In first meeting with dips since MONUC's new mandate

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000011 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/20 TAGS: MARR PGOV PHUM AORC PREL MOPS MCAP CG SUBJECT: In first meeting with dips since MONUC's new mandate approved, Doss highlights vetting, opposes naming of Congolese SSR coordinator DERIVED FROM: DSCG 05-1 (B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a January 15 meeting with senior diplomats to the DRC, SRSG Alan Doss confirmed that President Kabila was "anxious to see a drawdown plan" for MONUC. Doss said he did not support the creation of a GDRC SSR Coordinator, which, in Doss' view, was impractical and also risked appearing to infringe on the DRC's sovereignty. Rather, the international community should work through the relevant DRC ministries on SSR issues. Doss emphasized that although overall MONUC staffing levels would not change, forces could be redeployed to better align with mandate priorities. Doss encouraged all nations involved in SSR in the DRC to insist on U.S.-style vetting procedures. A MONUC police official noted that MONUC had imposed vetting requirements, with GDRC approval, on military and police commanders sent to deal with the quasi-rebellion in Equateur Province. End summary. Vetting in Equateur ¶2. (C) Referencing the USG's Leahy vetting process during an SSR meeting on January 15, SRSG Alan Doss and MONUC's SSR coordinator, Francis Saudubray, encouraged all member nations to conduct similar vetting for their own training programs in the DRC. He added that MONUC plans to conduct vetting of trainees similar to the U.S. process that excludes from training persons known or believed to have committed human rights abuses. The South African DCM expressed concerns that vetting sounded like summary judgment and asked if vetting might run counter to international law. Poloff responded that the USG's program does not result in criminal proceedings in the U.S. or the DRC; rather this training is foreign assistance, which the USG can decide how it wants to administer, and the GDRC has never challenged our findings. MONUC's acting police commissioner (a Nigerian national) rather animatedly voiced his support for the U.S. position. He opined that the GDRC would sign an agreement accepting vetting and would not challenge international input regarding those selected for training (Comment: While this might be necessary for MONUC, we would not advocate seeking government-to-government agreement for any USG vetting. End comment). He offered a recent example in which the DRC had already accepted MONUC's findings. In quelling the recent uprising in Equateur, MONUC refused to work with leaders of the Simba battalion of the Rapid Intervention Police, who had been involved in the 2008 Bas-Congo crackdown in which hundreds of civilians were killed. Doss quickly confirmed, without commenting further, that the DRC gave in to MONUC's demands for those identified to remain in Kinshasa when the battalion deployed to Equateur. MONUC Drawdown ¶3. (C) Regarding a progressive withdrawal of MONUC, Doss confirmed that President Kabila is "anxious to see a drawdown plan." According to Doss, MONUC is also ready to assess when and where FARDC troops could realistically incrementally replace blue helmets. To this end, MONUC seeks a viable GDRC interlocutor with whom it could devise a feasible drawdown plan by assessing Congolese defense, intelligence, and police force capabilities. While seeking a GDRC partner to develop such a drawdown plan, Doss did not support the idea of an "SSR czar." GDRC SSR Coordinator? ¶4. (C) Establishing the position of a Congolese SSR Coordinator -- someone who could communicate Kabila's intent both within the GDRC and among the international community -- is an idea advocated by some in Kinshasa, including the EU's Advisory and Assistance Mission for SSR (EUSEC) in the DRC. Doss said the creation of such a position was not "practical," nor did he support trying to direct SSR efforts through Kabila's existing national security advisory apparatus. He noted that "such institutions have a difficult enough time functioning in a well-established democracy," arguing that SSR coordination functions should not be absorbed into a given ministry, "especially not the Ministry of Plan." In Doss' view, the international community needed to continue to work closely with KINSHASA 00000011 002 OF 002 the Ministries of Defense, Justice, and other relevant ministries; and directly with the presidency when needed. Another "structure of coordination," Doss warned, might be viewed as an "infringement of sovereignty." Doss said he wanted to improve direct working relations with the Ministry of Defense to match MONUC's "very good experiences with the police." Doss: MONUC Flexible ¶5. (C) Although overall MONUC staffing levels would not change, forces could be redeployed to better align with mandate priorities. Doss said, "speaking frankly, there is no support in New York for an increase in personnel, but we have flexibility." He explained that he would look at reconfiguration of forces and assign staff where needed after receiving UN approval for his recommendations. Although Doss noted that it could be possible to shift resources from military operations to civil protection and coordinating functions, partner organizations, e.g. EUSEC, should continue to carry some of the burden of coordination and other member countries should continue their training efforts. To promote bi- and multilateral cooperation, Doss plans to revive the SSR Working Group to identify "pragmatic projects," e.g. chain of payments, which are in the best interests of the DRC to support. ¶6. (C) Comment: Doss' comments were his first public observations on SSR since the adoption UNSCR 1906 in December. In this vein, he offered a glimpse of a new era for MONUC, one in which MONUC and the GDRC will initiate discussions about an eventual drawdown, and a new paradigm for SSR in the DRC may emerge. Most encouragingly, MONUC imposed vetting requirements on the FARDC in Equateur, and the GDRC apparently accepted the vetting. According to some MONUC contacts, GDRC security forces have committed much fewer human rights violations in Equateur than expected. End comment. GARVELINK