SLOVENIA: OMLT ON ORDER FOR OCT 2010, LOGISTICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000001 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2020 TAGS: PREL NATO MARR AF SI SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: OMLT ON ORDER FOR OCT 2010, LOGISTICS NEXT ON THE MENU Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, reasons 1.4(b,d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary: Slovenia announced on December 24 that it would lead an Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) in Afghanistan beginning no later than October 2010, with functional caveats lifted to allow Slovene troops to accompany Afghan security forces on operations. USG support will be required if the Slovenians are to meet the October 30 deadline. Defense Minister Jelusic told CDA on December 30 that the compressed timeframe prior to deployment will challenge the Slovene Armed Forces (SAF) to have all logistics and training completed by October, with the most pressing concern being the immediate procurement of up-armored HMMWVs or similar armored vehicles. The current wait for up-armored HMMWVs purchased through FMS is more than a year, and the Minister of Defense told CDA that she will not deploy Slovenian forces without adequate armor. The Colorado National Guard plans to contribute up to 25 troops with specialized skills to the Slovenian OMLT during its first year of deployment, but will also be hard-pressed to meet the October deployment deadline if preliminary steps are not completed and a formal agreement is not reached before the end of January. Minister Jelusic stressed that the government needed to ramp up efforts on the "homefront" to engage both key political players and the general public in the run-up to deployment. End Summary. One OMLT, No Functional Caveats -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The coalition government made its official decision on December 24 to lift functional caveats and lead an OMLT in Herat, where Slovene soldiers currently provide force protection on an Italian base. The Slovene troops will train an Afghan battalion, and are expected to begin in late October 2010. The government's decision allows Slovenia to deploy the OMLT for two years, with 4 six-month rotations of approximately 90 troops (30-45 in the OMLT and the rest providing force protection). A new mandate would be required to extend the deployment beyond the initial two years. The Slovene troops, augmented by up to 25 Colorado Army National Guard (CONG) soldiers, will take over the OMLT from a U.S. Embedded Training Team (ETT) currently operating out of Camp Stone in Herat. ¶3. (SBU) Slovenia notified Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at the December 7 ISAF force generation conference of its plan to field an OMLT. With the final decision on December 24, Slovenia can now receive a formal tasking from SHAPE to take over the OMLT from the U.S. ETT in Herat. Slovene Armed Forces (SAF) will then perform a mission analysis to determine the number and composition of its contingent, name a commander for the OMLT, and then submit a Request for Forces (RFF) letter to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),who will evaluate the proposal and send an RFF letter to the CONG. The normal range for National Guard contributions to state partnership OMLTs runs from 12-30 troops, and Colorado has informally notified Slovenia that the CONG can contribute up to 25 troops. Logistics and Assistance: HMMWVs and Training -------------- ¶4. (SBU) State Secretary Krek told CDA on December 30 that the Slovene troops will need up-armored HMMWVs for the OMLT. Krek noted that Slovenia would procure the HMMWVs any way possible, though Foreign Military Sales (FMS) would be preferable due to cost. ODC has already begun to fast-track a request through the FMS process, but the normal lead time for production and delivery exceeds 12 months. Other procurement requests, for night-vision goggles, laser-range finders, and communications equipment, could follow as Slovenia discusses lessons learned with its neighbors, Croatia and Hungary, who have fielded OMLTs. ¶5. (SBU) CONG has also notified Slovenia that it needs a 270-day lead time to have its troops ready to complete training and preparations for deployment, meaning that a late-October deployment would require Slovenia to complete the RFF process and have formal agreement with Colorado by late January. After formal agreement, it is likely that SAF LJUBLJANA 00000001 002 OF 002 and CONG would coordinate on a fact-finding trip to Herat in early spring as well as on joint pre-deployment training in Germany in spring and summer. Homefront Opinions and Emotions -------------- ¶6. (C) Minister Jelusic told CDA on December 30 that convincing the homefront of the value and need for an OMLT would be a tough task, in addition to managing the logistics for deployment. She highlighted the close nature of Slovene society and how it is not just soldiers' families who are affected, but extended families, friends and communities. On the political front, Jelusic and FM Zbogar briefed the parliamentary Defense Committee on the government's proposal on December 17. Zbogar later noted to CDA that the briefing had succeeded in getting some of the more skeptical MPs to understand the urgency of ISAF's mission and how Slovenia could raise the quality of its ISAF contribution without increasing substantially the number of troops deployed. Zbogar reported that the committee wanted a detailed status report in one year to reevaluate their support for the deployment, and that the government would appreciate the Embassy's support on a proactive public diplomacy strategy in the meantime. CDA reaffirmed our commitment to support the OMLT deployment, both with help from the Colorado Army National Guard on the military side, and with public diplomacy assistance in Slovenia. Comment: Decision taken, Now Comes the Hard Work -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) After a long process overshadowed by the emotional border dispute with Croatia and the economic crisis, the GoS finally made a tough and much-appreciated decision to qualitatively improve its ISAF contribution. This deployment will not happen without USG support. The Minister of Defense told us flat-out that it would be political suicide for this government to deploy Slovenian troops in a new, more dangerous mission without adequate armored vehicles. The MOD has the money, but they will need our help to acquire the vehicles -- by purchase or lease, from the U.S. or a third country -- in time to deploy by October. SHAPE, the Slovenian Armed Forces, and the Colorado Guard will have to work together seamlessly for at least the next 30 days in order to get the CONG contribution rolling. ¶8. (C) Though the government announced both increased civilian assistance for Afghanistan and the possibility of fielding an OMLT in mid-December, the public, media, and the political class seemed to pay more attention to the civilian assistance. This highlights the challenge facing the government as it ramps up for deployment in October 2010: how to sell the idea to a skeptical public and handle the inevitable questions about Slovene troops in harm's way. As Krek told CDA in November, the policy sounds good now, but if there is a casualty, "you know what will hit the fan." We are urging the government to prepare for such situations, especially on the public relations front. With the political decision now made, the reality of the challenge must spur the government to more serious public diplomacy efforts. END COMMENT. SHULTZ