UKRAINE'S 2010 ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: UNCERTAINTY REMAINS AFTER

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KYIV 000226 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB, EEB/OMA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN EREL ELAB ECON ETRD PGOV PREL XH UP SUBJECT: UKRAINE'S 2010 ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: UNCERTAINTY REMAINS AFTER THE COLLAPSE KYIV 00000226 001.2 OF 004 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION ¶1. (SBU) Summary. Ukraine suffered one of Europe's worst recessions in 2009, with real GDP declining nearly 15%. The economic slump was prompted by a sharp fall in global demand for steel and chemical products, combined with the global credit crunch and vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian financial sector. The GOU's reaction to the crisis, which included demanding advanced tax payments from corporQons and non-payment of overdue VAT refunds worth over $1.5 billion, further harmed investor confidence. As the January 2010 presidential election approached, Prime Minister Tymoshenko refused to increase gas prices, reduce industrial subsidies, or reform the pension system. Ukraine's 2010 outlook depends on the pace of political consolidation after the presidential election, external demand for Ukraine's key export products, and implementation of reforms that bring back the IMF, prompt investment, and facilitate lending. End summary. UKRAINE'S GDP FREE FALL -------------- ¶2. (U) Ukraine's real GDP plummeted an estimated 14.8% in 2009, while overall industrial production declined 21.9%, according to recently released data from the State Statistics Committee and the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU). Key labor intensive industries constituting 55% of the overall economy were hardest hit, with machine building suffering the largest decline (65.1%),and metallurgical and chemical sectors falling 26.6% and 23.2%, respectively. ¶3. (U) In 2009, real household incomes fell 6.8% percent; the exchange rate, which depreciated over 40% from the start of the crisis, continued to fluctuate; and consumer lending froze up. As a result, Ukraine's construction and retail sectors shrunk by 48% and 16.6%, respectively. The only bright spot in the economy was agriculture, whose 0.1% growth resulted from a bumper crop and steady domestic demand. FISCAL WOES -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Ukraine's 2009 total budget deficit reached an estimated 10% of GDP, due to a collapse in revenues and the failure of Tymoshenko's government to cut spending. A substantial portion of the fiscal gap was monetized by the NBU, which bought UAH 34.89 billion ($4.36 billion) in domestic treasury bills in 2009. Loans provided by the IMF and World Bank, in addition to the conversion of IMF special drawing rights, proved fungible sources of extra cash. The GOU also filled the budget gaps by requiring businesses to make enterprise profit tax payments in advance and by arm-twisting the NBU into transferring UAH 4.6 billion ($575 million) in expected future profits to government accounts. ¶5. (SBU) By the end of 2009, the GOU had accumulated UAH 19 billion ($2.38 billion) in outstanding VAT refund claims. Of that figure, overdue (more than 60 days) payments are at the "record" level of UAH 12 billion ($1.5 billion),according to Kyiv-based experts. Embassy contacts have confirmed that the Tymoshenko government, under severe budget pressure, issued instructions in the fourth quarter of 2009 to withhold VAT refunds until after the presidential election. ¶6. (SBU) An internal Cabinet of Ministers' memo, leaked to local media sources on January 27, showed that the GOU failed to pay significant sums to numerous ministries in 2009. The overall shortfall was UAH 2.41 billon ($301 million),of which UAH 344 million had been dedicated to the swine flu prevention effort, UAH 480.43 million for election preparation, UAH 91.9 million for defense programs, UAH 121.4 million for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and UAH 106.89 million for the Ministry of Agrarian Policy. DOMESTIC BORROWING SPIKED -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Attempting to finance the budget deficit in 2009, the GOU placed particular emphasis on expanding the domestic debt market. It sold UAH 18.8 billion ($2.35 billion) in short-term domestic treasury bills at primary auctions in 2009. Weighted yields averaged 20.7% but spiked to 25% in December 2009, when the GOU struggled to make wage and pension payments while also rolling over maturing domestic securities. The latest auction on February 2 raised UAH 1.16 billion ($145 million) for domestic debt payments, with six-month bills sold at 23% and 32-month bills purchased at 26%. KYIV 00000226 002.2 OF 004 ¶8. (SBU) Analysts expect that the short-term treasury bills will create debt servicing problems as early as the second quarter of 2010, when the GOU needs to repay UAH 8.1 billion ($1.01 billion). To roll over these maturing domestic securities, the GOU may need to issue more treasury bills, possibly at higher interest rates. Another concern is that high bond yields will continue to "crowd out" investment in the real economy. FRAGILE BANKING SECTOR -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Large volumes of non-performing loans accumulated by banks (often exceeding 30%),combined with speculative pressure on the domestic currency, forced the NBU to tighten monetary policy and reserve requirements in 2009. Banks have also fought against low consumer confidence, reporting an overall 8.3% decline in deposits. New lending remains extremely limited, with loan portfolios posting only 5% nominal growth in 2009, most of it to state-owned enterprises. Mortgage loan volumes decreased ten-fold from 2008 levels, according to industry sources. Progress in creating bank restructuring mechanisms was offset by ongoing uncertainties over Nadra and Ukrprombank, two major financial institutions that have been under temporary administration for the past year. ¶10. (SBU) Statistical indicators show that Ukraine's banking sector remains dangerously unstable. Seven of the top eighteen banks in Ukraine have a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of less than 10%, according to non-published statistics passed to the Embassy. NBU refinancing has been doled out unevenly and in large quantities, with 11 of the top 18 banks receiving liquidity injections that constitute more than 10% of their total hryvnia-based credit portfolio. Of Ukraine's top tier banks, 13 maintain provisions equal to at least 10% of their total credit portfolio, with three holding provisions at more than 40%. Eight major banks rely on foreign currency lending for at least 60% of their credit portfolios and are thus heavily exposed to exchange rate fluctuations. IMBALANCE OF PAYMENTS -------------- ¶11. (U) Ukraine's current account deficit moved to $1.9 billion in 2009, an improvement over the $12.8 billion deficit registered in ¶2008. This shift reflected a significant decline in imports of manufactured and consumer products for the year, combined with growth in steel and chemical exports during the second half of 2009. ¶12. (U) The financial account worsened in 2009, due to the stoppage of foreign capital flows, foreign debt repayments by the banking sector, and a surge of hard currency purchases. Compared to the same period in 2008 when inflows were $9.6 billion in surplus, 2009 financial account figures indicated a deficit of $11.8 billion. ¶13. (SBU) Ukraine's population continues to horde hard currency, especially dollars, as a store of wealth and as a hedge against currency depreciation. In an uncertain political environment and where trust in the banking sector remains low, Ukraine's total hard currency purchases were $9.6 billion in 2009. The NBU covered the imbalance with its gross currency reserves, which stood at $26.5 billion at the end of 2009, equivalent to roughly five months of imports. EXTERNAL MARKETS MODERATE EXPORT DECLINES -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Ukrainian steel and chemical exports were supported by currency depreciation, transportation subsidies for steel producers, and energy subsidies for steel and chemical plants. Although steel and chemical exports for the year fell significantly, recovery in the markets of Ukraine's major trading partners, particularly Russia and China, provided some relief by the end of the year. ¶15. (U) All major steel indicators fell sharply in 2009. Crude steel production plummeted 20% to 29.8 million tons, pig iron fell 17% to 25.7 million tons, and finished rolled steel output declined 15% to 26.9 million tons, according to government statistics. ¶16. (SBU) Steel producers have told Embassy officials that short-term orders from Russia and East Asia helped Ukraine register a jump in industrial production in recent months, with statistics benefitting from low 2008 base numbers. December industrial output grew 7.2%, year-on-year, with metallurgy advancing 27.3% and chemicals gaining 17.4%. January 2010 steel output also jumped significantly, with finished rolled steel production up 20%, y-o-y, to 2.4 million tons. Without much external demand, however, the machine building sector was stagnant, with no signs of recovery in KYIV 00000226 003.2 OF 004 the fourth quarter and a 2.5% decline in December, y-o-y. MODERATE INFLATON -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Ukraine had comparatively moderate price growth in 2009. Its lower than expected 12.3% inflation rate reflected the government's decision to postpone most major increases in utility rates, particularly residential gas rates that had been slated to rise toward cost recovery levels. Utility rates grew only 8.2% in 2009, as opposed to 28.2% in 2008. The bulk of the price increases (6.9%) was registered in the first four months of 2009, mostly driven by inflation in imported products and sharp currency depreciation at the end of 2008. As Ukraine's currency stabilized and demand for consumer products fell, inflation moderated during the latter half of 2009. Ukraine's strong 2009 harvest limited food price growth to 10.9%, down from 24.5% in 2008. Public transportation rates grew only 10% in 2009, as opposed to 46.6% in ¶2008. ¶18. (SBU) Expected increases in 2010 transportation and residential gas rates will likely add 3-6 percentage points to inflation, according to Kyiv-based analysts at Astrum Investment and Concorde Capital. As a result, experts project Ukraine's 2010 inflation could exceed 2009 levels, contrary to the official forecast of 9.3%. 2010 ECONOMIC OUTLOOK -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Ukraine's 2010 outlook depends on the pace of political consolidation after the presidential election, external demand for Ukraine's key export products, and implementation of reforms to bring back the IMF, prompt investment, and facilitate lending. A protracted Tymoshenko challenge of the second round presidential election results, despite the apparent victory of Viktor Yanukovych, would postpone the formation of a new government and delay needed economic reform. This, in turn, would place significant pressure on the IMF, which has put off its engagement until political consolidation yields a slate of authorities with which it can negotiate. ¶20. (SBU) Budget problems are likely to remain the largest concern for the GOU in 2010. After the presidential election, the new government may have more political maneuverability to address its deficit by passing a sound budget and enacting tough reforms to address gas pricing and the pension system. However, the state cupboard is now bare, making broad first quarter budget arrears all but inevitable. ¶21. (SBU) Ukraine's difficult business environment, which has only worsened during the 2009 fiscal crisis, will continue to have a negative impact on investment in 2010. The obligation to pay back accumulated VAT refund arrears will also be a challenge for Ukraine's cash-strapped government. The Ministry of Finance has already announced it will allocate only UAH 1.3 billion monthly to pay VAT refunds during the first quarter of 2010, lower than the 2009 minimum monthly refund of UAH 2 billion. Further accumulation of VAT arrears has severely limited corporate working capital and poisoned the well for potential investors. ¶22. (SBU) To improve investor confidence and bring back the IMF and other external lending, the new President and government will have to push through a major, and painful, reform package in the early days after the inauguration. Without reforms that put the IMF program back on track, investment and bank lending will continue to be absent. Investors are wary, but many still think some of Ukraine's key sectors (especially agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and food processing) are excellent medium-term bets. ¶23. (SBU) Most experts project modest economic growth in 2010, including 2.7% GDP forecast by the IMF and 3% GDP growth foreseen by the EBRD. The revival of Ukrainian metallurgy sector is expected to be the largest economic driver and will also contribute to shrinking Ukraine's current account deficit. However, factors causing an imbalanced 2009 financial account (i.e. a sharp decline in investment inflows and increased corporate payments to external creditors) will likely continue in 2010. Any political uncertainty could ward off sources of financing and further distress investors and the banking sector. COMMENT -------------- ¶24. (SBU) In an environment where fiscal pressures will likely lead to significant payment arrears in March, a signal from the IMF that KYIV 00000226 004.2 OF 004 it is reengaging is considered vital. On the other hand, the IMF will run into reputational risks if it comes back too early or if Yanukovych follows through on a budget-busting promise to raise state sector wages and pensions. IMF and World Bank-supported reforms will likely be accepted by the public and are unlikely to lead to large-scale social unrest. Our baseline expectation is that investment numbers will not increase notably until later in 2010. Business investors will be watching for the new President's economic reform agenda, anxious to see signals of commitment before coming back to Ukraine in anything but a very tentative fashion. TEFFT