INDIA'S NEXT TOP GENERAL OFFERS POSSIBLE COUNTERINSURGENCY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KOLKATA 000029 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/INSB, SRAP, EAP/CM E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/26/2020 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IN BG AF SUBJECT: INDIA'S NEXT TOP GENERAL OFFERS POSSIBLE COUNTERINSURGENCY INSIGHTS FOR AFGHANISTAN REF: NEW DELHI 334 CLASSIFIED BY: Matthew Asada, A/Consul General. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 11 meeting, India's departing Eastern Commander and next Chief of Army Staff, LTG V.K. Singh, discussed India's success with its ongoing northeast counterinsurgency operations, improved security with Bangladesh, the military's take on the Maoist/Naxal threat and the India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh. While stressing that there is no "one-size-fits-all" counterinsurgency strategy, he conveyed his personal, unofficial view that the Indian Army's experience in reintegrating northeast insurgents may be of some value to the international community as it examines counterinsurgent reintegration in Afghanistan. Given his personal experiences with the Eastern Command, as its commander and as one of its officer in the 1971 India-Pakistan War, India's next top general may place more emphasis on India's eastern border than some of his predecessors. He continues to speak fondly of his time at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle and welcomes closer U.S.-India strategic cooperation. Eastern Command's Counterinsurgency Focus: Insights for Afghanistan ¶2. (C) On February 11 the Consul General paid a 45-minute courtesy call on the current Eastern Commander and India's next Chief of Army Staff, LTG V.K. Singh. One of six geographic Army commands, the Eastern Command located in Kolkata in historic Fort William is responsible for defending northeast and eastern India, including the strategic Siliguri corridor, from external or secessionist threats. The Eastern Command has extensive counterinsurgency experience with ongoing campaigns in Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. Singh was keen to emphasize the importance of coordinated military and political operations, and local cultural expertise to the success of his counterinsurgency campaigns. According to him, military operations have prompted insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) or Karbilongri North Liberation Front (KNLF) to come to the negotiations table (on the day of the meeting almost 400 KNLF militia surrendered to the military). He underlined the importance of successful reintegration programs. While stressing that there is no "one-size-fits-all" counterinsurgency strategy, he conveyed his personal, unofficial view that the Indian Army's experience in reintegrating northeast insurgents may be of some value to the international community as it examines counterinsurgent reintegration in Afghanistan. Positive Impacts of improved India-Bangladesh Relations ¶3. (C) He confirmed that improved India-Bangladesh counterterrorism cooperation was having a positive impact on India's ongoing counter-insurgency operations in the area. He noted an improvement in military-military ties (he had visited Dhaka last year),but according to him they had always been good. He complimented Bangladesh's interim military government on managing a successful return to civilian elected rule in 2008 - as he remarked a "quite unusual feat in this part of the world." Maoist/Naxal Threat - Law and Order, Not Secessionist ¶4. (C) He reiterated the official position that since the Maoist/Naxal threat was "not secessionist, but rather one of law and order" the police and state governments, and not the military, bore the responsibility for addressing the challenge. The military could, and is, working on a limited basis with the police in an advisory or training capacity, but they are not involved in active, kinetic operations. However, the military is monitoring the threat to ensure that it does not get out of hand. He advised against any overt U.S. assistance in this domestic, internal matter. Chinese Protests Over Arunachal Pradesh - Not So Subtle Reminder from India's Neighbor ¶5. (C) While dismissing media hype over alleged Chinese border incursions into the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh, he acknowledged differences between the two countries on the matter. While more reserved on the sensitive topic, he hypothesized three areas of potential future conflict between KOLKATA 00000029 002 OF 002 China and India: clash of actual "hard" interests (border, water, energy),regional ambitions, and global alliances. He interpreted Chinese protests over Arunachal Pradesh as a not-so-subtle Chinese reminder to India of its presence in the neighborhood and concern over improving U.S.-India relations in light of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Comment ¶6. (C) Singh, while generally friendly and open, was unusually candid for a man in uniform (he spoke without a note taker). It is unlikely that he will be as accessible or free to speak in his new position. He has a genuine soft spot for the Eastern Command, given his experiences as its commander and as one of its officer in the 1971 India-Pakistan War. This may translate into India's next top general placing more emphasis on India's eastern border than some of his predecessors, although Pakistan will continue to preoccupy the military establishment. His comments regarding Indian expertise in counterinsurgency warfare, and the importance of reintegration, may signal an opportunity to engage with the Government of India on the lessons learned from the northeast and what they might mean for Afghan reintegration. While the Government of India continues to be skeptical regarding reintegration (Reftel),this may be an opening for discussions and engagement. He continues to speak fondly of his time at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle and welcomes closer U.S.-India strategic cooperation. PAYNE