MALAWI 2009-2010 INCSR PART II, MONEY LAUNDERING AND

UNCLAS LILONGWE 000026

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INL, SCT, EEB, AF/S, AND PHAEDRA GWYNN
JUSTICE FOR AFMLS, OIA, and OPDAT
TREASURY FOR FINCEN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KCRM EFIN PTER SNAR MI
SUBJECT: MALAWI 2009-2010 INCSR PART II, MONEY LAUNDERING AND
FINANCIAL CRIMES

REF: SECSTATE 114960


1. Post is pleased to submit the following responses to the request
for information contained in reftel. Post's most recent INCSR
report dates from 2007. Accordingly, Post has chosen to reply to
the reftel questions. Answers are keyed to reftel paragraph
numbers.


2. Post contact for the 2009-2010 INCSR, Part II is Economic /
Commercial Officer Daniel N. Daley.

--------------
Replies to Questions
--------------


3. [ref para 14: Key information needed from all posts is
information that fully addresses the following: (1) describe the
anti-money aundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) plans,
programs and timetables adopted by the country; (2) discuss the
adequacy of the legal and law enforcement measures taken to combat
money laundering and terrorist financing; and (3) identify the
accomplishments achieved in accord with those plans, including in
particular whether the host country has successfully prosecuted
money laundering and/or terrorist financing cases (if so, please
provide the number of convictions in 2009 and details of noteworthy
cases). If necessary, please provide additional information on these
points and please convert any foreign currency figures into U.S.
dollars.]

(1) Malawi has enacted the Money Laundering, proceeds of Serious
Crime and Terrorist Financing Act 2006(ML Act). There is also a
National AML/CFT Committee which helps coordinate various aspects on
AML/CFT in the country, including developing an AML/CFT national
strategy to run from 2010 to 2015. The strategy has been approved by
the Ministry of Finance, and is expected to be launched soon.

The national strategy has 7 key strategic objectives, which include:
1) to develop and consolidate effective AML/CFT legal and regulatory
frameworks to fight money laundering and terrorist financing; 2) to
develop adequate institutional frameworks and capacity within all
key stakeholders to ensure they play their respective roles; 3) to
increase awareness of AML/CFT matters, roles and responsibilities by
the public and all reporting institutions; 4) to undertake research
and assessments of money laundering and terrorist financing risks
and vulnerabilities; and 5) to develop and sustain domestic,
regional and international cooperation.

(2) The Money Laundring Act addresses all aspects of AML/CFT and is
substantially consistent with the FATF 40 plus 9 Special
Recommendations. For proper implementation of the ML Act, however,
there is need for law enforcement agencies and financial
institutions to be trained on AML/CFT matters. Recognizing this
need, the FIU has been working with technical assistance providers
such as the World Bank to develop the capacity of these agencies so
that they acquire requisite expertise and skills to investigate and
prosecute financial crimes. In 2009 the FIU trained 55 individuals
in financial analysis to help them in investigating financial
crimes, espeQally money laundering cases.

(3) Achievements in 2009 include:

* Training 55 officials from Reserve Bank of Malawi, FIU,
Anti-Corruption Bureau, National Intelligence Services, Immigration,
Malawi Gaming Board, Malawi Police Services on AML/CFT issues;
* Training financial institutions on their reporting obligations,
detection of money laundering, etc;
* Presentations made to members of Society of Accountants;
* Started implementing public awareness campaigns through
bill-boards, newspaper inserts and brochures;
* Admission of the FIU to the Egmont Group, which will foster
exchange of information necessary for effective analysis of
suspicious transactions involving other countries.
The FIU has disseminated reports to various investigative
authorities. These cases are still under investigation. Malawi has
prosecuted 3 cases in the past year for possession of foreign
exchange suspected to have been obtained illegally. The amounts
involved for the cases totaled around US$183,000


4. [ref para 15: Please also provide the names/numbers of relevant
laws and regulations related to AML/CFT. We expect that numerous
governments have made significant changes in legislation and
implementing regulations to establish or strengthen their anti-money
laundering regimes, including counter-terrorist financing
components, subsequent to the submission of earlier responses to
questionnaires developed by the United Nations (UN) or the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF). We request that you report on such
changes made in 2009 and answer all questions in this cable.

Historical information should be in the 2009 INCSR already, and does
not need to be revisited as long as it is accurate.]

* The country passed the amended Banking Act, Penal code, and Police
Act in December 2009. This Act introduced new provisions in line
with the ML Act of 2006, empowering the Reserve Bank to take
enforcement action against non-compliance with the ML Act and
related regulations.

* The country finalized draft regulations addressing most of
deficiencies highlighted by the World Bank in their AML/CFT
Evaluation report.

* The country developed necessary instruments to monitor, detect and
confiscate illegal cross-border shipment of currency and bearer
negotiable instruments in compliance with FATF Special
Recommendation IX. These will be implemented in 2010.

* The country developed mechanisms for dissemination of the UN
Consolidated List (sent to the FIU by the office of UN Ambassador in
New York) and US OFAC list (received from FDIC electronically) to
financial institutions and other reporting institutions. This helps
to ensure that financial institutions don't open accounts or receive
funds suspected to be related to terrorist financing.


5. [ref para 16: Please identify any problems that are considered
deterrents to more effective host government responses (e.g.,
absence of laws, lack of political will, resource constraints,
corruption, inefficient financial systems, opposition by the
financial system or other groups, malfunctioning of the judicial
system to prosecute AML/CFT cases, lack of training for effective
AML/CFT law enforcement, etc.).]

* Investigative agencies do not have adequate financial and human
resource capacity to carry out effective investigation and
successful prosecution of money laundering cases. Investigative
agencies have also shown reluctance to seriously tackle the often
complex financial cases referred to them by the FIU.

* The judiciary does not appreciate issues of money laundering
sufficiently for them to make appropriate determination on cases
that they handle.


6. [ref para 18: Is the jurisdiction considered an important
regional
financial center? What is its significance in terms of money
laundering?]

Malawi is not a regional financial center.


7. [ref para 19: To the extent it is known, is money
laundering/terrorist financing primarily related to proceeds from
illegal narcotics, psychotropic substances, and chemical precursors?
(If applicable, specify drug.) If not, what is/are the major
source/s of the proceeds? Also, to the extent known, do the
criminal proceeds laundered in the jurisdiction derive primarily
from domestic or foreign criminal activity? Are the money
laundering proceeds controlled by drug-trafficking organizations,
organized crime, or terrorist groups operating locally? What is the
extent that public corruption contributes to money
laundering/terrorist financing in the host country? If applicable,
please provide examples.]

* Malawi has not conducted a systematic assessment of the problem of
money laundering in order to determine major sources of proceeds of
crime. No other illegal narcotics, psychotropic substances or
chemical precursors are known to be used or trafficked in
significant quantities.

* Based on media reports, the police have seized cannabis in
significant quantities, suggesting that it is a major source of
proceeds of crime.

* FIU case reports also indicate that tax evasion is another source
of proceeds of crime.

* Reports also indicate that Malawi is used as a transit route by
human traffickers.


8. [ref para 20: Is there a significant black market for smuggled
goods in the country? If so, is there evidence to suggest that it
is significantly funded by narcotic proceeds or other illicit
proceeds? Does contraband smuggling generate funds that are
laundered through the financial system?]

There are a significant amount of smuggled goods on the market,
especially pirated tapes, CDs and DVDs. These usually come from

Asia, West Africa and East Africa. There is no evidence that this
activity is significantly funded by narcotic proceeds.


9. [ref para 21: Does money laundering/terrorist financing occur in
the formal financial sector, within an offshore financial center or
free trade zone, or in the non-bank financial system (e.g. exchange
houses) or via alternative remittance systems, such as hawala,
hundi, or other systems? Please note if the country is experiencing
an overall increase or decrease in financial crimes.]

No reliable information is available what sectors may be used for
money laundering and/or terrorist financing, although the Formal
financial sector and the Non-bank financial system are the most
probable. Controls through supervision have been put in place in
both of these sectors. Malawi's National AML/CFT Committee intends
to examine this question as a priority issue. There is no
information on increase/decrease trends; this question will also be
addressed in the upcoming AML/CFT report.


10. [ref para 22: To the post's knowledge, do the jurisdiction's
financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving
international narcotics trafficking proceeds that include
significant amounts of U.S. currency or currency derived from
illegal drug sales in the United States or that otherwise
significantly affect the United States?]

No; to Post's knowledge Malawi's financial institutions are not
engaged in currency transactions involving international narcotics
trafficking.

11. [ref para 23: Is there any indication that trade-based money
laundering occurs in the post's jurisdiction?]

Yes.


12. [ref para 24: Is the country considered an offshore financial
center?
An offshore financial center is a financial center where attractive
financial and corporate services, such as favorable tax treatment or
freedom from exchange controls, are provided normally, but not
necessarily exclusively, to non-residents. The vulnerability for
money laundering is most acute when services include absent and/or
relaxed rules on disclosing any information regarding the beneficial
owner of legal entities such as trusts or international business
companies).]

No; Malawi is not an off-shore financial center and its financial
institutions are not allowed to deal with such centers.

13. [ref para 25: Are offshore banks, international business
companies, or other forms of exempt or shell companies or trusts
permitted? If so, how do offshore regulations differ from onshore?
For example:]

[a. Does the country license offshore banks and businesses? Does
the country adequately perform background checks on applicants for
banking and business licenses in its offshore sector? Is a physical
presence required, or does the jurisdiction allow shell banks and
/or companies?]

Offshore banks are not licensed in Malawi. In addition shell banks
are not licensed in Malawi.
[b. Please provide: the numbers of offshore banks; trusts; offshore
international business companies, exempt companies, or shell
companies; and any other offshore financial services businesses,
such as insurance companies, mutual fund companies, trust companies
and agents.]

There are none in the Malawi financial sector. The Reserve Bank,
which licenses banks, insurance companies etc., undertakes a
rigorous assessment of all applications before a license is issued.
Other entities such as business companies, legal practitioners,
notaries, accountants have been included in the ML Act to ensure
they comply with the same anti-money laundering and combating the
financing of terrorism obligations. The office of the Registrar of
Companies, lawyers and accountants have been trained in AML/CFT to
ensure they carry out their work properly.
[c. Are nominee (anonymous) directors and/or trustees allowed?]

Nominee directors or trustees are not allowed in the Malawi
financial sector.

14. [ref para 26: Please provide the number of offshore casinos or
internet gaming sites. Does the jurisdiction license and regulate
these sites?]

There are no offshore casinos and internet gaming sites in Malawi.
Domestic casinos in Malawi are regulated by the Malawi Gaming Board
and the Financial Intelligence Unit.

15. [ref para 27: Is there a separate regulatory agency for the

offshore sector, or is the offshore financial center regulated by
the onshore regulator? Are regulations governing offshore banks and
businesses different in any key respects from regulations governing
domestic banks and businesses? If so, how? For example, are
offshore financial institutions required to perform customer due
diligence and file suspicious activity reports?) If not, what
businesses and services are inadequately supervised and regulated?]

There is no offshore sector in Malawi; there is no separate
regulatory agency for the offshore sector.

16. [ref para 28: Are there free trade zones operating in the
jurisdiction? If so, please give the number and name, and briefly
describe their operations, capability and function.]

There are no free trade zones (FTZs) operating in Malawi. Nineteen
companies operate as export processing zones (EPZs),however.
Companies licensed as EPZs are eligible to import inputs duty free
(must be bonded) on condition that their entire production is
exported.


17. [ref para 29: Is there any indication that these FTZs are being
used in trade-based money laundering schemes or by the financiers of
terrorism?]

Post has no seen indications that the EPZ regime is being used in
this way.


18. [ref para 30: What types of supervisory programs and/or due
diligence procedures are in place to monitor activities in the FTZ
zone? Are there identification requirements for companies and
individuals who use the zone?]

The Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA) is responsible for supervision of
the export processing regime. The MRA monitors imports of bonded
inputs and is present when an EPZ company draws down on these goods.
The MRA also certifies the end products and that all EPZ products
are exported. Companies must be licensed by the Ministry of
Industry and Trade to operate as an EPZ.


19. [ref para 31: What laws and regulations exist in relation to
AML/CFT? Is money laundering a criminal offense in this
jurisdiction? Does the law apply only to drug-related money
laundering? Does the jurisdiction list specific crimes as predicate
offences or take an "all serious crimes" approach? In some
jurisdictions, anti-money laundering laws are applicable to
predicate offences defined as "all serious crimes," crimes that
carry a threshold minimum sentence in the jurisdiction's penal code.
If there is a threshold minimum sentence, what is that threshold? If
the country has a "list" approach, what offenses are covered?]

Money laundering is legislated for under the Money Laundering,
Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act of 2006 (ML
Act). The law is applicable to other types of predicate offences
apart from drug related offences. The definition of serious crimes
under the ML Act includes all offences for whose punishment is 12
months imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death.


20. [ref para 32: Has the country enacted secrecy laws that prevent
disclosure of client and ownership information by domestic and
offshore financial services companies to bank supervisors and law
enforcement authorities?]

No. In addition, the ML act specifically states in Section 44 that
the provision of the Act shall effect not withstanding any
obligations to secrecy or other restrictions on disclosure of
information.


21. [ref para 33: Are bearer shares permitted for banks and/or for
companies?]

These are not permitted in any circumstances.


22. [ref para 34: Which entities supervise and examine financial
institutions for compliance with AML/CFT laws and regulations? What
is their capacity to conduct compliance investigations (i.e. are
they adequately staffed and trained)?]

According to the ML Act, institutions that had supervisors before
the enactment of the ML Act will continue to be supervised by the
same supervisors on AML/CFT compliance. Thus, industries such as
insurance companies, banks, and forex bureaus will continue to be
supervised by the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM). The FIU will assume
responsibility for supervision of institutions such as estate agents
who do not have a supervisor. However it should be noted that the
FIU has residual powers to enforce compliance by entering any
financial institution and searching records maintained by such
financial institution. RBM and FIU staff capable of conducting

compliance investigations, but are limited by human capacity and
financial limitations.


23. [ref para 35: Are banks and other financial institutions
required to know, record, and report the identity of customers
engaging in significant transactions, including the recording of
large currency transactions at thresholds appropriate to the
country's economic situation? What is the statutory threshold?]

Yes, banks are expected to know record and report identity of all
their customers. All transactions above 1 million Malawi Kwacha
(about USD 6,850) must also be reported to the FIU, under Section 28
of the ML Act.

Stakeholder consultations are currently ongoing in order to
determine a threshold below which simplified identification
documents will not be required. This will be in line with the
policy to promote the use of the financial system by low income
bracket of the population.


24. [ref para 36: Are banks and other financial institutions
required to maintain for an adequate time records necessary to
reconstruct significant transactions through financial institutions
in order to be able to respond quickly to information requests from
appropriate government authorities in narcotics-related or other
money laundering or terrorist finance cases? For how long?]

Yes; financial institutions are required to maintain records, in a
manner that will allow for the transaction to be reconstructed. The
records are to be maintained for at least seven years. This is
provided for in Section 27 of the ML Act.


25. [ref para 37: Do financial institutions report suspicious
transactions? Which ones? Is such reporting mandatory or
voluntary? Is reporting required for all suspicious transactions,
or is there a threshold amount below which suspicious transaction
reports are not required?]

Yes; financial institutions are required to report by mandate, and
there are penalties for failing to do so. Financial Institutions
are required to submit three kinds of reports: A) suspicious
transaction reports, which do not involve any threshold amount, B)
large currency transaction reports which are reports on any
transaction in cash exceeding the threshold of one million Malawi
kwacha, and C) reports on electronic funds transfers, which is not
yet operational.


26. [ref para 38: Are reporting individuals protected by law with
respect to their cooperation with law enforcement entities?]

Yes; reporting individuals are protected. The ML Act makes it crime
for any person to reveal that a suspicious transaction report has
been filed or that there are other investigations taking place. It
is also a crime to reveal the identity of a person who has filed a
suspicious transaction report.


27. [ref para 39: Are the AML/CFT controls as described in the
preceding 5 paragraphs applied to non-bank financial institutions
(NBFIs) and designated non-financial businesses and professions
(DNFBPs),such as exchange houses, stock brokerages, cash couriers,
casinos, dealers in jewels and precious metals, insurance companies,
pawn shops, realtors, high-worth dealers in art and vehicles, and to
intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, notaries, or
broker/dealers? Which are subject to the requirements to report
suspicious transactions and/or large transactions? Which entities
have actually filed such reports?]

Yes; DNFBPs are subject to the same regulations as Financial
Institutions. Under the ML Act section 2, DNFBPs are actually
defined as financial institutions and are treated as such in term of
what is expected from them.


28. [ref para 40: Do current laws provide for the establishment and
funding of a financial intelligence unit (FIU)?]

An FIU is established under Section 11 (1) of the ML Act, and
Section 19 of the same act provides that the FIU should provide its
yearly budget to the minister of finance for them to be included in
the country's yearly budgets. Since the FIU was established in July
2007, funding has been made without problems.


29. [ref para 41: Has the country established an FIU? Is it
operational? Is it adequately staffed? To what degree does it have
operational and budgetary independence? Where in the government is
it housed; e.g., within a finance or national police ministry, or as
an independent agency?]

Yes; an FIU has been established. It was formally established in
July 2007, but received its first reports in December 2007.
Currently the FIU is housed in the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM)
Building, but has operational independence. The FIU currently has 9
staff members occupying its five departments: Finance and
Administration, Legal and Policy, Compliance and Prevention,
Monitoring and Analysis, and ICT. Three additional staff members
are expected to start work on 4th January, 2010. The division of
staff in the department is as follows,

* Monitoring and Analysis 3
* Legal and policy 1
* Compliance and prevention 1 (to be increased to 3 in 1/2010)
* ICT Department 1 (to be increased to 2 in 1/2010)
* Finane and Administration 2

The FIU is currently headed by an Acting Director; a permanent
Director has yet to be appointed.

Although the FIU is operationally independent, it is required to
make annual reports to the Minister of Finance. This gives a
general picture of the work of the FIU.


30. [ref para 42: Describe the authorities and functions of the FIU.
Is it an administrative body that performs analytical duties? Does
it also have criminal investigative and/or regulatory
responsibilities?]

Malawi's FIU is an administrative unit, performing only analytical
duties. According to the ML Act, the FIU is mandated to request,
receive, analyze and disseminate to competent authorities
disclosures of financial information as required in order to counter
money laundering and financing terrorism. The FIU also has
regulatory powers to enforce compliance. It has no investigatory or
prosecutorial authority.


31. [ref para 43: Does the FIU have access to the records or
databases of other government entities or financial institutions?
Does it have formal mechanisms in place to share information
domestically (with law enforcement/prosecutors) or internationally
with other FIUs?]

Yes; the FIU has access to databases of other government
institutions; this can be exercised either informally or by means of
a memorandum of understanding (MOUs). Informally access involves
the FIU simply going to the required office and asking for
information. MOUs also exist indicating when and how information is
to be exchanged, and how this information can be used. Currently
the FIU has MOUs with the Immigration Department and the Reserve
Bank of Malawi. The plan is to enter into MOUs with all relevant
agencies.


32. [ref para 44: How many suspicious transaction reports (STRs)
were received in 2009? How many were the subject of investigation
or resulted in referrals to law enforcement for investigation?]

Nine (9) STRs were received in 2009, out of which five (5) were
disseminated to law enforcement agencies (LEAs).

The FIU al also have disseminated to LEAs ten (10) reports stemming
from Large Currency Transaction Reports.

The FIU has also received ten (10) requests for information from
LEAs, all of which have been responded to.


33. [ref para 45: Which government bodies are responsible for
investigating financial crimes, including money laundering and
terrorist financing? Are they adequately staffed and trained?]

The investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing is
done by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Malawi Revenue Authority,
and the Fiscal and Fraud Police of the Malawi Police Services.
Cases will be assigned to a particular agency depending on the
nature of the predicate offence. Training has been provided, but
agencies still lack experience with financial investigations.


34. [ref para 46: Have there been arrests, prosecutions, and
convictions for money laundering or terrorist financing since
January 1, 2009? How many? Please report highlights of any major
cases not previously reported.]

To date there have been no cases.


35. [ref para 47: The seizure and forfeiture of assets (including
but not limited to bank accounts, other financial assets, airplanes,
autos, residences, other property) derived from international drug
trade, money laundering, terrorist financing or other serious crimes

can be important elements in efforts to control drug trafficking,
money laundering, terrorist financing and organized crime activity.
Has the country enacted laws and established systems for
identifying, tracing, freezing, seizing, and forfeiting
narcotics-related assets as well as assets derived from, or intended
for, terrorist financing and other serious crimes? If so, please
describe the authority (regulatory or judicial). Are new
legislation or changes in current laws, regulations, judicial or
administrative authorities being considered?]

Yes. Malawi recognizes the importance of the seizure and forfeiture
of assets derived from crime. The ML Act specifically addresses the
issues of identifying, tracing, freezing, seizing, and forfeiting
property or assets related to any serious crime, which includes
money laundering and terrorist financing. Under the Act, the
competent authority, the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is
generally responsible for court applications to freeze or seize
assets. However throughout the process, especially where there are
terrorist financing funds, the FIU or the RBM can move for freezing
of such funds. In addition there is a common law remnant in
criminal cases where instruments used in crime can be seized upon a
conviction. The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB),established under the
Corrupt Practices Act as a specialized agency, also has a mandate to
freeze property related to commission of corrupt practices related
offences. Presently there are no moves to change the law.

36. [ref para 48: What are the obstacles or disincentives to
enacting such laws, regulations, other authorities?]

Although the ML Act has already been enacted, the concept of
anti-money laundering efforts and CFT is fairly new to Malawi. As a
result there is a general lack of appreciation of what the issues
are, and the need for such legislation. The main challenge is now
to put the enacted law in practice, complete with institutional
framework and capacity.

37. [49. What are the major provisions in current and/or proposed
legislation? For example, what assets can be seized? Do they
include: instruments of crime such as conveyances used to transport
narcotics, property on which illicit crops are grown or are used to
support terrorist activity, or intangible property such as bank
accounts? Can substitute assets be seized or must a relationship to
the crime be proven? Can legitimate businesses be seized if used to
launder drug money, support terrorist activity, or are otherwise
related to other criminal proceeds?]

Under the ML Act, Corrupt Practices Act, Customs and Excise Act,
Police Act and Exchange Control Act, all of the above can be seized
and confiscated. Under the ML Act, legitimate business or assets of
a lgitimate business can be seized if they are involved in money
laundering or terrorist financing.

Under ML Act, the court can order payment in other form were tainted
property cannot be traced, or has been transferred to a third party,
or located outside Malawi, or is commingled with other property that
cannot easily be separated.


38. [ref para 50: What government entities are responsible for
tracing, seizing assets and freezing assets? Is there a period of
time ascribed to the action of freezing, after which the assets are
released? Are frozen assets confiscated? If yes, by what
government entity? Is there an asset forfeiture fund? What
entity/s receive/s proceeds from asset seizures and forfeitures?
Which agencies manage and have responsibility for seized assets?
What is their capacity to manage seized assets?]

The tracing, seizing and freezing of assets falls under the
responsibility of the DPP with the assistance of the FIU and the RBM
as provided under Section 78 of the ML Act, for the financial
institutions which the two entities supervise.
Bank accounts/funds can be frozen for an initial period of three
months. The ML Act provides for a period of not more than twelve
(12) months after conviction during which the competent authority
(the DPP) may apply to the courts to have the property confiscated.
Other assets can be seized upon conviction or proof that they are
proceeds of crime, or instrumentalities of crime. In both cases the
freezing or seizure is subject to review by the court, where the
affected persons have a right to be heard. Once that is done the
assets can be confiscated. In general under Malawi criminal law,
seized assets or confiscated funds are owned by the GOM. Under the
ML Act, the Attorney General is mandated to ensure that property
finally confiscated is properly transferred or registered as
property of the GOM.
There is currently no asset forfeiture fund. Where necessary the
court can appoint an administrator to take possession of the
property and empower the administrator to sell the property.

39. [ref para 51: Does the banking community cooperate with
enforcement efforts to trace funds and seize/freeze bank accounts?]

Yes; the banking community does cooperate in the seizure and
freezing of assets. The Bankers Association has a robust
sub-committee of Compliance Officers with a mandates to foster
cooperation amongst the banks to ensure illegal funds do not
infiltrate into the system.

40. [ref para 52: Does the law allow for civil as well as criminal
forfeiture?]

The ML Act allows only for criminal forfeiture, but it does allow
for a restraining order in order to ensure that property which may
be subject to confiscation is not transferred or otherwise
dissipated. This is also possible under the Corrupt Practices Act.


41. [ref para 53: Does the government enforce existing asset seizure
and forfeiture laws? Does the jurisdiction have adequate police
powers and resources to trace, seize and freeze assets? If so, can
the jurisdiction freeze assets without undue delay?]

Yes, the Government does enforce the laws. The Anti Corruption
Bureau has prosecuted corruption charges, and has confiscated and
seized the property of some convicts. The ML Act fairly new,
however, and Malawi is still building capacity in this area and does
not yet have a fully fledged seizure mechanism. The ML Act is
fairly adequate; the FIU is now in place, and all law enforcement
agencies such as the DPP, Police, Revenue Authority, Anti-Corruption
Bureau, and Immigration have been familiarized in its terms.
Enforcement resources to trace, seize and freeze assets are limited,
however, and can cause delays.

42. [54. Does the government have an independent national system and
mechanism for freezing terrorist assets?

No.


43. [ref para 55: What was the dollar amount of narcotics-related,
terrorist-related and other criminal-related assets frozen, seized,
and/or forfeited in the past year? How does this amount compare to
amounts seized / forfeited / frozen in previous years?]

There are currently no statistics available to measure these
amounts. Capacity building efforts are being undertaken in relevant
agencies such as the Home Affairs - Drugs Enforcement Unit to ensure
that statistics are available in the future.

44. [ref para 56: Has the country enacted laws for the sharing of
seized assets with other governments? Is the government engaged in
bilateral or multilateral negotiations with other governments to
enhance asset tracing, freezing and seizure?]

Under the ML Act and under the Mutual Legal Assistance Laws, Malawi
can enter into agreements both short and long term with Commonwealth
and non Commonwealth countries. Under those agreements issues of
sharing assets can be specifically provided. The ML law stipulates
that Malawi is under an obligation to freeze tainted assets on the
request of other countries.


45. [ref para 57: Has the jurisdiction criminalized the financing of
terrorism as required by the UN International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and UN Security Council
Resolution 1373? If so, please provide title of act, date of
enactment, and pertinent details. If the jurisdiction has an "all
serious crimes" anti-money laundering law, please indicate if
terrorism and terrorist financing are considered serious crimes. If
the country has listed the predicate offenses for money laundering,
please indicate if terrorism and terrorist financing are on the
list.]

Yes, financing of terrorism is criminalized under the Money
Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act
which was passed in August of 2006. The act provides for the
seizure of assets suspected to be held for the purpose of terrorist
financing. The definition of Serious Crimes includes all crimes for
whose punishment is 12 months imprisonment, life imprisonment, or
death. Offences include money laundering and terrorist financing.


46. [ref para 58: Has the jurisdiction circulated to its financial
institutions the list of individuals and entities that have been
included on the UN 1267 sanctions committee's consolidated list as
being linked to Usama bin Ladin, members of the Al Qa'ida
organization or the Taliban? Does the jurisdiction circulate the
list of terrorist organizations/financiers that the USG or the
European Union (EU) have designated under relevant authorities? Did
the jurisdiction identify, freeze, seize, and/or forfeit related
assets in 2009? If so, please provide dollar amount.

Yes, Malawi circulates the UN and OFAC list. To date financial
institutions have not come across names matching any of the
individuals or organizations appearing on these lists.




47. [ref para 59: Does the jurisdiction acknowledge the existence
and use of value transfer systems outside the formal financial
system? Describe the steps the jurisdiction has taken regarding
regulating alternative remittance systems, such as hawala or hundi;
the exploitation thereof, including black market exchanges; money
remitters; trade-based money laundering; cross-border cash
smuggling; or the misuse of precious metals and stones.]

Yes, alternative value transfer systems are recognized. These
alternative remittance systems are not included in the ML Act.
Malawi authorities indicate that (unspecified) plans are under way
to ensure they are regulated.

Trade-based money laundering and cross-border cash smuggling are
covered by the ML Act.


48. [ref para 60: Discuss the efforts the jurisdiction has taken to
thwart the misuse of charitable and or non-profit entities that can
be used as conduits for the financing of terrorism. For example, is
there a government entity that regulates or supervises the sector?
If so, please name the entity. Does it monitor the sector for
potential terrorist financing abuse? How are overseas financial
transactions monitored to prevent potential terrorist financing?]

Malawi has a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Board that conducts
supervisory oversight of NGOs.

The Council for Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGOMA),a civil
society body, has been involved in AML/CFT Training.

The FIU has made presentations to members of CONGOMA on AML/CFT
issues.

Neither the NGO Board nor CONGOMA is believed to have any
significant capacity to monitor the sector for terrorist financing
abuse.


49. [ref para 61: Are there statutory requirements for limiting or
monitoring the cross-border transportation of currency and monetary
instruments? If so, please describe cross-border currency reporting
requirements for both inbound and outbound currency, including those
that apply to cash couriers, including the monetary threshold that
would require a report to be filed. Are mandatory declaration forms
used at border crossings?]

The ML Act requires that declarations should be made when
transporting currency across the borders, and failure to make such
declarations is a crime. Customs and Police officials are
responsible for seizing any currency that has not been declared, any
currency they suspect to be the proceeds of ML, or that could be
used for terrorist financing. The declaration forms are mandatory
and are filed with the FIU. The declaration system is yet to be
implemented, however. The FIU, the Malawi Revenue Authority, the
RBM, and the Immigration Department have been holding meetings to
draft an MOU specifying how the system should work and outlining the
roles of the various players.


50. [ref para 62: Are cash declaration or smuggling reports entered
into a database? Is such data shared between host government
agencies, in particular with an existing FIU?]

Currently this does not happen. GOM authorities inform us that
plans are underway to have such a system in place, although not
implementation date is specified.


51. [ref para 63: Has the country adopted laws or regulations that
allow for the exchange of records with the United States on
investigations and proceedings related to narcotics, all-source
money laundering, terrorism and terrorist financing? Has the
jurisdiction reached agreement with the United States authorities on
a mechanism for exchange of records in connection with such
investigations and proceedings? If not, is the country negotiating
in good faith with the United States to establish such an exchange
mechanism? Does the jurisdiction have similar arrangements with
other jurisdictions?]

No such agreement currently exists or is being negotiated between
the GOM and the U.S. However Malawi and U.S. can still exchange
such information under the international cooperation provisions of
multilateral international anti-terrorism and CFT conventions to
which both countries are parties.


52. [ref para 64: Identify all treaties, agreements, or other
mechanisms for information exchange that the host country has
entered into with the USG or other countries, including agreements
between the FIU and its counterparts, as well as membership in the
Egmont group, and those with home country supervisors to facilitate

the exchange of supervisory information regarding banks and trust
companies operating in the host country. Describe the status of
efforts to update such agreements or arrangements.]

The FIU was admitted to Egmont in May 2009. So far MOUs have been
signed with South Africa, Namibia, and United Arab Emirates. Draft
MOUs have been sent to Tanzania and Zambia.


53. [ref para 65: Has the country cooperated, when requested, with
appropriate USG law enforcement agencies and other governments
investigating financial crimes related to narcotics, terrorism,
terrorist financing and other crimes? If the country has cooperated
on important cases with USG agencies, please describe.]

In general the GOM enjoys a friendly and cooperative relationship
with the U.S. Post is not aware of any specific USG or other
government requests with respect to the crimes listed.


54. [ref para 66: Please detail any instances of refusals to
cooperate with foreign governments, as well as any actions taken by
the USG and any international organization to address such
obstacles, including the imposition of sanctions or penalties.]

Post is unaware of any instances of the GOM refusing to cooperate
with the USG or other foreign governments in any investigations or
enforcements relating to issues covered by this report.


55. [ref para 67: Is the country a party to the UN International
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention),the UN Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention),the UN
Convention Against Corruption, and the UN International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism or other
applicable agreements and conventions? If the country ratified or
acceded to these conventions in 2009, please provide the date of
ratification/accession.]

Vienna Convention: Acceded 12 October 1995;
Palermo Convention: Ratified 17 March 2005;
Convention Against Corruption: Ratified December 4, 2007
Convention for Suppression of Financing of Terrorism: Acceded
August 11, 2003.


56. [ref para 68: Does the country adhere to relevant international
money laundering standards, such as the recommendations of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)? If so, what steps is it taking
to implement the standards? Is it a member of any FATF-style
regional body? If not, what, if any, steps is the country taking to
become a member of a body or to implement AML/CFT measures?]

Malawi is a member of the East and Southern African Anti-Money
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG),a body comprising the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) countries plus Uganda and Kenya.
ESAAMLG subscribes to the FATF recommendations and encourages its
members to do the same. Malawi has enacted the Money Laundering
Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act, which
includes the FATF recommendations. Malawi has also submitted itself
to the AML/CFT mutual evaluation process and in this regard, has
undergone a mutual evaluation process conducted by the World Bank in
March 2008.

BODDE