Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10LONDON84
2010-01-15 12:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy London
Cable title:
UK VIEWS ON IRAN SANCTIONS: UN, EU AND U.S.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000084
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2020
TAGS: ETTC ECON KTFN EFIN IR US
SUBJECT: UK VIEWS ON IRAN SANCTIONS: UN, EU AND U.S.
Classified By: RICHARD ALBRIGHT, ECONOMIC MINISTER COUNSELOR, FOR REASO NS 1.4 B&D
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000084
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2020
TAGS: ETTC ECON KTFN EFIN IR US
SUBJECT: UK VIEWS ON IRAN SANCTIONS: UN, EU AND U.S.
Classified By: RICHARD ALBRIGHT, ECONOMIC MINISTER COUNSELOR, FOR REASO NS 1.4 B&D 1. (C/NF) Summary: The British government is not optimistic about the January 16 New York meeting on Iran sanctions. China is sending a strong negative signal by pulling its Beijing representative from the talks and being represented only by its UN Mission. A far-reaching attempt by the U.S., UK and Security Council members which fails, however, could spur the EU to undertake a stronger EU Autonomous package. In either event, the EU is sensitive to any USG act to sanction European companies. End summary
UN Sanctions Process --------------
2. (C/NF) Antony Phillipson, the UK Foreign Office's Iran Coordinator, told us January 14 that the January 16 P5 1 meeting in NY will be very indicative of how the next round of sanctions will work. He is not optimistic about the signal Beijing is sending by being represented only by its NY-based representative, and anticipated China will not allow a strong sanctions package to move forward. On the other hand, he said, it could be that the presence of the NY-based official vice a Beijing-based one would permit an uninterrupted discussion among the other five countries. In that case, however, he speculated that Russia could become the spoiler (or that the rotating UNSC members, such as Brazil, Turkey or Bosnia could play that role if discussion progressed that far).
3. (C/NF) The ideal timeline in the UN, Phillipson said, is for P5 1 agreement by late January, and a vote in February. He noted, however, that pinning hopes of success solely on a French chair of the UNSC is unrealistic. The best way to view having a friendly P5 member in the chair is not that France would be able to drive through a strong resolution, but rather that there wouldn't be an unfriendly country in the chair who could block action.
4. (C/NF) Presuming China would try to block a strong sanctions package, Phillipson told us he hoped the U.S. would be candid afterwards about what we were trying to achieve in this round, even if it would upset China. He urged us to clearly state that China's failure to be properly represented was a major cause of breakdown, and to address publicly the concerns about the future of the P5 1. The UK message to other EU Member States will be that "Five countries support stronger sanctions, but China refuses to attend at the appropriate level despite the meeting having been arranged at the time and location of its convenience. China has its own agenda. The EU needs to move ahead."
5. (C/NF) Phillipson suggested that ideally, the UN and EU sanctions' processes work in parallel, but with the UN slightly ahead - to give cover to more cautious EU governments. Despite the need to come to consensus on a resolution, the P5 1 need to reach high in trying to get the most robust measure possible. If we try and fail, it would build a stronger argument to get EU governments to support EU autonomous measures, Phillipson told us.
Progress on EU Parallel Sanctions --------------
6. (C/NF) The UK and France (who are "joined at the hip") and Germany held meetings January 11 to discuss next steps in EU sanctions against Iran, Phillipson said. The meetings were a follow-up to the December 11 EU Council political mandate to begin looking into possible sanctions to "accompany" the UN sanctions process in the case of failed negotiation attempts with Tehran. The European Commission was tasked to look at: the effectiveness of sanctions; the vulnerabilities in Iran; and the case for the EU to act autonomously. The January 11 discussions were also a prelude to the January 25 Foreign Affairs Council, which the UK hopes will lead to a more focused target list, and a political recommendation that the EU undertake both UN and EU autonomous action, Phillipson told us.
7. (C/NF) The EU is better positioned now to impose some sort of sanctions than ever before. The UK, France and Germany have for months been trying to build a "core" EU group on sanctions, which includes Italy, Spain and Sweden - although they will not refer to them as such to avoid offending other EU countries. Italy, according to Phillipson, is very eager to be "inside the tent," and is much more positive on sanctions than it had been previously. The Italians are talking about oil and gas sanctions, but don't want to cut off high-level contacts with Tehran because their Foreign Minister desperately wants to visit Tehran. Spain is included because it has the EU presidency, and is receptive to taking the Iranian threat more seriously than it had before due to its desire to improve relations with the U.S. FM Moratinos also understands the strategic problems in the Middle East posed by an unstable Iran, but in Madrid there are counter-balancing concerns over Spain's own energy security, according to Phillipson.
8. (C/NF) Sweden is considered to be an "outlier" on the sanctions issue, but the UK and France want the Swedes inside and discussing, rather than outside and working with other skeptical states. Stockholm is still unconvinced of the benefit of the EU operating independently on this issue outside the UN framework. Malta will never be fully convinced about the need for sanctions on transportation because of its relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran's Shipping Line (IRISL),but if a majority lines up for sanctions, it would be hard for Malta, Greece and Cyprus to block, Phillipson said.
EU Member States Sensitive to Sanctions on Their Companies -------------- --------------
9. (C/NF) U/S for Political Affairs Bill Burns' meeting on January 15th with the 27 EU political directors will go a long way towards selling our position and soothing the concerns of hesitant members, Phillipson told us. But the Europeans are still confused as to the true U.S. sanctions focus: energy or Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The UK has responded that the focus should be both, and include anything else that can bring about a change in Iran's behavior, but this should be further explained to the EU-27. Phillipson also said EU governments are sensitive to the mixed signals posed by current congressional legislation (Iran Sanctions Act) and proposed legislation (Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act). Phillipson said that anything that targets European companies instead of Iran would create problems in the EU sanctions process. If the focus of attention shifts to EU-U.S. sanctions disputes rather than going after Iran, it will hinder the ability of the EU to impose autonomous sanctions. Phillipson said that new U.S. legislation that can be fully waived by the President would pose fewer problems for the EU.
10. (C/NF) Some European states "spook easily", Phillipson told us, and some seek to be spooked. He said that discussions of potential sanctions against refined petroleum products was a positive tactic. However, it won't work in practice, as there are too many ways around such sanctions, and would only serve the Iranian regime's goals of portraying the West as the cause of their citizens' misery.
Comment --------------
11. (C/NF) If HMG has correctly read European winds, the EU may be well-positioned to take action against Iran in tandem with UN action (or in place of UN sanctions if that approach fails.) Phillipson's comments on EU concerns about potential sanctions against EU companies echo what we have heard previously from Foreign Office and Business and Innovative Skills Department officials who fear U.S. action could slow EU momentum at a crucial period, or, worse, provoke the EU to invoke its 1997 Blocking Statute against U.S. sanctions legislation and/or undertake a WTO case. Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2020
TAGS: ETTC ECON KTFN EFIN IR US
SUBJECT: UK VIEWS ON IRAN SANCTIONS: UN, EU AND U.S.
Classified By: RICHARD ALBRIGHT, ECONOMIC MINISTER COUNSELOR, FOR REASO NS 1.4 B&D 1. (C/NF) Summary: The British government is not optimistic about the January 16 New York meeting on Iran sanctions. China is sending a strong negative signal by pulling its Beijing representative from the talks and being represented only by its UN Mission. A far-reaching attempt by the U.S., UK and Security Council members which fails, however, could spur the EU to undertake a stronger EU Autonomous package. In either event, the EU is sensitive to any USG act to sanction European companies. End summary
UN Sanctions Process --------------
2. (C/NF) Antony Phillipson, the UK Foreign Office's Iran Coordinator, told us January 14 that the January 16 P5 1 meeting in NY will be very indicative of how the next round of sanctions will work. He is not optimistic about the signal Beijing is sending by being represented only by its NY-based representative, and anticipated China will not allow a strong sanctions package to move forward. On the other hand, he said, it could be that the presence of the NY-based official vice a Beijing-based one would permit an uninterrupted discussion among the other five countries. In that case, however, he speculated that Russia could become the spoiler (or that the rotating UNSC members, such as Brazil, Turkey or Bosnia could play that role if discussion progressed that far).
3. (C/NF) The ideal timeline in the UN, Phillipson said, is for P5 1 agreement by late January, and a vote in February. He noted, however, that pinning hopes of success solely on a French chair of the UNSC is unrealistic. The best way to view having a friendly P5 member in the chair is not that France would be able to drive through a strong resolution, but rather that there wouldn't be an unfriendly country in the chair who could block action.
4. (C/NF) Presuming China would try to block a strong sanctions package, Phillipson told us he hoped the U.S. would be candid afterwards about what we were trying to achieve in this round, even if it would upset China. He urged us to clearly state that China's failure to be properly represented was a major cause of breakdown, and to address publicly the concerns about the future of the P5 1. The UK message to other EU Member States will be that "Five countries support stronger sanctions, but China refuses to attend at the appropriate level despite the meeting having been arranged at the time and location of its convenience. China has its own agenda. The EU needs to move ahead."
5. (C/NF) Phillipson suggested that ideally, the UN and EU sanctions' processes work in parallel, but with the UN slightly ahead - to give cover to more cautious EU governments. Despite the need to come to consensus on a resolution, the P5 1 need to reach high in trying to get the most robust measure possible. If we try and fail, it would build a stronger argument to get EU governments to support EU autonomous measures, Phillipson told us.
Progress on EU Parallel Sanctions --------------
6. (C/NF) The UK and France (who are "joined at the hip") and Germany held meetings January 11 to discuss next steps in EU sanctions against Iran, Phillipson said. The meetings were a follow-up to the December 11 EU Council political mandate to begin looking into possible sanctions to "accompany" the UN sanctions process in the case of failed negotiation attempts with Tehran. The European Commission was tasked to look at: the effectiveness of sanctions; the vulnerabilities in Iran; and the case for the EU to act autonomously. The January 11 discussions were also a prelude to the January 25 Foreign Affairs Council, which the UK hopes will lead to a more focused target list, and a political recommendation that the EU undertake both UN and EU autonomous action, Phillipson told us.
7. (C/NF) The EU is better positioned now to impose some sort of sanctions than ever before. The UK, France and Germany have for months been trying to build a "core" EU group on sanctions, which includes Italy, Spain and Sweden - although they will not refer to them as such to avoid offending other EU countries. Italy, according to Phillipson, is very eager to be "inside the tent," and is much more positive on sanctions than it had been previously. The Italians are talking about oil and gas sanctions, but don't want to cut off high-level contacts with Tehran because their Foreign Minister desperately wants to visit Tehran. Spain is included because it has the EU presidency, and is receptive to taking the Iranian threat more seriously than it had before due to its desire to improve relations with the U.S. FM Moratinos also understands the strategic problems in the Middle East posed by an unstable Iran, but in Madrid there are counter-balancing concerns over Spain's own energy security, according to Phillipson.
8. (C/NF) Sweden is considered to be an "outlier" on the sanctions issue, but the UK and France want the Swedes inside and discussing, rather than outside and working with other skeptical states. Stockholm is still unconvinced of the benefit of the EU operating independently on this issue outside the UN framework. Malta will never be fully convinced about the need for sanctions on transportation because of its relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran's Shipping Line (IRISL),but if a majority lines up for sanctions, it would be hard for Malta, Greece and Cyprus to block, Phillipson said.
EU Member States Sensitive to Sanctions on Their Companies -------------- --------------
9. (C/NF) U/S for Political Affairs Bill Burns' meeting on January 15th with the 27 EU political directors will go a long way towards selling our position and soothing the concerns of hesitant members, Phillipson told us. But the Europeans are still confused as to the true U.S. sanctions focus: energy or Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The UK has responded that the focus should be both, and include anything else that can bring about a change in Iran's behavior, but this should be further explained to the EU-27. Phillipson also said EU governments are sensitive to the mixed signals posed by current congressional legislation (Iran Sanctions Act) and proposed legislation (Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act). Phillipson said that anything that targets European companies instead of Iran would create problems in the EU sanctions process. If the focus of attention shifts to EU-U.S. sanctions disputes rather than going after Iran, it will hinder the ability of the EU to impose autonomous sanctions. Phillipson said that new U.S. legislation that can be fully waived by the President would pose fewer problems for the EU.
10. (C/NF) Some European states "spook easily", Phillipson told us, and some seek to be spooked. He said that discussions of potential sanctions against refined petroleum products was a positive tactic. However, it won't work in practice, as there are too many ways around such sanctions, and would only serve the Iranian regime's goals of portraying the West as the cause of their citizens' misery.
Comment --------------
11. (C/NF) If HMG has correctly read European winds, the EU may be well-positioned to take action against Iran in tandem with UN action (or in place of UN sanctions if that approach fails.) Phillipson's comments on EU concerns about potential sanctions against EU companies echo what we have heard previously from Foreign Office and Business and Innovative Skills Department officials who fear U.S. action could slow EU momentum at a crucial period, or, worse, provoke the EU to invoke its 1997 Blocking Statute against U.S. sanctions legislation and/or undertake a WTO case. Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX ed_Kingdom
SUSMAN