SCENESETTER FOR NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000053 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/S LAYLWARD AND JNAMDE NSC FOR MGAVIN AND EHUIE ADDIS PLEASE PASS NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GAVIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2020 TAGS: PREL ECON EAID KCOR ZA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS MICHELLE GAVIN'S VISIT LUSAKA 00000053 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Koplovsky for reasons 1.4(d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary and Introduction: The U.S. Mission to Zambia welcomes the visit of Michelle Gavin, Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council and Senior Adviser to the President. Your visit comes at a time when President Rupiah Banda's administration has changed course on a number of issues important to the United States. Your interventions can help set Zambia on a corrected course, bolstering progress on democracy and promoting transparency and accountability. You should also press for enhanced cooperation in multilateral fora and a larger peacekeeping role. In 2009, the GRZ pivoted away from anti-corruption, good governance, and regional stability, issues that had been a focus of the Mwanawasa government. Banda is struggling to consolidate control within the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy party while maintaining national support in the lead up to 2011 general elections -- an election that could see a significant percentage of young voters disenfranchised if voter registration efforts do not begin in earnest soon. Banda has also changed course on Zimbabwe, deferring to President Mugabe as an elder liberation struggle hero. Despite significant financial U.S. assistance to Zambia, the GRZ is an inconsistent partner on regional and multilateral issues and has generally toed the African Union/Non-Aligned Movement line in international fora. Zambia weathered the economic downturn relatively well but still struggles to reduce poverty through economic growth or to attract significant foreign investment. End Summary and Introduction. Relationship Stressed But Improving -------------- ¶2. (C) After the late President Mwanawasa's death in 2008, Banda was a consensus choice to replace him -- an older, not-so-ambitious candidate to serve out Mwanawasa's term and make way for new leadership in 2011. His campaign was based on a "Mwanawasa legacy" platform, but Banda quickly tacked away from the previous government's agenda. Mwanawasa's death left a weakened and fractured MMD. Banda has pursued a more ambitious personal political agenda, exacerbating the rifts. He now must work to consolidate control over the MMD while maintaining his support nationally. Banda has removed or reshuffled competent cabinet members and national party executive committee officials considered Mwanawasa's people and replaced them with his own loyalists in a bid to consolidate control over the party (and government resources) in the lead up to an MMD party congress in 2010. ¶3. (C) Since the 2008 by-election, Banda and his administration have demonstrated increasing intolerance of public criticism. The GRZ has attempted to restrain the independent media through intimidation, such as the unsuccessful criminal case against "Post" editor Chansa Kabwela on charges of distributing pornography, and through restrictive media regulation legislation. In August 2009, the government passed an NGO bill that could be used to silence organizations that are deemed not be operating in the "national interest." These and other actions demonstrate the GRZ's lack of commitment to freedom of speech and expression when it does not serve the GRZ's purposes. On many occasions, GRZ representatives have told the Ambassador and Emboffs that Zambia's young, fragile democracy cannot be exposed to unfettered freedoms that countries like the United States enjoy. ¶4. (C) The Banda administration has lacked Mwanawasa's commitment to fight corruption. In August 2009, former President Frederick Chiluba was acquitted of corruption charges by a Zambian court. In the lead up to the acquittal, Banda treated Chiluba as an honored former head of state, speaking positively about him in the press and seating Chiluba and his wife at the head table at government events. After the acquittal, the GRZ removed Max Nkole, lead prosecutor of the Task Force on Corruption, which prosecuted all Chiluba-era corruption cases, for attempting to submit a request to appeal the decision. The GRZ announced that the government would not appeal the decision and disbanded the Task Force, moving its remaining cases to the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC),which is headed by a Banda loyalist. The GRZ has yet to register the approximately USD 45 million UK civil court decision against Chiluba in a Zambian court. In October 2009, at the nadir of its relationship with the international community, the GRZ publicly accused "foreign LUSAKA 00000053 002.2 OF 003 diplomats" of interfering in its sovereignty and "inciting people" against the government after a memo describing a conversation between Banda and donor representatives, including the Ambassador, about the Chiluba case was leaked to the press. The GRZ backed off after a number of European Ambassadors and Charge registered their concern with the Foreign Minister. ¶5. (C) In December 2009, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) board re-selected Zambia for Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Compact eligibility. In making its decision, the board expressed concerns about the GRZ's commitment to good governance, anti-corruption efforts, and freedom of speech and expression, essential to Zambia's continued qualification for a compact. While the GRZ touts Zambia's FY10 MCA indicator scores as proof that its commitment to transparency and good governance remains strong, the lagging indicators are based on information from 2008 or earlier. ¶6. (C) In a series of recent meetings, GRZ officials have touted the government's new anti-corruption policy as proof that Banda is serious about fighting corruption. The policy, announced in August 2009, would strengthen the ACC, pass and implement new anti-corruption legislation, and create a financial intelligence unit that meets international standards. The GRZ has also committed to engage with NGOs on an implementation framework for the NGO law and has, for now, shelved its restrictive media regulation bill in favor of re-engagement with media organizations to develop a less restrictive self-regulatory mechanism. While the GRZ's words are encouraging, Post has yet to see concrete action. The "Youth Bulge" and the 2011 Elections -------------- ¶7. (C) Zambia is a young country, with an estimated 55 percent of its 12.8 million people under the age of 19. The Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) has done no voter registration since December 2005, which means that any Zambian citizen who has turned 18 since then is unable to vote. The GRZ has promised to initiate a significant voter registration drive in the lead up to the 2011 elections, but has yet to commit the necessary resources. It is estimated that unless issuance of voter and national registration cards (both required to vote) begins immediately, up to 2.8 million voters could be disenfranchised in the 2011 elections. The GRZ has been dragging its feet on mobilizing voter registration drives, likely because a majority of Zambia's youth is expected to support the opposition in 2011. Initial efforts by the Ministry of Home Affairs to issue national registration cards have been somewhat anemic, especially in opposition strongholds. Retreating from Leadership on Regional Issues -------------- ¶8. (C) Banda has refrained from speaking critically on the situation in Zimbabwe. Banda has said that he prefers to pursue quiet, deferential regional diplomacy that emphasizes patience. Soon after becoming president, Banda privately claimed to support his predecessor's public positions on Zimbabwe but said that, as the most junior head of state in the region, he must defer to his elders and let SADC take the lead on creating consensus on Zimbabwe. In public he has been supportive of Mugabe as an elder of Africa's liberation struggle and described him as "a brave leader" and a "selfless nationalist who has withstood pressure from his enemies." ¶9. (C) Zambia's military, totaling just over 20 thousand personnel, deploy with paramilitary elements of the Zambia Police Service for peacekeeping missions and are generally considered competent peacekeepers. Zambia currently has 700 peacekeepers deployed, including on UN missions in southern Sudan, Darfur, and Congo. Zambia has not responded to the African Union (AU) call for peacekeepers in Somalia and is unlikely to do so unless the AU increases pay scales and provides equipment. ¶10. (C) The United States provided battalion-level military training in 2007 under the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program. Offers of a second round of training have been politely rebuffed for various and changing reasons. A major hurdle to bilateral military cooperation is the GRZ's rejection of AFRICOM -- the GRZ views AFRICOM as a threat to Zambia's sovereignty and LUSAKA 00000053 003.2 OF 003 suspects militarization of foreign policy. An Inconsistent Partner on Multilateral Issues -------------- - ¶11. (C) Although Zambia ranks 28th in the world in U.S. assistance per capita and enjoys one of the largest Peace Corps programs, our cooperation on many multilateral issues is minimal. Zambia's 2008 voting coincidence on non-consensus resolutions during the 2008 UNGA was 16 percent (and zero percent on votes deemed important by the USG). In the months leading up to the 2009 UNGA, Post engaged the MFA at multiple levels to encourage the GRZ to vote its principles rather than in lockstep with the AU/Non-Aligned Movement positions. MFA officials expressed an interest in changing the way it approaches votes at UNGA, saying that they felt their voice was lost by bloc voting even on resolutions about which they have different views. While final tallies for 2009 UNGA voting have not been completed, Post does not expect a significant improvement in voting coincidence and expects a similar result on important votes. ¶12. (C) In other fora, while Zambia has not recognized Kosovo's independence, the GRZ did support Kosovo's bid to join the World Bank and IMF. Zambia supported the U.S. candidacy for the Human Rights Council and the renewal of the Sudan Special Rapporteur's mandate within the Council. Zambian Economy and GRZ Focus on Investment -------------- ¶13. (C) A sharp rise in global copper prices and a bumper maize harvest helped Zambia to rebound quickly from the 2008 economic downturn to an estimated five to six percent real GDP growth in 2009. During the short-lived economic crisis, the GRZ renewed its focus on diversifying the economy to insulate it against volatile global copper prices. Unfortunately, Zambia's strong economic performance could cause the GRZ's focus on economic diversification to flounder as it has during past periods of robust copper-fueled economic growth. ¶14. (C) In your possible meeting in Addis Ababa, Banda and/or Foreign Minister Pande will likely raise the issue of American investment in Zambia. The USG has responded to GRZ interest in increasing bilateral trade and investment by working toward an Open Skies civil aviation agreement and proposing the creation of an informal working group on bilateral trade and investment lead by USTR on our side. Both efforts have been delayed repeatedly by GRZ inaction. Foreign Direct Investment is further constrained by a high cost of doing business. Zambia has made strides to streamline business licensing and provide incentives to foreign investors, but high fuel costs, poor infrastructure, restrictive labor laws and a dearth of skilled labor continue to limit foreign investment. Engaging the GRZ -------------- ¶15. (C) Your possible meeting with President Banda and/or Foreign Minister Pande on the margins ofthe AU summit and your subsequent visit to Lusaka will provide an opportunity to reinforce Washington's interest in governance and anti-corruption issues in Zambia. You may wish to stress that commitment to good governance and fighting corruption is essential not just for Zambia's continued qualification for an MCA compact, but for the country's standing in the region and the world. You can remind your Zambian interlocutors that it is crucial that 2011 general elections are free and fair so that the next Zambian administration be seen as credible both domestically and abroad. You can also explain that the United States looks to Zambia to be a partner in the region and on the world stage. As such, we will expect Zambia to cooperate in multilateral fora, to help solve regional problems, and to provide peacekeeping forces, for which we stand ready to assist with training and equipment. KOPLOVSKY