticized not only by the USG, but by the EU and member states, the Catholic Church and international and domestic NGOs, the Ambassador said that we were still waiting for the National Electoral Council to actually publish detailed electoral results as Nicaraguan law requires. Gomez at that point jumped in, suggesting that it had become a matter of sovereignty and that Nicaraguan electoral authorities would never publish results simply because the USG was demanding them. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador reiterated that Ortega's comments were offensive and damaging to the bilateral relationship. He said that a senior USG delegation was planning to attend the Nicaraguan Army's change of command ceremony on February 21, and warned that if President Ortega repeated false accusations regarding Haiti it would have no choice but to walk out. When Santos and Gomez suggested that this was a threat, the Ambassador said that in the interests of maintaining decent relations, he had felt obligated to give them advance warning. Santos agreed to pass this message on to Ortega. ¶7. (C) At a press encounter earlier that day, the Ambassador took the opportunity to praise the Nicaraguan military presence in Haiti (search and rescue and medical) and to describe the U.S.-led international humanitarian effort there effort there. He said that was "sad that some persons take advantage of this to play politics regarding U.S. actions." The Ambassador's comments were extensively reported in print and electronic media. ¶8. (C) Comment: The effort in Haiti simply does not fit with the GON's preferred portrait of the U.S. as a heartless, interfering, capitalist monster. We can expect that GON spokesmen will stick to their talking points no matter how far they vary from reality. They have already been re-used by First Lady Rosario Murillo, FSLN international affairs chief Jacinto Suarez, and Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United Nations Maria Rubiales CALLAHAN