EXTENSIVE USG ENGAGEMENT WITH SPAIN ON IRAN'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000119 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO (CATALANO),ISN/RA (NEPHEW, ALLEN-CLOSE, MONGIELLO),EUR/ERA (DEAN),EUR/WE (MCKNIGHT, ZERDECKI) DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSC (RYU, MAGSAMEN, HOLGATE, CONNERY, SAMORE, BRADLEY) FOR USUNVIE/IAEA FOR USEU (SIDHU) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2025 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL IR TRGY SP EUN UNSC SUBJECT: EXTENSIVE USG ENGAGEMENT WITH SPAIN ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM REF: A. SECSTATE 9124 ¶B. MADRID 80 ¶C. MADRID 67 ¶D. MADRID 49 ¶E. MADRID 48 ¶F. MADRID 25 ¶G. MADRID 69 ¶H. 09 MADRID 1240 ¶I. 09 MADRID 1210 ¶J. 09 MADRID 1087 ¶K. 09 MADRID 1029 MADRID 00000119 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM Arnold A. Chacon for Reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Post has left no stone unturned in its extensive engagement with the GOS on the USG's dual-track engagement with Iran and the importance of increasing pressure on Iran if Tehran fails to reciprocate with confidence-building measures and transparency regarding its nuclear program. As requested in Ref A, this cable highlights Post's efforts in this regard. Explaining USG policy on Iran and soliciting GOS support for these efforts have been a staple of Ambassador Solomont's talking points in nearly all of his introductory courtesy calls following his arrival to Post on January 9. In preparation for Spain assuming a more influential role in international affairs in its capacity as EU President during the first half of 2010, Post already had ramped up its engagement with the GOS on the Iranian nuclear issue in recent months and notes the MFA's stance has evolved into a more supportive policy for additional sanctions. Spanish officials who just a few months ago were skeptical on the value of additional sanctions - especially if done without the umbrella of a new UNSC resolution - are now telling the U.S. that they are in sync with USG contingency plans for targeted unilateral sanctions and, as the EU President during the first half of 2010, are willing to cooperate in whatever way they can. The February 17 meeting in Washington, DC between King Juan Carlos and President Obama offers another opportunity for the USG to engage with Spain on Iran at the highest levels. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT //The Ambassador's Outreach on Iran// ¶2. (C) In a January 22 meeting with Spanish President Zapatero, Ambassador Solomont indicated that the USG appreciated Foreign Minister Moratinos' recent public comments about the importance of sanctions as a diplomatic tool (Ref B). The Ambassador briefed on U/S Burns' recent meetings with EU Foreign Ministers to lay the ground for a UNSC resolution. While we were not closing the door to dialogue, Iran had not been responsive and the international community must stand together in bringing pressure to bear on Iran. Spain's leadership in the EU is very important on these key foreign policy challenges. ¶3. (C) A day earlier, the Ambassador stressed to opposition leader Mariano Rajoy of the center-right Popular Party (PP) the importance the USG attaches to European and Spanish support for tougher sanctions (Ref C). The Ambassador said the first track of the dual-track strategy is not working and explained the USG is working on a new UNSCR and with allies such as Spain to find ways to enhance existing sanctions and develop new ones. Rajoy said that the PP fully shares USG concerns about Iran and assured the Ambassador the party is supportive. MADRID 00000119 002.2 OF 003 ¶4. (C) The Ambassador even made a passing mention of the USG's dual-track policy on Iran in his January 18 meeting with Interior Minister Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba (Ref D),whose influence in Cabinet and with Zapatero exceeds the formal parameters of his portfolio. ¶5. (C) U/S of State for Political Affairs William Burns and Ambassador Solomont raised the topic of Iran during their January 15 lunch with FM Moratinos (Ref E),who replied that the Spanish EU presidency would offer its "full backing" to U.S. efforts on both the engagement and pressure tracks. U/S Burns briefed on the U.S. strategy going forward, noting that we are at the moment when we have to give full meaning to all elements of it - to include sanctions. Moratinos replied that the U.S. policy on Iran will have Spain's "full backing during the EU Presidency." Engaging the Syrians may also be a helpful tool in further isolating Iran, he added. Moratinos said that as for the dual track approach, Spain was already on this path and mentioned the Spanish energy company Repsol's restraint on conducting business in Iran as an example. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador on January 12 discussed Iran with National Security Advisor-equivalent Bernardino Leon (Ref F), who said Spain stands ready to support the USG and added that UNSC support will be instrumental to achieving our objectives. Leon said he had long been concerned about the proliferation effects from an unchecked Iran, noting that Iran's actions threaten not only the Middle East but also the Maghreb on Spain's border. //Additional Outreach on Iran// ¶7. (C) In addition to the Ambassador's engagement with the GOS outlined above, Post and other USG officials have held numerous other meetings with key GOS contacts on Iran's nuclear program. Highlights of this outreach are discussed below. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Stephen Mull, Special Advisor to P, on January 15 held talks with Carmen Bujan, MFA Director General (DG, A/S-level) for Strategic Affairs and Terrorism, and Fidel Sendagorta, DG for the Mediterranean, Maghreb and Near East, regarding key updates in the USG's engagement track with Iran and the need to begin focusing on a UNSC resolution for additional sanctions if Tehran refuses to engage (Ref G). Mull emphasized the need for the USG and Spain - as rotating EU President - to coordinate closely on this issue. Bujan and Sendagorta reacted positively to the USG proposals on the types of new sanctions that could be implemented and stated that the USG can count on Spain's full support as EU President. ¶9. (C) On January 11-12, 2010, House Committee on Foreign Affairs staff director Richard Kessler and two professional staff members visited Madrid (see Septel) to inform GOS officials of pending legislation (H.R. 2194) that, if passed in its current form, would toughen sanctions on Iran by punishing trade and investment in its petroleum sector. The staff delegation met with officials at the MFA, the Presidency, and the Finance Ministry, as well as an opposition legislator, several prominent think tanks, and media representatives. They underscored the high priority the U.S. places on combating Iran's proliferating activities and our hope for a robust UNSCR. MADRID 00000119 003.2 OF 003 ¶10. (S//NF) With an eye toward cementing GOS political support for USG policy regarding Iran's nuclear program, Post arranged for a Washington-based analyst to travel to Madrid to deliver an intelligence briefing on December 21 to key MFA officials on the technical capabilities of Iran's nuclear program (Ref H). DG Carmen Bujan, Carlos Torres, Counselor for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and Joaquin de Aristegui Laborde, Deputy DG for Bilateral Economic Relations focused their questions on the timeframe of political ramifications of the information conveyed in the briefing, the international community's red lines for Iran's technological capabilities, and the effectiveness of potential further economic sanctions, respectively. ¶11. (C) In meetings in Madrid during October 22-23, officials from the U.S. Departments of State and Treasury detailed the U.S. dual-track approach on Iran and discussed the prospect of eventually pursuing additional sanctions on Iran, if Tehran failed to reciprocate good-faith engagement. MFA DG for Foreign Policy Alfonso Lucini (P-equivalent),DG Fidel Sendagorta, and other key MFA officials appeared skeptical and wary of additional sanctions at the time (Ref J). The U.S. delegation also held technical meetings with working-level contacts at the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce and the Ministry of Finance and Economy. Spanish interlocutors noted that Spain vigorously enforces existing sanctions and would be willing to implement additional measures, if they were consensus actions under UNSC and/or EU authority. ¶12. (C) Then Charge d' Affaires Arnold A. Chacon on October 19 discussed Iran with NSA-equivalent Bernardino Leon (Ref K),who noted that while in Israel, Zapatero had been very clear with the press regarding Spain's stance: if Iran did not negotiate seriously, the international community must be united in taking appropriate measures (i.e., sanctions). Leon said that, regarding Iran, the U.S. and Spain were on the "same sheet of music." SOLOMONT