NSS OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST NTAGANDA ARREST, CALLS

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000024

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR PGOV PHUM KAWC KJUS PINS KPKO
CG, RW
SUBJECT: NSS OFFICIAL WARNS AGAINST NTAGANDA ARREST, CALLS
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF MARCH 23 AGREEMENT IN DRC

Classified By: Ambassador W. Stuart Symington for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Joseph Nzabamwita, head of the National
Security Service (NSS)'s Department of External Intelligence
and Security, on December 14, pressed visiting EU Great Lakes
Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer and Deputy to the U.S.
Special Advisor for the Great Lakes James Yellin for Western
support to combat FDLR leadership, warned that an arrest of
CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda would be destabilizing, and called
for implementation of the March 23 agreement between the GDRC
and the CNDP. DCM and UK ambassador also attended the
meeting, which took place in Nzabamwita's office. END
SUMMARY.

EU SPECIAL ENVOY ON CONGO'S TROUBLED EAST


2. (C) Nzabamwita welcomed his visitors with a flourish and
invited all to speak freely and openly. Van de Geer, drawing
on his recent visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
with Yellin, said it was difficult for the Government of the
DRC (GDRC) to act with "determination and timeliness" and
said the accelerated DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) integration
"has cracks." The army had not been paid, fed or equipped,
and there were many defections; but the good news was the
soldiers' names had been successfully reinstated in the
computers so that correct payments could be made.


3. (C) Regarding the Congres National pour la Defense du
Peuple (CNDP),van de Geer said Bosco Ntaganda remained in
the FARDC, but was nervous and engaged in a two-pronged
policy: he had his own group in the army and he was
reinforcing his supporters in Masisi, which was becoming
"CNDP Boscoland." (Note: After CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda
was arrested by Rwandan authorities in early 2009, the bulk
of its members agreed to integrate into the FARDC. End
Note.) MONUC felt there had been some military progress with
respect to the FDLR, but it was, in fact, very limited, van

de Geer said. (Note: The FDLR is an armed Rwandan group
based in eastern DRC that opposes the Government of Rwanda
and includes former members and supporters of the Rwandan
government that orchestrated the 1994 genocide. End Note.)
The FDLR controls the bush; the Congolese Armed Forces
(FARDC) controls the roads and towns so it had become a
classic guerilla situation. There were direct confrontations
between CNDP-inclusive FARDC units and the FDLR. There had
been many atrocities and the GDRC needed to take more
responsibility, Van de Geer asserted. MONUC was under
pressure from many sides, including, indirectly, Kigali;
however, MONUC's withdrawal would mean victory for the FDLR.


4. (C) Van de Geer summarized his discussion with Jean
Sayinzoga, Chairman of Rwanda's Demobilization and
Reintegration Commission (see reftel),and called on Rwanda
to exercise maximum pressure for voluntary returns of FDLR
rank-and-file. The EU and United States are pushing for
returns and want to stick to the text of the 2007 Nairobi
Communique, i.e., return to Rwanda, but were willing to
support any flexible solution agreed upon by Rwanda and the
DRC. Van de Geer saluted Rwandan outreach, renewed
Rwandan-French relations and the exchange of Ambassadors
between the DRC and Rwanda but expressed concern that the
GDRC was "outside the game" in eastern DRC, Kabila's failure
to visit the United States or UK, and the overall difficulty
to dialogue with him. With respect to CNDP leader Bosco
Qto dialogue with him. With respect to CNDP leader Bosco
Ntaganda, Van de Geer contrasted the comment by Nzabamwita
during a previous visit that "Rwanda has a moderating
influence on the CNDP largely through Bosco so we don't
support his arrest now" with that of Congolese generals who
said Ntaganda could be arrested. UK ambassador then asked
whether Ntaganda might leave the FARDC and form his own
group.

RWANDAN OFFICIAL URGES CONTINUED PRESSURE ON FDLR...


5. (C) Nzabamwita spoke of the need to "stay the course,"
arguing that there were no quick fixes for the FDLR nor in
the wake of the insecurity that came out of genocide. He
described Umoju Wetu, the combined Rwandan-Congolese military
offensive against the FDLR that took place in early 2009, as
the culmination of all that had gone before it and the FDLR
as "at the heart" of security concerns for Rwanda. He called
for support within the region and from Europe, the United
States, and the UN since FDLR actions in eastern DRC were
being coordinated from Western capitals. Nzabamwita asked
rhetorically: "How is it possible to coordinate divergent
interests in different capitals? If it took Germany ten
years to arrest FDLR leader Murwanashyaka, how long would it

take the DRC to act?"


6. (C) Nzabamwita said that when FARDC and MONUC continued
operations (after Umoja Wetu, as Kimia II),the FDLR changed
its strategy and tactics to create chaos in eastern DRC;
Rwanda told Special Representative of the Secretary General
Alan Doss of the change in strategy and insisted MONUC and
the FARDC were not defeating the FDLR. When asked if there
were any forces capable of dealing with the FDLR, Nzabamwita
said the Rwandan Defense Forces might be able to get quicker,
better results, but would benefit from command and control
capabilities from the U.S. and Europe.


7. (C) Nzabamwita then compared the Rwandan situation with
FDLR to that of the U.S. against Al Qaida. He suggested the
FDLR be listed as a terrorist organization in the U.S., said
that UNSCR 1804 and other resolutions needed to be
implemented, and people "who undermine the security of the
Great Lakes" should be sanctioned. (Note: The FDLR has not
targeted Americans and is not listed as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization by the USG. A predecessor organization, ALIR
(Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, aka Interahamwe or
ex-FAR),is listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List, which
designated terrorist organizations for immigration purposes.
In tandem with UNSCR 1533, the USG has designated several
FDLR members under E.O. 13413 as subject to an asset freeze,
travel ban and prohibiting Amcits from engaging in
transactions with them. End Note.)

...AND SAYS UMOJA WETU FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED RWANDA-DRC
RELATIONS


8. (C) Regarding the CNDP, Nzabamwita said Umoja Wetu
fundamentally changed the bilateral relationship between
Rwanda and the DRC and helped neutralize the "internal civil
war" among the CNDP, PARECO and various Mai Mai groups.
Rwanda was able to help join FARDC and CNDP structures
together. Although the integration was quick, the CNDP
stopped fighting the FARDC. It was a misinterpretation that
Rwanda controlled the CNDP, Nzabamwita continued. There were
FARDC units with some former CNDP members who collaborated
with the FDLR against the GDRC on the ground. Nzabamwita
called Rwanda's Western Province his country's "breadbasket"
- the source of gas, tourism revenues, and its most fertile
land. The GDRC-CNDP agreement of March 23, 2009 still has
not been implemented and if there were an alliance between
former CNDP and FDLR elements, it would be a threat. Rwanda
is more interested in the stability of this region than
Kinshasa, Nzabamwita claimed. (Note: The March 23 agreement
specifies, among other things, that the CNDP will transform
itself into a political party and will integrate its fighters
into the Congolese army and police. End Note.).

WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ARREST NTAGANDA


9. (C) UK ambassador again raised the possibility of further
political fragmentation if authorities arrested Bosco
Ntaganda. Nzabamwita said that it would take time for the
CNDP and Kinshasa to develop trust in one another. The CNDP
agreed to join with FARDC because Rwanda would be there to
guarantee implementation of its political demands, but the
CNDP was not one hundred percent happy: there were two
factions and a lack of implementation. The group now taking
the upper hand is asking, "Why did Bosco sell us out?" Then
there is the international community and the International
Criminal Court, which are demanding that Ntaganda's arrest.
QCriminal Court, which are demanding that Ntaganda's arrest.
"But this so-called criminal brokered the peace." This area
needs to be stable in order to implement justice.


10. (C) Nzabamwita then returned to the theme of "no quick
fixes." He described Ntaganda as a "victim" who was "being
paid a private first class salary" and said that arresting
him would not help the situation. Rather, the solution was
to "go to Kinshasa and tell the leadership that the lack of
implementation of the March 23 Agreement will increase
fragmentation." He added that if Bosco were arrested, "you
would surely have ten Boscos. You touch him and you touch
the rank and file of the CNDP. Is he the worst criminal in
eastern DRC?" UK ambassador asked if Ntaganda would stay
where he was or move elsewhere with his militia forces if
left alone. Nzabamwita said that he "still has to think
about the ICC, so where would he go?" Ntaganda tried to
contain several ex-CNDP battalions that wanted to mutiny, he
added. Let all the parties stick to implementation and we
should oversee implementation. What message do you send if
you arrest Bosco? If this agenda is driven by international
NGOs, it will be a disaster. "You will crumble Kinshasa."


11. (C) COMMENT: Nzabamwita's professional role is to
monitor and combat the GOR's external enemies, chief of which
is the FDLR. He reiterated the GOR's views on issues such as
the GOR's relationship with the CNDP and the DRC, the need
for international pressure on the FDLR, and the possible
effect of arresting current CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda.
Nzabamwita made clear that continued Rwandan-DRC and
international cooperation was essential to defeat the FDLR.
END COMMENT.
SYMINGTON