CHOD Outlines Military Reform Plans

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000025 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/28 TAGS: PGOV MCAP PREL KCRS AORC MARR PHUM PINS CG SUBJECT: CHOD Outlines Military Reform Plans REF: 09 KINSHASA 1033 AND PREVIOUS; 09 KINSHASA 976 DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 (B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Didier Etumba Longila discussed plans to reform the military during a January 26 briefing to select UNSC ambassadors and senior MONUC officials. The FARDC plans to organize its national defense into three geographical zones headquartered in Kinshasa, Kisangani, and Lubumbashi. Etumba announced a revised combat chain of command under the CHOD, not the MoD, as was the case previously. Etumba was remarkably open about the need to reform the FARDC, including reducing overall numbers, improving training, and providing better opportunities to re-insert demobilized soldiers into civilian jobs. Interestingly, Etumba announced the FARDC would deploy a contingent of engineers and a company of military police to the small city of Dongo, the scene of fighting in Equateur Province over the last several months. End summary. Kabila's zone defense ¶2. (C) During a January 26 briefing to select UNSC ambassadors and MONUC leadership, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Didier Etumba Longila confirmed plans to organize the DRC's national defense into three zones headquartered at Kinshasa, Kisangani, and Lubumbashi, respectively. This concept was previously discussed at working level meetings, but the briefing was the first time that the concept was formally unveiled in a multilateral setting, perhaps pointing toward a coalescing of purpose and opinion within the GDRC. Etumba explained that the defensive posture, centered on the three largest cities, was designed around economic centers. It is noteworthy that the geographic placement also complements President Kabila's centers of power: the capital in Kinshasa; his base of support in Lubumbashi; and Kisangani, gateway to the East and purported construction site of a new presidential retreat (report to follow septel). In addition to reducing response time to crises, Etumba said an advantage of basing soldiers in key locations throughout the country was to "ensure national unity after decentralization." Dongo - engineered peace or martial law? ¶3. (C) In a previously unreported development, the plan assigns engineering and military police (MP) battalions to each defensive zone. Etumba said deployment of MP battalions aimed to address �00A;both broad concerns of troop discipline and specifically to counter human rights violations. While battalion headquarters would be collocated with the defensive zone commandants in major cities, MP companies would be posted near military bases and strategic cities. Interestingly, the previously unremarkable city of Dongo in Equateur Province, site of recent inter-ethnic fighting that escalated into a quasi-insurgency (ref A),will receive both a contingent of engineers to work on local development projects and a company of military police to maintain the peace. The deployment could be seen as a troubling application of quasi-occupation or a realistic assessment of the risks and causes of civic unrest in the impoverished border region. On a small scale, the GDRC response to the Equateur crisis could be an important evolution towards central planning to counter a security threat. The decision to deploy engineer and MP companies to Dongo, coupled with the measured response to the uprising itself - in terms of proportionality of response, early involvement of the international community, and military preparation involving airlift, stocking of rations, communications, and vehicles for command and control - is a first for the DRC. The president as commander-in-chief ¶4. (C) While stating the goal of the reform is to develop "a professional, modern, and credible republican army ," which is a deterrent to internal or external aggression, Etumba said it was necessary to establish a revised chain of command to implement army reform. He displayed an organizational chart that delineated a parallel command structure that places recruitment, training, logistics, and administrative matters under the Ministry of Defense; and the combatant commands under the Chief of Staff. While both command structures would ultimately report to the president, the exclusion of the Minister of Defense from the combat chain of command effectively centralizes military authority in the presidency. Current state of soldiers: untrained and nearing retirement age ¶5. (SBU) In describing the current state of the military, Etumba KINSHASA 00000025 002 OF 002 enumerated limitations of an army that is poorly equipped, operationally incapable of force projection and logistical resupply, and suffering numerous personnel problems. Chief among the latter, Etumba said, are the absence of support for military dependents, insufficient discipline and a lack of respect for human rights in the force itself, which he described as "a composite army with imbalances in ethnic and geographic composition, of which 70% are untrained and 40% aged." Establishment of a training command under the Minister of Defense would address one problem and retirement would deal with the other problem. Retirements offer a means to reduce the force, replace those incapable of performing their duties with new recruits, and demonstrate the government's resolve in honoring soldiers' service with a severance package. ¶6. (SBU) Etumba outlined a short-term, three-year program beginning in 2010 to retire over 45,000 soldiers, including 71 general officers in their early to mid-60s. All forced retirees would receive a lump sum payment (up to $30,000 for a general officer),a monthly pension, and some would be offered continued government employment in the diplomatic service or in parastatals as part of a program consisting of retirement, demobilization, and retraining. Etumba envisaged a force over 140,000; however, he commented that numbers should not be viewed with "close precision." (Comment: To date, all GDRC interlocutors have quoted optimal force levels half as large. Publicly offering this high number as the FARDC's opening position, the GDRC might ultimately agree to lower numbers. The reverse scenario would be diplomatically difficult to manage. End comment.) ¶7. (SBU) To reach this end state, Etumba outlined three phases of implementation identical to those Defense Minister Charles Mwando Nsimba outlined when describing his plan for armed forces reform to the parliament in October 2009 (ref B). ¶A. Phase I (2010-2011): reorganize the army, "participate" in operations to secure the country, and prepare to relieve MONUC ¶B. Phase II (2011-2016): consolidate the new organization and territorial orientation of the army ¶C. Phase III (2016-2025): conduct operations to assure territorial defense and peace ¶8. (SBU) Mwando said he hoped to instill discipline in the armed forces, a respect for human rights, and civic education by reforming the military's organization, physical infrastructure, training, and access to the resources necessary to fulfill their defensive mission. He concluded by saying he hopes to have bi- and multilateral partners, welcoming prospective partners who wish to engage within the reform structure "under Congolese coordination and leadership." ¶9. (C) Comment: By presenting a 15-year reform plan, the GDRC unexpectedly exhibited an ability to realistically assess - and publicly discuss - the many problems facing its armed forces. While stark self-criticism of the army by President Kabila and senior officials happens only in private, the frank review of the current state and desired end-state of the military is a promising development for meaningful reform of the security sector. End comment. GARVELINK