Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10LJUBLJANA1
2010-01-04 10:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ljubljana
Cable title:
SLOVENIA: OMLT ON ORDER FOR OCT 2010, LOGISTICS
VZCZCXRO0085 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHLJ #0001/01 0041053 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041053Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7610 INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1197 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0073 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHMFIUU/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000001
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2020
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR AF SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: OMLT ON ORDER FOR OCT 2010, LOGISTICS
NEXT ON THE MENU
Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, reasons 1.4(b,d)
Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000001
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2020
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR AF SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: OMLT ON ORDER FOR OCT 2010, LOGISTICS
NEXT ON THE MENU
Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, reasons 1.4(b,d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Summary: Slovenia announced on December 24 that it
would lead an Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) in
Afghanistan beginning no later than October 2010, with
functional caveats lifted to allow Slovene troops to
accompany Afghan security forces on operations. USG support
will be required if the Slovenians are to meet the October 30
deadline. Defense Minister Jelusic told CDA on December 30
that the compressed timeframe prior to deployment will
challenge the Slovene Armed Forces (SAF) to have all
logistics and training completed by October, with the most
pressing concern being the immediate procurement of
up-armored HMMWVs or similar armored vehicles. The current
wait for up-armored HMMWVs purchased through FMS is more than
a year, and the Minister of Defense told CDA that she will
not deploy Slovenian forces without adequate armor. The
Colorado National Guard plans to contribute up to 25 troops
with specialized skills to the Slovenian OMLT during its
first year of deployment, but will also be hard-pressed to
meet the October deployment deadline if preliminary steps are
not completed and a formal agreement is not reached before
the end of January. Minister Jelusic stressed that the
government needed to ramp up efforts on the "homefront" to
engage both key political players and the general public in
the run-up to deployment. End Summary.
One OMLT, No Functional Caveats
--------------
2. (SBU) The coalition government made its official decision
on December 24 to lift functional caveats and lead an OMLT in
Herat, where Slovene soldiers currently provide force
protection on an Italian base. The Slovene troops will train
an Afghan battalion, and are expected to begin in late
October 2010. The government's decision allows Slovenia to
deploy the OMLT for two years, with 4 six-month rotations of
approximately 90 troops (30-45 in the OMLT and the rest
providing force protection). A new mandate would be required
to extend the deployment beyond the initial two years. The
Slovene troops, augmented by up to 25 Colorado Army National
Guard (CONG) soldiers, will take over the OMLT from a U.S.
Embedded Training Team (ETT) currently operating out of Camp
Stone in Herat.
3. (SBU) Slovenia notified Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) at the December 7 ISAF force generation
conference of its plan to field an OMLT. With the final
decision on December 24, Slovenia can now receive a formal
tasking from SHAPE to take over the OMLT from the U.S. ETT in
Herat. Slovene Armed Forces (SAF) will then perform a
mission analysis to determine the number and composition of
its contingent, name a commander for the OMLT, and then
submit a Request for Forces (RFF) letter to Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR),who will evaluate the proposal and
send an RFF letter to the CONG. The normal range for
National Guard contributions to state partnership OMLTs runs
from 12-30 troops, and Colorado has informally notified
Slovenia that the CONG can contribute up to 25 troops.
Logistics and Assistance: HMMWVs and Training
--------------
4. (SBU) State Secretary Krek told CDA on December 30 that
the Slovene troops will need up-armored HMMWVs for the OMLT.
Krek noted that Slovenia would procure the HMMWVs any way
possible, though Foreign Military Sales (FMS) would be
preferable due to cost. ODC has already begun to fast-track
a request through the FMS process, but the normal lead time
for production and delivery exceeds 12 months. Other
procurement requests, for night-vision goggles, laser-range
finders, and communications equipment, could follow as
Slovenia discusses lessons learned with its neighbors,
Croatia and Hungary, who have fielded OMLTs.
5. (SBU) CONG has also notified Slovenia that it needs a
270-day lead time to have its troops ready to complete
training and preparations for deployment, meaning that a
late-October deployment would require Slovenia to complete
the RFF process and have formal agreement with Colorado by
late January. After formal agreement, it is likely that SAF
LJUBLJANA 00000001 002 OF 002
and CONG would coordinate on a fact-finding trip to Herat in
early spring as well as on joint pre-deployment training in
Germany in spring and summer.
Homefront Opinions and Emotions
--------------
6. (C) Minister Jelusic told CDA on December 30 that
convincing the homefront of the value and need for an OMLT
would be a tough task, in addition to managing the logistics
for deployment. She highlighted the close nature of Slovene
society and how it is not just soldiers' families who are
affected, but extended families, friends and communities. On
the political front, Jelusic and FM Zbogar briefed the
parliamentary Defense Committee on the government's proposal
on December 17. Zbogar later noted to CDA that the briefing
had succeeded in getting some of the more skeptical MPs to
understand the urgency of ISAF's mission and how Slovenia
could raise the quality of its ISAF contribution without
increasing substantially the number of troops deployed.
Zbogar reported that the committee wanted a detailed status
report in one year to reevaluate their support for the
deployment, and that the government would appreciate the
Embassy's support on a proactive public diplomacy strategy in
the meantime. CDA reaffirmed our commitment to support the
OMLT deployment, both with help from the Colorado Army
National Guard on the military side, and with public
diplomacy assistance in Slovenia.
Comment: Decision taken, Now Comes the Hard Work
-------------- --------------
7. (C) After a long process overshadowed by the emotional
border dispute with Croatia and the economic crisis, the GoS
finally made a tough and much-appreciated decision to
qualitatively improve its ISAF contribution. This deployment
will not happen without USG support. The Minister of Defense
told us flat-out that it would be political suicide for this
government to deploy Slovenian troops in a new, more
dangerous mission without adequate armored vehicles. The MOD
has the money, but they will need our help to acquire the
vehicles -- by purchase or lease, from the U.S. or a third
country -- in time to deploy by October. SHAPE, the
Slovenian Armed Forces, and the Colorado Guard will have to
work together seamlessly for at least the next 30 days in
order to get the CONG contribution rolling.
8. (C) Though the government announced both increased
civilian assistance for Afghanistan and the possibility of
fielding an OMLT in mid-December, the public, media, and the
political class seemed to pay more attention to the civilian
assistance. This highlights the challenge facing the
government as it ramps up for deployment in October 2010: how
to sell the idea to a skeptical public and handle the
inevitable questions about Slovene troops in harm's way. As
Krek told CDA in November, the policy sounds good now, but if
there is a casualty, "you know what will hit the fan." We
are urging the government to prepare for such situations,
especially on the public relations front. With the political
decision now made, the reality of the challenge must spur the
government to more serious public diplomacy efforts. END
COMMENT.
SHULTZ
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2020
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR AF SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: OMLT ON ORDER FOR OCT 2010, LOGISTICS
NEXT ON THE MENU
Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, reasons 1.4(b,d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Summary: Slovenia announced on December 24 that it
would lead an Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) in
Afghanistan beginning no later than October 2010, with
functional caveats lifted to allow Slovene troops to
accompany Afghan security forces on operations. USG support
will be required if the Slovenians are to meet the October 30
deadline. Defense Minister Jelusic told CDA on December 30
that the compressed timeframe prior to deployment will
challenge the Slovene Armed Forces (SAF) to have all
logistics and training completed by October, with the most
pressing concern being the immediate procurement of
up-armored HMMWVs or similar armored vehicles. The current
wait for up-armored HMMWVs purchased through FMS is more than
a year, and the Minister of Defense told CDA that she will
not deploy Slovenian forces without adequate armor. The
Colorado National Guard plans to contribute up to 25 troops
with specialized skills to the Slovenian OMLT during its
first year of deployment, but will also be hard-pressed to
meet the October deployment deadline if preliminary steps are
not completed and a formal agreement is not reached before
the end of January. Minister Jelusic stressed that the
government needed to ramp up efforts on the "homefront" to
engage both key political players and the general public in
the run-up to deployment. End Summary.
One OMLT, No Functional Caveats
--------------
2. (SBU) The coalition government made its official decision
on December 24 to lift functional caveats and lead an OMLT in
Herat, where Slovene soldiers currently provide force
protection on an Italian base. The Slovene troops will train
an Afghan battalion, and are expected to begin in late
October 2010. The government's decision allows Slovenia to
deploy the OMLT for two years, with 4 six-month rotations of
approximately 90 troops (30-45 in the OMLT and the rest
providing force protection). A new mandate would be required
to extend the deployment beyond the initial two years. The
Slovene troops, augmented by up to 25 Colorado Army National
Guard (CONG) soldiers, will take over the OMLT from a U.S.
Embedded Training Team (ETT) currently operating out of Camp
Stone in Herat.
3. (SBU) Slovenia notified Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) at the December 7 ISAF force generation
conference of its plan to field an OMLT. With the final
decision on December 24, Slovenia can now receive a formal
tasking from SHAPE to take over the OMLT from the U.S. ETT in
Herat. Slovene Armed Forces (SAF) will then perform a
mission analysis to determine the number and composition of
its contingent, name a commander for the OMLT, and then
submit a Request for Forces (RFF) letter to Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR),who will evaluate the proposal and
send an RFF letter to the CONG. The normal range for
National Guard contributions to state partnership OMLTs runs
from 12-30 troops, and Colorado has informally notified
Slovenia that the CONG can contribute up to 25 troops.
Logistics and Assistance: HMMWVs and Training
--------------
4. (SBU) State Secretary Krek told CDA on December 30 that
the Slovene troops will need up-armored HMMWVs for the OMLT.
Krek noted that Slovenia would procure the HMMWVs any way
possible, though Foreign Military Sales (FMS) would be
preferable due to cost. ODC has already begun to fast-track
a request through the FMS process, but the normal lead time
for production and delivery exceeds 12 months. Other
procurement requests, for night-vision goggles, laser-range
finders, and communications equipment, could follow as
Slovenia discusses lessons learned with its neighbors,
Croatia and Hungary, who have fielded OMLTs.
5. (SBU) CONG has also notified Slovenia that it needs a
270-day lead time to have its troops ready to complete
training and preparations for deployment, meaning that a
late-October deployment would require Slovenia to complete
the RFF process and have formal agreement with Colorado by
late January. After formal agreement, it is likely that SAF
LJUBLJANA 00000001 002 OF 002
and CONG would coordinate on a fact-finding trip to Herat in
early spring as well as on joint pre-deployment training in
Germany in spring and summer.
Homefront Opinions and Emotions
--------------
6. (C) Minister Jelusic told CDA on December 30 that
convincing the homefront of the value and need for an OMLT
would be a tough task, in addition to managing the logistics
for deployment. She highlighted the close nature of Slovene
society and how it is not just soldiers' families who are
affected, but extended families, friends and communities. On
the political front, Jelusic and FM Zbogar briefed the
parliamentary Defense Committee on the government's proposal
on December 17. Zbogar later noted to CDA that the briefing
had succeeded in getting some of the more skeptical MPs to
understand the urgency of ISAF's mission and how Slovenia
could raise the quality of its ISAF contribution without
increasing substantially the number of troops deployed.
Zbogar reported that the committee wanted a detailed status
report in one year to reevaluate their support for the
deployment, and that the government would appreciate the
Embassy's support on a proactive public diplomacy strategy in
the meantime. CDA reaffirmed our commitment to support the
OMLT deployment, both with help from the Colorado Army
National Guard on the military side, and with public
diplomacy assistance in Slovenia.
Comment: Decision taken, Now Comes the Hard Work
-------------- --------------
7. (C) After a long process overshadowed by the emotional
border dispute with Croatia and the economic crisis, the GoS
finally made a tough and much-appreciated decision to
qualitatively improve its ISAF contribution. This deployment
will not happen without USG support. The Minister of Defense
told us flat-out that it would be political suicide for this
government to deploy Slovenian troops in a new, more
dangerous mission without adequate armored vehicles. The MOD
has the money, but they will need our help to acquire the
vehicles -- by purchase or lease, from the U.S. or a third
country -- in time to deploy by October. SHAPE, the
Slovenian Armed Forces, and the Colorado Guard will have to
work together seamlessly for at least the next 30 days in
order to get the CONG contribution rolling.
8. (C) Though the government announced both increased
civilian assistance for Afghanistan and the possibility of
fielding an OMLT in mid-December, the public, media, and the
political class seemed to pay more attention to the civilian
assistance. This highlights the challenge facing the
government as it ramps up for deployment in October 2010: how
to sell the idea to a skeptical public and handle the
inevitable questions about Slovene troops in harm's way. As
Krek told CDA in November, the policy sounds good now, but if
there is a casualty, "you know what will hit the fan." We
are urging the government to prepare for such situations,
especially on the public relations front. With the political
decision now made, the reality of the challenge must spur the
government to more serious public diplomacy efforts. END
COMMENT.
SHULTZ