DRC/UNHCR/RWANDA TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT: VIEW FROM THE DRC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 000250 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF PGOV UNHCR PHUM MOPS CG SUBJECT: DRC/UNHCR/RWANDA TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT: VIEW FROM THE DRC REF: KIGALI 120; 09 KINSHASA 1052 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Governments of the DRC and Rwanda, and UNHCR signed a long-awaited Tripartite Agreement in Kigali on February 17 providing a framework for the voluntary repatriation of Congolese refugees from Rwanda and Rwandan refugees in Congo. For the Congolese refugees, the agreement will cover only those registered with UNHCR, some 53,632. Between now and the next meeting of the Tripartite Commission in May 2010, the technical working group of the commission will work on the modalities of the return process, including verification of registrations and areas of return. Organized returns could begin as early as summer 2009. UNHCR and both governments face significant challenges in ensuring a voluntary, safe, and durable repatriation of these two entrenched refugee populations, avoiding a precipitous return that could risk destabilizing return areas in North Kivu. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) On February 18, UNHCR DRC Eastern Coordinator Karl Steinacker briefed Goma-based diplomats and MONUC officials on the Tripartite Agreement signed in Kigali on February 17. PRM TDY also met separately with UNHCR, MONUC, and GDRC officials to discuss the Tripartite Agreement and the refugee return process. Tripartite Agreement -------------- ¶3. (SBU) UNHCR described the agreement as "very standard," in line with other, similar UNHCR arrangements. Steinacker noted two particularly contentious aspects of the agreement negotiations: the scope of which Congolese refugees in Rwanda would be covered; and a clause calling on the Rwandan Government not to discriminate against returnees. On the designation of which Congolese refugees would be covered by the agreement, Steinacker said most of the debate took place within the Congolese delegation itself, while the Rwandan delegation was largely silent on the issue. The final consensus was that only refugees that were registered by UNHCR - 53,632 - would be covered under the agreement. These refugees reside mainly in three camps and receive formal protection and assistance from UNHCR. Given tension and conflict over land in the primary areas of return - Masisi and Rutshuru Territories in North Kivu - limiting the number of Congolese who could claim benefits under the agreement was a crucial point. On the second contentious �A;issue, the clause on non-discriminatory policies, the Rwandan delegation reportedly took umbrage at this "stock" clause in the Tripartite Agreement. Per Steinacker, the eventual solution was to phrase the clause with a positive construct, i.e., "the Government of Rwanda will not discriminate against repatriated refugees" became "the Government of Rwanda will take measures to protect the fundamental rights of the returnees should be treated with equality." ¶4. (SBU) The DRC delegation numbered nearly thirty participants, led by the Minister of Interior, and including the head of the National Refugee Council, the governors of North and South Kivu, the North Kivu Provincial Minister of Justice and Social Reinsertion, and as last minute invitees, a large complement of traditional chiefs from North Kivu and South Kivu. Steinacker said nearly all members of the Congolese delegation intervened at different points, often debating more amongst themselves the various aspects of the agreement, rather than with their Rwandan or UNHCR counterparts. In contrast, on the Rwandan side, only ten members were in the delegation, which through its spokesperson, Secretary of State Christine Nyatanyi, "spoke with one voice," according to Steinacker. UNHCR had pushed to include observers from the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL). However, per Steinacker, the Rwandans declined, adding that CEPGL participation would be welcome at subsequent meetings of the Tripartite Commission. The delegation visited Gihembe refugee camp, where the Congolese leaders stressed to camp residents that "the war is over" and that it is "time to come home." KINSHASA 00000250 002 OF 004 Return process -------------- ¶5. (SBU) On timelines, the technical working group of the commission will work for the next two months on modalities of return, including identification of areas of return, methods of return, assistance packages for returnees, return infrastructure (e.g. transit centers),etc. There will then be a formal meeting in May of the Tripartite Technical Committee to finalize these arrangements. With time allotted for the construction of transit center facilities and other assistance arrangements, UNHCR Goma estimated facilitated returns could begin as early as July 2010. Steinacker noted that the Rwandan delegation provided UNHCR a list of some 8,000 Congolese refugees who were ready to return as soon as possible. Given the complexity and political sensitivity of the caseload and the significant work involved in identifying areas of return and ensuring the returnees' acceptance in these areas, Steinacker, when pressed for an overall timeline for the return operation, commented that "at best, it would muddle along for at least two years." ¶6. (SBU) To assess whether areas of return in DRC can be declared safe, and to work on community reconciliation in areas of return a two-tiered committee system is being developed by the GDRC, UNHCR, and MONUC at the Groupement (Comite Locale Permanent de Conciliation - CLPC) and the Provincial (Comite Provinciale de Gestion de Retour - CPGR) levels. Local authorities, civil society, traditional chiefs, IDP representatives and UN officials will be members. Upon recommendation of the CLPC, the Ministre de l'Administration Territoriale (of each Province) will declare a particular Groupement to be safe for the return of IDPs, displaced returnees and the facilitated/promoted repatriation of refugees. If the area is declared unsafe by the committee, UNHCR will not facilitate return. The CLPCs, the establishment of which is included in a clause of the GDRC-CNDP March 23 Agreement, may also have a role in identifying which refugees are eligible for return to certain areas, although the modalities of this identification process have yet to be determined. Referring to these resources as "embryonic," Steinacker made a pitch to the donor community to support these committee mechanisms which UNHCR and MONUC officials see as key to ensuring a peaceful return process. In advance of the returns, and as part of ongoing IDP operations, UNHCR has expanded its presence in areas of potential return, with new offices in Masisi and Kitchanga. In addition, UNHCR is recruiting national UN Volunteer staff to be deployed to support the CLPCs, as technical advisors, but in part in an effort to thwart manipulation of the CLPC process by the CNDP. Financing for the committees and support staff will be through a $2 million allocation from the UN Peace-building Fund. Risk -------------- ¶7. (SBU) UNHCR Goma's presentation to Goma diplomats was rather sanguine, noting that the agency was working with the MONUC stabilization team to "manage the risk" of returns, but sounding no dire warnings of impending instability due to return operations. However, in private discussions with PRM TDY officer, UNHCR staff admitted much more concern about the potential for violence stemming from refugee returns. Recognizing that the CNDP had much invested in the return to bolster its constituency in the Kivus, a senior UNHCR official said the agency was worried about the potential for violence stemming from an acceleration of the process by either the CNDP or the Government of Rwanda. The official said that it would be very easy for indigenous groups opposed to the return to "stage a small massacre" to terrorize Congolese Tutsis into staying in camps. When asked what UNHCR could do to prevent such attacks, the official said that the process hinges on the CLPCs, who will be key to ensure local buy-in of the process, and critically, to determine which areas are safe for return. But it remains to be seen how the guarantors of the return process could KINSHASA 00000250 003 OF 004 prevent manipulation of the CLPCs, many of whom will operate in CNDP strongholds. A UNHCR official candidly said that that the Congolese delegation had signed the Tripartite "for the gallery" and that much of the refugee return process was "out of the government's control" - overseen by the CNDP parallel administration, which the official suggested would become even more entrenched following the recent GDRC cabinet reshuffle which excluded the CNDP. ¶8. (SBU) The specter of the return of the Congolese Tutsis has already led to instability in certain communities, notably in Walikale and southern Lubero, where in October 2009 residents attacked UNHCR offices causing the evacuation of the agency from its field office (Note: According to UNHCR, there are only 800 refugees in Rwanda who are from Lubero and 600 from Walikale. Part of the intense reaction in these areas was due to a confusing map that circulated widely confusing IDP and refugee return numbers, implying that thousands of Congolese refugees would return to the two territories. End note). With the signing of the Tripartite, rumors spread of impending demonstrations in Lubero, although none have yet occurred. Potential spoilers to a peaceful refugee return process also include the "unofficial/undocumented" returnees (or migrant Rwandans or a mixture thereof) that have been entering DRC from Rwanda since 2009 (ref B),as well as other spontaneous returnees, including some 400 households of Congolese refugees that have come back to Rutshuru from asylum in Uganda (where no Tripartite has been signed). In response to a question about managing the risk of the return operation, Steinacker suggested that the international community could and should play a helpful role by conveying a clear message to both the DRC and Rwandan Governments that, while the opportunity has come for return, the operation should not be rushed, nor disrupted by manipulation of the process. Rwandan refugees -------------- ¶9. (SBU) While the Congolese return attracts most attention, and indeed was the dominant element of UNHCR's presentation and ensuing discussions of the Tripartite Agreement, the return of Rwandan refugees from Congo is equally, if not more complex and difficult. This is because of the difficulty in identifying this caseload, many of whom remember little of Rwanda, and have only tentative links to their "homeland." PRM TDY has spoken with multiple Rwandan refugees over the past several weeks at transit centers in Bukavu and in Goma, who had left Rwanda following the genocide as children, integrated in Congo either with Congolese or Rwandan families (including FDLR),but who had recently been separated via military operations against the FDLR. These refugees - in limbo at transit centers where they did not leave, fearing the reaction of local populations - knew no home in Rwanda, and were not allowed by the DRC authorities to remain in Congo. These returns have been occurring for years (9,019 returned in 2009),and thus the Tripartite represents only a formalization of the movement, which has been ongoing for years. A key development will be whether the technical committees work out a system of formal local integration within the DRC for this caseload (Note: This question will be linked to, but separate from, whether FDLR combatants can be relocated within DRC rather than return to Rwanda. End note). UNHCR recognizes that the transit centers, which are intended to be temporary and limit refugees' freedom of movement, are not a good solution, but claim to have little choice until Rwandan and DRC authorities change their positions on these difficult cases. ¶10. (SBU) Comment: In discussions, UNHCR officials have oscillated between optimism - based on hopes for the nascent Congolese structures being put in place to address return issues - and pessimism - based on a realistic assessment of the political dynamics in return areas that are admittedly "out of UNHCR's control." UNHCR and the MONUC Stabilization Team have drafted a strategy document on the Return, Reconciliation, and Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees in Eastern DRC as part of the overall UN Security and Stabilization Support Strategy. Working closely with KINSHASA 00000250 004 OF 004 the GDRC on the implementation of the strategy, the UN system will need to be well-supported financially to ensure the implementation of the plan to address outstanding issues of citizenship, land access, conflict mediation, shelter assistance and peaceful coexistence. While a massive, precipitous return of the official refugee population seems unlikely, undocumented "unofficial" returns have continued in recent months, and there exists a real possibility that the process could accelerate. The real potential for significant violence and instability due to a poorly managed return operation demands close attention to and support of the actors: MONUC, UNHCR, and the new committee structures overseeing the fragile process. It is important that the USG continue to support voluntary return in safety and dignity, which in this case means slow and steady. As a first step, this message should be sent clearly to all parties with a stake in controlling the pace of returns, including the GDRC and GOR, as well as CNDP officials. End comment. GARVELINK