EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT: LONG WAY STILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000059

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2020
TAGS: PREL UP EU
SUBJECT: EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT: LONG WAY STILL
TO GO

REF: 09 KYIV 1894

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Ukrainian Foreign Minister Poroshenko has declared the
signing of an Association Agreement with the EU in 2010 to be
one of Ukraine's top two foreign policy goals. At the same
time, tough EU criticism of Ukraine's reforms stole the show
at the December 4 Ukraine-EU Summit. GOU negotiators contend
that both Ukraine and the EU will need to demonstrate
determination to resolve remaining differences to reinforce
the credibility of Ukraine's European aspirations. However,
there is doubt as to whether either of the two front runners
in the January/February Presidential election -- PM
Tymoshenko or opposition leader Yanukovych -- would be
willing to make the hard political choices needed to conclude
in 2010 the Free Trade Agreement, which is the main
impediment to wrapping up the Association Agreement. End
Summary.

2009: FM Puts Positive Spin on EU-Ukraine Relations
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2. (C) Calling 2009 a "breakthrough" year for EU-Ukraine
relations, Foreign Minister Poroshenko said Ukraine's two
main foreign policy goals for 2010 will be to sign the
Association Agreement with the EU (which will necessitate the
finalization of difficult Free Trade Area negotiations),and
to achieve new security guarantees for Ukraine.


3. (C) As anticipated, the EU-Ukraine Summit held in Kyiv on
December 4 produced little in the way of hard deliverables
(reftel),but did recognize progress in important areas.
Among other things, the two sides managed to finish most
negotiations on the political and security aspects of the
greatly-anticipated Association Agreement, although key areas
of disagreement over specific language remained. The two
sides announced the completion of the Association Agenda,
designed to implement the terms of the Association Agreement,
and therefore a significant practical achievement. Also
important, although more qualified than the GoU had expected,
the EU expressed support for Ukrainian membership in the
European Energy Community.

The December Summit: EU Takes Off the Gloves
--------------


4. (C) While echoing EU officials' statements on possible
goals for the relationship in 2010, Poroshenko's December 30
remarks did little to address the strong reservations
expressed at the Summit by the EU earlier in the month. The
frank and public nature of these reservations set a negative
tone at the outset of those meetings, resulting in public
perceptions that what might otherwise have been a quiet and
uneventful meeting had ended up as a "trip to the EU
woodshed" for Yushchenko and the GoU.


5. (U) In a BBC interview on the eve of the summit, EU
Ambassador to Ukraine Jose Teixeira castigated the GoU for
lack of progress over the past five years since the Orange
Revolution. "The Government has done nothing," he said,
pointing to failure to undertake constitutional and economic
reforms, and in particular its lack of commitment to
anti-corruption efforts. European Commission President
Barroso the next day added that "promises are only partly
met, commitments are only partly met, words are not always
matched by actions."


6. (C) While the GoU had no pretensions to grand outcomes at
the summit (reftel),Ukrainian negotiators did hope for
compromise language recognizing Ukraine's European identity,
recognition that the Visa Free Dialogue is intended to move
Ukraine toward Schengen membership, and that this Dialogue
would follow an articulated plan of action toward that end.
Furthermore, imposition of new conditions for Ukraine to earn
EU support for membership in the European Energy Community
caught both MFA and the Cabinet of Ministers (CabMin) by
surprise. Contacts in both agencies saw this as a
counterproductive development, and speculated that Russia had
leaned on EU members to slow Ukraine's progress.


7. (C) Our GoU interlocutors commented on the failure to
reach agreement on a Joint Statement text, and expressed
dismay that negotiations on the statement were continued in
the summit meeting itself. "This is the first time in
history a Joint Statement was agreed in the summit meeting",
opined Vadym Triukhan, Director of the CabMin's Coordination
Bureau for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Andrei

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Pravednyk, Deputy Director of the MFA EU Department,
regretted the EU's unwillingness to use the summit to
generate new momentum.


8. (C) Nevertheless, GoU interlocutors at CabMin and MFA
remained optimistic that progress would continue. According
to Triukhan, the EU is not holding off on contacts until
after Ukraine's presidential elections in January/February.
He highlighted the fact that despite the distractions of the
Lisbon Treaty process, the EU kept the summit date with
Ukraine. Pravednyk observed that the Association Agreement
with Ukraine is actually a novel instrument for the EU, even
though the title has been used many times, and its very
novelty is slowing down internal EU processes. Pavlo
Klimken, Pravednyk's boss, added that there will be new
opportunities to move EU-Ukraine relations forward after the
presidential elections, and told us the main achievement of
this year's summit was that it maintained momentum in the
relationship despite the significant domestic distractions
for both sides.

Myths and Underlying Challenges
--------------


9. (C) Ukrainian and international coverage of the negative
atmospherics of the summit overshadowed the positive, though
relatively minor, elements of progress over the past year.
MFA, CabMin, and expert contacts admitted that exaggerated
promises (reftel) made by President Yushchenko created false
expectations among Ukrainians and deeply irritated the EU.
Still, they noted that media in Kyiv and Europe quickly and
inaccurately ascribed both Yushchenko's inability to finalize
the Association Agreement and the EU's refusal to provide
Ukraine a membership perspective - neither of which were ever
realistic goals - to the EU's public complaints, transforming
the not-unusual lack of high-profile summit deliverables into
an indictment of Yushchenko's presidency and Ukraine's
European potential.


10. (C) Director of the International Center for Policy
Studies in Kyiv, Olga Shumylo, said the situation illustrates
the myths that surround the idea of EU membership for
Ukraine, and the misunderstanding of the long-term process on
which Ukraine has embarked. Domestic resistance to new and
European norms is so significant that even a Membership
Perspective would do little to rally Ukrainian civil servants
to the cause of reform.


11. (C) According to Shumylo, there are three groups within
the GoU: those who really understand the benefits of
reforming to European standards; those who "defend" Ukrainian
interests by seeking both treatment as equals in the
relationship and EU recognition that Ukraine can decide its
own standards and approaches to reform; and, the largest
group, those who are not interested in change, not much
interested in European standards, and are not much interested
in Europe. Shumylo's comments were echoed by Pravednyk, who
argued that real progress and reform would require
generational change within the GoU. However, he noted that
the situation is complicated by the fact that the old system
continues to shape incoming civil servants. Western exposure
and both student and professional exchanges are the key to
reshaping attitudes, he said.

Ukrainian Elections and the EU
--------------


12. (U) In televised remarks January 12, presidential front
runner Viktor Yanukovych sketched an outline of his
prospective foreign policy, including Ukraine-EU relations.
While a number of his immediate goals will maintain the
current course (achieving the Free Trade Agreement, a
visa-free regime, and wrapping up the Association Agreement),
Yanukovych will drop the push for a membership perspective.
Instead, he said, the process of achieving European social
and technical standards is what should motivate Ukraine to
reform; discussion of membership should begin only when
Ukraine has attained those standards. He emphasized, however,
that while Ukraine will value European guidance and examples
of such standards, "we must convince our partners to the east
and west to treat us with respect." In separate remarks in
late December, Yanukovych stated that he sees EU membership
as Ukraine,s long-term goal and will work toward that end.


13. (C) For her part, fellow candidate and main rival Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has also taken the spotlight off EU
membership, in favor of "creating Europe in Ukraine." While
her official "manifesto" (platform) statement focuses on
creating trade and economic opportunities for Ukraine, during
a short troika-format meeting on the margins of the December
summit, Tymoshenko did not make demands or requests of her EU

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counterparts. Instead, the Prime Minister said eighteen
years of opportunity for real reform have been wasted in
Ukraine; her task is to see Ukraine live as any EU member
state, which will require urgent reforms. She estimated that
voters might give her at most 18 months to prove herself if
she is elected president, and said energy, agricultural and
electoral reform will be her top priorities.


14. (U) Currently running third, come-from-behind candidate
Serhi Tihipko may finish the election in position to become
Prime Minister. His foreign policy is pragmatic, and focused
on repairing relations with Russia. He has stated that
Ukraine has no need for EU membership and rather than be
treated as a less than equal partner in negotiating
membership in an organization he believes is outdated,
Tihipko hopes to make Ukraine a bridge in relations between
Europe and Russia.

Comment
--------------


15. (C) Young, reform-oriented officials with whom we spoke
(Tryukhan, Klimken, and Pravednyk) were philosophical and
calm about Ukraine's long-run challenges and optimistic about
the EU's commitment to Ukraine. All three told us that the
first 300 days of the new presidential administration would
be crucial for proving Ukraine's ability to reform. Ukraine
must receive clear signals from the EU for the process to
have credibility with Ukrainian society. Shumylo's view that
the GoU has not done enough to explain to Ukrainians that the
reforms themselves are the real value-added of the process
has merit. Ukrainian leaders, Yushchenko in particular, have
been fond of declarations, but less fond of the nitty-gritty
of reforms, and short term political costs, required. Many
of our contacts, including EU diplomats, question whether the
next Ukrainian administration will be willing to make the
hard political choices needed to secure signing of the Free
Trade and Association Agreements in 2010.
TEFFT