2009 in review: On balance progress prevails, but barely

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KINSHASA 000033 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/02 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON MOPS MARR PHUM PREF EAID PBTS CG SUBJECT: 2009 in review: On balance progress prevails, but barely CLASSIFIED BY: William J. Garvelink, Ambassador, Embassy Kinshasa; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: 2009 did not commence auspiciously for the DRC. The country faced a critical security situation, both internally and with regard to certain neighboring countries; the specter of the global economic crisis threatened financial collapse; and weak political institutions appeared to make possible increases in the president's power at the expense of other legitimate political forces. At year's end, however, the DRC and Rwanda had formally reconciled, while a tenuous peace settlement seemed to be taking root in the east where a long-standing conflict still simmers; the government had made some hard choices favoring greater economic stability; and the power of the presidency had not unconstitutionally supplanted the powers of other government branches. New civil strife erupted in the western region late in the year creating more than 100,000 refugees; the government's response was measured and appears to have succeeded in preventing a large-scale conflict. The DRC and Angola also resolved to settle differences through dialogue. But progress in 2009 was disappointingly modest and is precarious at best. The GDRC will be under continuous pressure from Western partners in 2010 to commit to serious actions against corruption and human rights abuses, to strengthen democratic institutions and to enact meaningful economic reforms. Working closely with other influential donors we must leverage the good will accruing from our assistance programs and other activities to ensure slow, but steady, forward movement on all these fronts. President Kabila was a weak leader in 2009, avoiding opportunities to inspire his own people and to engage with foreign interlocutors. A major challenge this year will be to encourage Kabila to provide enhanced leadership and engage with partners on a wide range of important issues. Equally as important, given Kabila's shortcomings, we must learn to make greater use of alternative pressure points within the GDRC in an effort to advance our bilateral agenda. End summary. Ties with eastern neighbors improved ¶2. (SBU) Rapprochement in 2009 with its eastern neighbors Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda was a clear signal of a shift in the DRC's regional diplomatic engagement from short-term survival to long-term sustainability. The GDRC demonstrated political will at the highest level with historic heads-of-state meetings, exchanges of ambassadors, resumption of bilateral ministerial and working-level commissions. Most importantly, this engagement also contributed to tangible regional stability through joint military operations against transnational paramilitary forces. ¶3. (SBU) Following an exchange of ambassadors in the summer between the DRC and neighboring Uganda and Burundi, President Kabila turned his full attention toward cementing relations with Rwanda. In a highly publicized event, he met Rwandan President Kagame in Goma on August 6, 2009, the first public heads-of-state meeting between the neighboring countries in 13 years. The DRC and Rwandan presidents accredited ambassadors from each other's country in November and December respectively. Improved diplomatic relations followed an escalation of combat - except this time, the DRC and Rwanda fought together as allies. ¶4. (SBU) Following a December 2008 bilateral meeting of foreign ministers in which the agreement was forged, the DRC and Rwanda launched joint military operations (Umoja Wetu) to combat the FDLR (Front DC)mocratique pour la LibC)ration du Rwanda/Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda: groups of Rwandan Hutu rebels operating inside the DRC since the defeat of Rwandan genocidaires in 1994),which includes former soldiers and supporters of the regime that orchestrated the 1994 Rwandan genocide. During Kimia II military operations, the FARDC, with logistical support from the United Nations peacekeeping mission (MONUC),continued to pursue the FDLR in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu with mixed results, demonstrating military success at combating large concentrations of FDLR forces, but often falling short of adequately protecting civilians. Furthermore, elements of the FARDC were implicated in attacking innocent civilians. Perhaps because of both military success and in response to calls from the international community to better protect civilian populations, Kimia II ended in December 2009. The next phase of targeted operations and police actions (Operation Amani Leo) seeks to KINSHASA 00000033 002 OF 006 disrupt any resurgent or replacement militia group and to ensure a continuation of positive security conditions, while encouraging tens of thousands of IDPs and refugees to return home. A willingness to undertake joint military operations, involving two armies (Ugandan and Rwandan) that had previously invaded the DRC, was a courageous decision by Kabila, one on which he may have successfully gambled both national security and his own political viability. Conflicts in the East, however, continue ¶5. (C) A precondition for peace in the East was the neutralization of the threat posed by the increasingly powerful Congolese Tutsi rebel group CNDP (CongrC(s National pour la DC)fense du Peuple/National Congress for the Defense of the People). One of the key parts of the (unwritten) Congolese-Rwandan agreement was the January 2009 arrest of CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda. At the time, CNDP Chief of Staff Bosco Ntaganda took control of the organization and negotiated with the GDRC. A peace deal was signed in March that transformed the CNDP into a political organization and its military wing was integrated into the FARDC. While military integration is uneven, the threat of the CNDP to the Kinshasa regime and (to a lesser extent) the status quo in the Kivus has greatly diminished. Kabila has been personally involved in negotiations with recalcitrant CNDP leaders in recent months, although Bosco appears to be entrenching himself should his suspected verbal deal with Kabila end and the GDRC seek to turn him over to the ICC. ¶6. (SBU) The GDRC also conducted joint military operations (Operation Lightening Thunder, then Rudia II) with Southern Sudanese and Ugandan forces against Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) operating with impunity against civilian populations in sparsely populated and densely foliated northwestern Orientale Province. The FARDC, with residual Ugandan intelligence forces and crucial MONUC logistical support, continues to pursue the LRA in the Rudia II military operations. The six-month offensive resulted in the destruction of large concentrations of LRA forces, the disruption of their command and control network, and the flight of remaining paramilitary fighters into neighboring Central African Republic. Currently, small independently operating bands numbering approximately 100 remain in the DRC, though other elements could easily return across the DRC's porous northern border region. ¶7. (SBU) Both Kimia II and Rudia II operations were conducted with MONUC logistical support. Notably, the GDRC now refers to MONUC as a "partner," a relationship far different than that of a year ago. The GDRC also weighed in on the extension of the MONUC mandate, clearly stating the role they see for the mission. Relations between MONUC and the GDRC were more cooperative operationally and less acrimonious diplomatically with fewer incidents of using the UN as a scapegoat for internal security and development problems. Positive diplomatic engagement included improvements in relations with former colonizer Belgium and France, as exemplified by the visit of French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Recent actions by the GDRC attest to promising, yet inconsistent diplomacy with other countries, international organizations, and financial institutions. Economic stability: Kabila makes some good choices ¶8. (SBU) Both the executive and legislative branches took positive steps to improve the macro-economic environment. By amending the Sino-Congolese agreement to make it compatible with debt sustainability, the DRC obtained approval of a formal IMF program (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility -- PRGF) and could achieve the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point as early as June 2010 if it successfully meets all triggers in the agreement. To improve the investment climate, Kabila announced in his December 6, 2009 State of the Nation address - and the legislature recently approved -- joining the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (known by its French KINSHASA 00000033 003 OF 006 acronym OHADA) as part of the GDRC's goal to improve its World Bank "Doing Business" global ranking by 20 places in 2011. The GDRC recently launched a steering committee under the Ministry of Plan to help support the implementation of short- and medium-term reforms to improve the business climate. The Congo also improved a few key physical infrastructure nodes including making significant progress towards compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code (with the assistance of the U.S. Coast Guard),resumption of international commercial flights to Kisangani, the DRC's third largest city, and construction of passable roads to complement open borders with Uganda. Looking ahead, the IMF forecasts DRC economic growth of 5.4% for 2010, nearly double the growth recorded in 2009. Some forward movement with institution-building ¶9. (C) Political pressure by Kabila supporters was probably used to obtain the resignation of National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe. Kamerhe's departure from office, however, proceeded non-violently in accordance with constitutional and parliamentary procedures, as well as pursuant to the internal procedures of Kamerhe's and Kabila's political party, the PPRD. The Senate, led by Kengo wa Dondo (not a member of Kabila's ruling coalition),is testing the waters as a legislative check to the executive, most publicly by investigating charges of vote buying in the gubernatorial election of a Kabila ally in what was formerly the sole opposition-held seat of Equateur. The Senate is currently conducting corruption investigations against government officials in five other provinces. The parliament is considering draft laws to reform the security forces (both the FARDC and the police),and both majority and opposition politicians cite the need for a "republican army" subject to civilian control, capable of defending the territorial integrity of the country. Concerns that the executive branch had become more authoritarian have been mollified with Kabila's public promise of forthcoming elections and apparent abandonment of rumored moves to unilaterally change presidential term limits and the composition of the magistrature. ¶10. (SBU) In the area of press freedom, the annual report by the respected NGO Journalists in Danger (JED) noted there were fewer assaults on journalists in 2009, and more GDRC statements supporting freedom of the press. The report concluded, however, that the GDRC exerted considerable "soft pressure" on media, e.g. bribes, to entice members of the media to avoid certain politically sensitive subjects or to support biased reporting, e.g. presenting a given politician in a good light. Equateur: a measured response prevents large-scale conflict ¶11. (C) Equateur Province counts among its native sons current Senate President Kengo wa Dondo, MLC party president and ICC detainee Jean-Pierre Bemba, and, of course, former strongman Mobutu. This large and formerly influential province now fallen on hard times was, until elections in mid-October, the only province to have an opposition government. The electoral victory of an independent allied to Kabila was hardly celebrated before a long-simmering tribal dispute turned violent. The inter-clan conflict, fought with primitive weapons in a limited area, was seemingly contained until well-armed, trained militiamen mounted a quasi-insurgency. Unemployed former combatants in an economically depressed area may have seen an opportunity to obtain an integration deal similar to the CNDP in the East, while their political leaders may have hoped to embarrass Kabila or obtain some valuable settlement in return for laying down arms. However, it is notable that, despite rumors and initial fears of a government crackdown similar to GDRC actions in 2007 and 2008 against the Bas-Congo political-religious militants, the GDRC refrained from brutal reprisals, and invited international observers to the region early in the process. Kabila reportedly is personally involved in negotiations. KINSHASA 00000033 004 OF 006 Differences settled through dialogue ¶12. (C) Returning again to international relations, the DRC seems to be increasingly assertive In response to regional disagreements including disputes over the management of natural resources. After a 21-year hiatus, the DRC hosted a bilateral commission with participation of a Rwandan delegation led by its foreign minister. The commission, a possible mechanism for strengthening rapprochement, reviewed the gamut of issues from economic and military cooperation to management of trade and population flows. Discussions on competing claims to methane reserves under Lake Kivu may also have been on the agenda. Similarly, with Uganda, the DRC is reviewing a border delineated by the river Semliki, a Lake Albert tributary that has naturally changed its course with implications for ownership of confirmed oil deposits. While these discussions are behind the scenes and in varying stages of settlement, unsightly disagreements with Angola have come fully into public view. ¶13. (C) The year began with continued good relations between the DRC and Angola, marred only by a seemingly annual Angolan police incursion across the undefined border of Bas-Congo province. Tensions spiked when reports surfaced that the DRC had made claims to oil reserves exploited by Angola along the Atlantic coast. Problems in the bilateral relationship grew with expulsions of Congolese expatriates by Angola and the DRC's subsequent tit-for-tat expulsions of Angolans living north of the border - including some with verifiable refugee status. Following contentious statements circulated amongst the diplomatic community in Kinshasa by the GOA and GDRC, the governments held a bi-national commission in Luanda, which discussed migration and economic issues, established an expert working group to discuss maritime boundaries, but skirted around the contentious issue of oil development rights. Some contacts suggest Angolan President Dos Santos is so fed up with his Congolese homologue over the claims against Angola for oil royalties and might not bail out Kabila if he were threatened. ¶14. (C) The DRC hosted and chaired the annual SADC summit in September. For the DRC, the summit was important symbolically, as this was the first regional or international conference in Kinshasa since the 1980s when Mobutu hosted a France-Africa summit. For many DRC citizens, from Kabila down to the man on the street, the fact that the DRC could host (albeit with considerable South African logistical support) such an event confirms that the country has begun to bottom out from a period of paralysis. Indeed, Kabila's comments about the importance of democracy in Zimbabwe and Madagascar presented the DRC to the region as a stabilizing African state with a voice on the issues of the day. It is noteworthy that DRC Foreign Minister Thambwe successfully led opposition at the 2009 UNGA to a proposed address by Andry Rajoelina, the self-declared Malagasy "president." There are recent indications that the GDRC may also be moving toward a tougher stance on Zimbabwe, a regime that enjoyed close security, political, and economic ties to the DRC under Laurent Kabila. Kabila studiously avoids exercising leadership ¶15. (C) With improved security in the East, better relations with its neighbors and a feckless political opposition, Kabila had breathing space in 2009 to exert a more decisive leadership style, but he did not. He appeared to carefully avoid exercising leadership as he chose not to attend important foreign meetings, including the UN General Assembly and the Copenhagen summit on the environment, while he did not make important speeches at home on issues of national and international concern, including SSR reform, SGBV, economic reform and many others. Kabila remained an enigma in 2009. We do not see his lack of leadership; however, as meaning he is totally "uninterested" or disengaged. Nor does it mean the country is not moving forward on its own -- and achieving some progress -- in certain sectors. A major challenge this year will be to encourage Kabila to provide enhanced leadership and engage with partners on a wide range of important issues. Equally as KINSHASA 00000033 005 OF 006 important, given Kabila's shortcomings, we must make greater use of alternative pressure points within the GDRC in an effort to advance our bilateral agenda. Solidifying USG-DRC relations ¶16. (C) Secretary of State Clinton's visit to the DRC August 10-11 signaled a turning point in U.S.-DRC relations, a significant improvement in high-level engagement between the USG and the GDRC. The Secretary's meetings with President Kabila, Prime Minister Muzito, and civil society representatives went well; GDRC logistical support was unusually good; and her visit aroused great interest in and received positive coverage from the DRC media. The Secretary offered technical assistance to the DRC to deal with its most pressing problems. As a result, the USG has engaged the GDRC in five critical areas: sexual- and gender-based violence; security sector reform; corruption; economic governance; and food security. Assessment teams in all five areas have visited the DRC to discuss how the U.S. might be able to assist the DRC on these issues. Evaluations from these assessment visits will guide the next steps on this U.S.-DRC initiative. ¶17. (C) U.S.-DRC mil-to-mil cooperation accelerated in 2009, centered on efforts to realize the objective of instilling professionalism and respect for human rights in a soon-to-be U.S.-trained FARDC light infantry battalion (LIB). This effort, which originated in an October 2007 promise by President Bush to President Kabila, moved forward, as the GDRC agreed to a Status of Forces Agreement, a site to construct the training facility, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) outlining the commitments on both sides. The MoU also allows the USG to stop training, should major political or human rights concerns arise. Importantly, the GDRC agreed to assume the expenses to transport its troops to the training facility in Kisangani, to provide weapons for FARDC troops involved in the training, and to pay its troops in the LIB. Training this battalion will be an important contribution to security sector reform. Progress in 2009 left us optimistic about achieving the LIB objectives. Stabilization, recovery and development agenda ¶18. (U) GDRC and donor commitment to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was highlighted by a high-level forum in June. Significant advances have been made on developing sector strategies, mapping donor assistance, incorporating external resources into the 2010 National Budget undertaking Medium-Term Expenditure Plans. Following the Umoja Wetu joint military operation with Rwanda, the GDRC produced a Stabilization and Recovery Strategy for Eastern Congo (STAREC),providing the framework for international support. The GDRC also released a Global Strategy for the Fight Against Sexual Violence. The GDRC - with the participation of First Lady Olive Kabila, and support from USAID and UNFPA - held a National Conference on Repositioning Family Planning. The DRC, through UNDP and three NGOs, signed $216 million in agreements with the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Round 8 and received preliminary approval for $307 million in programming under Round 9. ¶19. (C) Comment: 2009 ended with signs of cautious optimism, with the DRC showing improvement on some important fronts. Relations with eastern neighbors clearly improved, lessening significantly the threat of a recurring regional conflagration. Progress on the domestic front has been bumpier, but democratic institutions withstood high political drama in 2009, attacks on journalists decreased, a free press still prevails, and a vocal, albeit self-destructive, opposition exists. Despite the frustrations and disappointments of slow movement, obtaining in the DRC the objectives of stronger political institutions, security sector reform (SSR) and sustainable economic growth is possible. A quick review of how things have changed for the better since 2001 when Kabila came to power bears this out. Decades of neglect and a KINSHASA 00000033 006 OF 006 complete lack of state authority throughout much of the country cannot be reversed overnight. End comment. GARVELINK