Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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10KYIV232 | 2010-02-11 12:29:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Kyiv |
VZCZCXRO1330 PP RUEHIK DE RUEHKV #0232/01 0421229 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 111229Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY KYIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9316 INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE |
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000232 |
1. (SBU) Summary. Nadra Bank's year-long moratorium on deposit withdrawals ended on February 10, amidst last-ditch negotiations over the bank's future. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) had engaged in talks on February 10 about liquidating Nadra, one of Ukraine's largest private banks, only to halt negotiations at day's end and yield to majority shareholder Dmitro Firtash's proposal to recapitalize the bank. This solution amounts to a notable defeat for Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who had sought to gain control of the bank to prove accusations of currency speculation and insider dealings against Firtash, Nadra's majority shareholder. Nonetheless, if Firtash's plan comes to fruition, the GOU would stand to save $938 million in expenditures from its strapped 2010 budget that had been slated for Nadra's recapitalization. The deal would also eliminate the NBU's need to monetize GOU securities to pay for the majority of Nadra's unfinanced liabilities. End summary. FIRTASH REGAINS THE UPPER HAND -------------------------- 2. (SBU) In what appears to be a dramatic, if predictable, conclusion to the Nadra saga on February 10, business tycoon Dmytro Firtash offered to inject a further UAH 6 billion ($750 million) into Nadra, provided he was given a guarantee that Nadra's assets and liabilities would remain at the bank. This proposal caused the NBU governing board to halt deliberations over transferring Nadra's assets and liabilities to state-owned Rodovid, which it had been mandated to do per a December 23 Cabinet of Ministers' decision. According to Embassy sources, NBU deliberations on February 10 were interrupted throughout the day by numerous side meetings between NBU Governor Stelmakh and Firtash. Ultimately, the NBU announced it would extend Nadra's temporary administration and stated it would be willing to accept Firtash's recapitalization proposal, upon receiving proof that Firtash had sufficient funds to meet Nadra's needs. 3. (SBU) A major financial backer of Viktor Yanukovych, Firtash is motivated to retain control over and prevent liquidation of Nadra, both to keep it out of the hands of Tymoshenko's government and to prevent the loss of UAH 4 billion ($500 million), which Firtash had placed as collateral for NBU refinancing in 2008. Since he also reportedly controls roughly 92% of Nadra's shares through numerous holding companies, including the eponymous DF Group, losing the bank would mean he would cease having access to a financing source for his numerous business activities. 4. (SBU) After purchasing Nadra in the fall of 2008, Firtash quickly managed to secure NBU refinancing, which in total was equivalent to nearly 29% of Nadra's entire loan portfolio. Tymoshenko then accused Firtash, also the notorious head of gas middleman RosUkrEnergo (RUE), of using Nadra's NBU monies for currency speculation in December 2008. Tymoshenko publicly claimed Firtash's currency dealings caused massive hryvnia depreciation and wreaked havoc on Ukraine's banking sector and broader economy. Tymoshenko has since sought to wrest control of the bank from Firtash and the NBU. 5. (SBU) Meanwhile, Nadra's temporary administrator, Valentina Zhukovskaya, has reputedly worked to delay the bank's resolution until after the presidential election. With a Yanukovych victory apparent for weeks before the election, and with the alleged support of incumbent President Yushchenko, Zhukovskaya succeeded in scuttling a negotiated agreement with foreign creditors, including the U.S. Export-Import Bank and USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation. The inability to come to terms with creditors prevented a decision by the Tymoshenko government and stymied plans for Nadra's recapitalization and nationalization. NBU EXTENDS TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION -------------------------- 6. (SBU) After the NBU agreed on February 10 to extend Zhukovskaya's writ for another year, Nadra announced it would begin paying out deposits to households for the first time since February 2009. The following day, lines of disenfranchised, mostly elderly depositors could be observed outside Nadra branches in Kyiv. Analysts speculate there will be a run on Nadra's deposit base, leading to a sharp deterioration of Nadra's already precarious capital position. As of January 2010, Nadra's capital adequacy ratio was a meager 1.9%, according to Embassy sources. TYMOSHENKO NOW PLIANT -------------------------- KYIV 00000232 002.2 OF 002 7. (SBU) Aced out by Firtash and Zhukovskaya (and their political supporters), the Tymoshenko government announced it would likely cancel the December 23, 2009 Cabinet of Ministers' resolution to transfer Nadra's assets and liabilities to recently nationalized Rodovid bank. Acting Finance Minister Umanskyi also said the government would halt plans to use government treasury bills to recapitalize Rodovid, which reportedly required UAH 7.5 billion ($938 million) to make up for the shortfall in Nadra's assets. Umanskyi insinuated that Tymoshenko had agreed to halt the recapitalization of Rodovid, and he suggested the Cabinet of Ministers would likely approve his proposal during a February 11 meeting. Umanskiy indicated the move would save the government UAH 7.5 billion in expenditures and drastically reduce the overall amount the NBU would need to monetize in government securities in 2010. COMMENT -------------------------- 8. (SBU) Despite the fact that Nadra is -- in the words of one IMF official -- a "dead man walking" from a financial point of view, Firtash's victory is sweet revenge over Tymoshenko, who had cut RUE out of its lucrative dealings with Gazprom and Naftohaz in early 2009. Firtash has clearly made the calculation that he stands to gain more by retaining control of the troubled bank than letting it become nationalized or liquidated, and thus falling into the hands of Tymoshenko in what most likely are the waning days of her government. After following through on his proposal to recapitalize Nadra, Firtash is likely to get another major liquidity injection from the NBU, which could enable the bank to become a going concern again and position Firtash to take full advantage of his alliance with Yanukovych, Ukraine's apparent President-elect. TEFFT |