CAN TYMOSHENKO MAINTAIN BALANCE AS THE ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000008 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2020 TAGS: PGOV EFIN PREL UP SUBJECT: CAN TYMOSHENKO MAINTAIN BALANCE AS THE ELECTIONS NEAR? REF: 09 KYIV 2138 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b,d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During a December 31 introductory call, PM Tymoshenko discussed with Ambassador Tefft her efforts earlier that day to convince National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) Chairman Stelmakh to disburse $2 billion in reserves so that the government can make its scheduled January gas payment. Tymoshenko is concerned about fraud in the elections but believes that, if she is able to maintain economic stability, her chances of winning the presidency in the second round are equal to those of current front-runner Viktor Yanukovych. She argued that radical pro-western ideals have not served previous Ukrainian leaders well and, therefore, she would take a more 'balanced' approach as President. Ukraine's path is clearly toward Euro-Atlantic integration, she added, but she would not do anything to bring Ukraine into open conflict with Russia. The stress caused by her opponents' daily public attacks (especially from President and erstwhile ally Yushchenko) and Ukraine's flailing economy have taken a visible toll on the traditionally calm and focused PM. End summary. IMF Money: NBU Still Resisting -------------- ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Tymoshenko, accompanied by Deputy PM Nemyria, told Ambassador Tefft that her first priority, even above the upcoming Presidential election, was to achieve economic stability for Ukraine. She related that she had just exited from a very difficult five-hour meeting with National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) Chairman Stelmakh, who had agreed, she said, to a mechanism to transfer $2 billion in IMF money from the NBU to the Government of Ukraine. ¶3. (C) Tymoshenko said that Stelmakh was not comfortable with the IMF board decision of December 30 concerning the transfer of IMF liabilities from the NBU directly to the GOU. Instead of a direct transfer, Stelmakh proposed a scheme whereby Ukraine's Ministry of Finance would issue a promissory note worth $2 billion to the IMF. The Government of Ukraine would then ask the IMF, based on this promissory note, to cancel $2 billion of the NBU's liabilities to the IMF and reallocate the $2 billion as a GOU liability. According to the Prime Minister, if the IMF makes the reallocation, Stelmakh said he would issue $2 billion to the GOU. ¶4. (C) Deputy PM Nemyrya characterized the scheme as simply a mechanism to implement the IMF board's decision and told us that if the IMF agrees to the technicalities of this transfer, then the GOU would receive the money on January 4 from the NBU. Stelmakh is insisting, however, on a positive response from the IMF approving the transfer scheme. Nemyrya said IMF lawyers were looking over the proposal. (Comment: This sounds like a very complex way to achieve something that should be relatively simple, if only Stelmakh were on board. It could be that Stelmakh is again trying to delay the transfer while "appearing" to agree with the Prime Minister's requests. End comment.) ¶5. (C) Once the government received the money, the Prime Minister stated that she would use the money for gas payments, as stipulated by the IMF. Opponents Seeking to Destabilize the Economy -------------- ¶6. (C) Tymoshenko believed the $2 billion would be enough to get the country through the election period. She could not be certain, however, because her political rivals were seeking to destabilize the country to draw votes away from )!QQQQsQ%hQP?Q;ecoming harder and harder every day before the election to maintain balance in the country. U.S. Business Concerns -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador thanked the Prime Minister for her engagement in resolving the issues that had prevented the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) from operating for almost a decade in Ukraine. U.S. firms want to KYIV 00000008 002 OF 003 participate in Ukraine's development, and the reopening of OPIC would facilitate their investment here. In addition, the Ambassador noted the need to address other issues that limit investment in Ukraine, such as the unreliable VAT refund system. Tymoshenko pledged to address VAT arrears after the elections. Finally, the Ambassador expressed support for a U.S. consortium that recently won the auction to rebuild the Lviv airport. The Prime Minister said she was aware of and welcomed U.S. involvement in the Lviv airport project. Nemyrya acknowledged that he and the Ambassador had discussed these business issues in great detail recently. Elections: Tough Road Ahead, But Optimistic -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to the upcoming presidential elections, Tymoshenko dismissed the validity of recent polls that show a growing gap between front-runner Yanukovych and her in the second round. She argued that such polls do not accurately represent the strength of her support because most of her electorate lives in the countryside, while the polls mostly query urban voters. She asserted that her own polling shows her chances of winning in the second round equal to Yanukovych's, and reminded us that polls in previous elections underestimated her support by 10%. ¶9. (C) Tymoshenko admitted that her main campaign goal for the January 17 first round is to keep the difference between Yanukovych and her as small as possible, since a big gap would have a demoralizing effect on her supporters. She pointed to economic stability as the key issue that could affect the vote during the first round, but also emphasized her opponent's proven record of willingness to falsify elections in his favor. "Yanukovych says we will use fraud to win, but I pledge that we will not. He has already done so in 2004, and the Supreme Court proved this," she added. The PM had no doubt that Regions is already preparing false ballots for the elections, adding that her ability to fight cheating is hindered by the prohibition against sending police into polling stations to seize fraudulent ballots. ¶10. (C) Tymoshenko scoffed at Yanukovych's claim of being disadvantaged because he does not have access to the same "administrative resources" that she and President Yushchenko have. Because most current local officials were appointed by President Yushchenko while Yanukovych was PM, she argued that these local officials are actually aligned with Yanukovych rather than with her. ¶11. (C) Tymoshenko acknowledged that President Yushchenko's incessant attacks on her are affecting her level of support among "orange" voters in central and western Ukraine. His effect during the second round is hard to predict, but she is hopeful that "orange" voters will realize that staying at home would in essence be voting for a Yanukovych presidency. Her campaign strategy going forward will be to mobilize the west and center in her favor while working to undermine Yanukovych's support in the east. She told us that she will begin visiting Ukraine's regions immediately after the January 1 New Year holiday. Approach to Russia? -------------- ¶12. (C) When asked about her strategy towards Russia, the PM answered in philosophical terms. She observed that in Ukraine's history, radical pro-Western and nationalistic views have not been a recipe for success. She pointed to Yushchenko as an example, stating that his support decreased significantly as his pro-Western views became more radical. Thus, to lead Ukraine, one must strike a balance between Russia and the West. In her mind, Ukraine's orientation must remain toward Europe and independence. That said, the leader of Ukraine must avoid rhetoric that would antagonize Russia or incite its leaders to action. Euro-Atlantic Integration -------------- ¶13. (C) Tymoshenko emphasized her desire to see Ukraine join NATO, adding that she would not agree to any integration with Russia into a "single economic space" or similar arrangement. She did not, however, believe Ukraine's citizens were ready for NATO integration, and opposed a national referendum on the issue at this time. She argued that Yushchenko's radical position on pushing for NATO membership had needlessly polarized the Ukrainian populace. ¶14. (C) Tymoshenko stated unequivocally that as President she would not do anything to lead Ukraine into direct confrontation with Russia -- "this would be insanity." She KYIV 00000008 003 OF 003 argued that groups in Crimea are just waiting for Kyiv to take some radical action in order to respond and destabilize the region further. Any drastic action by Kyiv toward the Russian Black Sea Fleet could be such an action. Comment: Visibly Strained -------------- ¶15. (C) During the meeting, the PM appeared tired, stressed, and rundown, showing that the daily barrage of attacks from her opponents, combined with the dire economic situation and the demands of running the country, have taken their toll on the usually calm and focused Tymoshenko. As she herself stated, it is becoming increasingly difficult each day to maintain the balance. The elusive $2 billion is arguably her best hope of keeping the budget afloat and pulling out a come-from-behind victory in the upcoming elections, a point driven home by her direct involvement in the five-hour negotiations with the National Bank head and postponement of her meeting with the Ambassador until late in the day on New Year's Eve. TEFFT