SUDAN DDR FACING OPERATIONAL FLAWS AND FUNDING SHORTFALLS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000218 SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO MCAP EAID SU SUBJECT: SUDAN DDR FACING OPERATIONAL FLAWS AND FUNDING SHORTFALLS REF: 09 KHARTOUM 1086; 09 KHARTOUM 1087 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Participants from the Government of National Unity (GoNU),the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS),the UN, and international donors met on February 1 and 3 seeking to rectify shortcomings plaguing Sudan's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants pursuant to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). An independent assessment of the DDR program completed in November found numerous shortcomings, including candidates for DDR not being chosen in accordance with agreed criteria and inability to account for numerous weapons collected. In addition, difficulty adequately defining Women Associated with Armed Forces (WAAF) and People's Defense Forces (PDF) leaves the DDR program open to being overwhelmed by potential candidates. However, efforts to suspend the program until credibility can be re-established are constrained by the risk of violence by previously-identified candidates grown impatient with delays. Meanwhile, DDR continues to receive inadequate operational funding from the GoNU and GoSS, and funding for program benefits is drying up as donors wait to see program deficiencies addressed. Despite setbacks to DDR, donors remain willing to participate if current difficulties can be remedied. DDR is the proverbial goose that laid the golden egg; and, given its value to the governments in both the north and the south, there is good reason to believe that they will at least make superficial efforts to assure its survival. End Summary. -------------- Damning Assessment of DDR Program -------------- ¶2. (SBU) An independent assessment evaluating the DDR program, commissioned by the United Nations Integrated DDR (UNDDR) Unit, in consultation with other relevant stakeholders, was published on November 28. The assessment found that the process for generating and certifying a list of DDR candidates is deficient, and further, that these candidate lists were often abandoned in favor of those established by local commanders on a daily or weekly basis. The assessment notes that this lack of a reliable listing of candidates facilitated the corruption of the DDR process through the entry of ineligible candidates into the program. 
 ¶3. (SBU) The assessment also found the National Strategic Plan, the guiding document of the DDR program, is insufficient to guide a credible program. Among other weaknesses, the assessment found that this strategy document does not adequately define Women Associated with Armed Forces (WAAF) and People's Defense Forces (PFD),two amorphous groups eligible for DDR, making it impossible to establish solid criteria for candidature in either group. The assessment also noted the lack of an agreed upon mechanism for monitoring the collection and management of ex-combatant's weapons by the SAF and the SPLA. Finally, the assessment noted minimal understanding of the DDR program among participants and affected communities, resulting from the absence of any substantial information program. Based on these concerns, in December the UN and donor community suspended DDR activities in order to evaluate DDR and implement solutions to restore credibility. -------------- Efforts Made to Regain Control of DDR -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On February 1, Poloff attended a meeting of the newly-formed ad hoc DDR working group, tasked with developing weapons and candidate verification procedures. Representatives for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) each offered to provide a revised candidate master list for a new DDR intake location thirty days prior to the KHARTOUM 00000218 002 OF 004 commencement of DDR activities at that location. The revised candidate master list will include candidates' name, mother's name, date of birth, gender, year mobilized, years of service, current residence, and for SAF forces only, military ID type and number. Verification of SPLA candidates will be conducted by cross-checking candidate names against payroll data. The group also agreed that the SPLA and SAF would produce a weapons verification plan based on steps already outlined in the National Strategic Plan. ¶5. (SBU) Donors at the ad hoc meeting pressed SPLA and SAF representatives on the need to establish acceptable operating procedures for the joint military teams (JMT) charged with conducting candidate intake and verification. The representative for the SPLA stated that it is the only party entitled to accept or reject a candidate for DDR. This approach was accepted by the UN and donors, though it appears to limit the JMTs to a role of monitoring whether a candidate appears on the master list. In a February 2 conversation, Sarah Douglas, DDR Officer in the UNDDR Unit, told Poloff that this approach is manageable because the master list is relatively trustworthy. Douglas stated that the primary concern described by the DDR assessment is one in which local commanders discard the master list, substituting their own lists of candidates. -------------- -------------- Risk of Violence Limits UN's Ability to Pause Program -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Despite flaws in the program and a general freeze on current DDR activities, Douglas said the UN decided to continue processing approximately 8,000 candidates in Kadugli where the risk of violence from a suspension of DDR is especially acute. (Note: In Kadugli DDR is being conducted on a unit by unit basis, and units are typically formed on an ethnic basis. Jealousy and ethnic tensions are likely to flare if one ethnic group is perceived to have received preferential treatment. End Note.) ¶7. (SBU) Douglas said that in Rumbek the program was frozen upon release of the assessment, but plans exist to restart the program on February 15. (Note: The population in the Rumbek area is overwhelmingly Agar Dinka, lessening the risk of ethnic violence. End Note.) Douglas said that the need to restart the program in Rumbek is pressing because candidates for DDR have already been informed of their eligibility and could become violent if they are now delayed or excluded. Rumbek will act as a pilot program for the new procedures developed in accordance with the assessment. The existing master list will be used, but candidates on that list will be cross-checked against SPLA payroll records. ¶8. (SBU) In a similar vein, Douglas noted that the 18,000 candidates who underwent disarmament and demobilization prior to the assessment will also receive the reintegration package despite corruption concerns. Douglas noted that the reintegration program started recently in Blue Nile and will begin soon in Southern Kordofan, Lakes, and Western, Eastern and Central Equatoria. -------------- Funding Concerns Continue -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Douglas stated that inadequate funding by the GoSS for the operational costs of the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) remains a major challenge, severely limiting the effectiveness and capacity of the SSDDRC to process candidates. On the positive side, Douglas noted that, despite a general hiring freeze in the KHARTOUM 00000218 003 OF 004 GoSS, the SSDDRC was given a waiver to hire several badly-needed additional staff. In addition, though in contravention of existing agreements and the original intent of the donor community (Ref A), Canada has provided equipment to the SSDDRC, while the UN has provided a number of vehicles. (Note: Pursuant to agreements governing DDR entered into by the GoSS, the GoNU and the UN, the GoSS and the GoNU is each obligated to pay the operational costs of the SSDDRC and Northern DDR Commission (NDDRC) respectively, while the UN and donors fund the program benefits received by DDR participants. End Note.) Douglas said that funding by the GoNU for the operational costs of the NDDRC often suffers significant delay, but is comparatively problem-free. ¶10. (SBU) A rising concern is donor funding. On February 3, Poloff attend a meeting of the High Level DDR Committee, in which Basil Massey, DDR Program Manager for the United Nations Development Fund, stated that currently the DDR program has only US$29 million remaining to provide reintegration program benefits to program beneficiaries. Massey stated that without new funding, the program will run out of money by the end of March. Donors, in turn, stated that the program must show concrete improvement before they can provide additional funding. -------------- WAAF: Too Many, Too Confusing -------------- ¶11. (SBU) WAAF were discussed at both the ad hoc meeting and high level meeting with no consensus reached on whether and how WAAF should be addressed by the DDR program. At the high level meeting, Ambrose Kambaya, representing the SSDDRC, stated that the number of WAAF eligible for DDR is difficult to support, threatening to overwhelm the program. He noted that he is not opposed to including WAAF in the program, but that the concept needs to be refined. The chairman of the meeting, General Bakri Hassan Saleh, noted that the root of the problem in Southern Sudan is that all women in the south were associated with armed forces during the war. There is no list or record of which woman did what. Bakri noted that providing DDR benefits to some women is unfortunately going to disenfranchise and anger a vast number of other women who were equally involved. He suggested that perhaps another approach or program for women is appropriate. -------------- Processing 180,000 Candidates Not Possible -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Looking forward, Douglas stated that the agreed goal of processing 180,000 candidates before the end of the CPA's interim period is not feasible. She stated that even working though the end of 2011, processing the 64,000 candidates currently submitted by the two parties will be a "massive accomplishment." (Note: Currently 18,000 candidates have undergone disarmament and demobilization. Some of these candidates have entered reintegration, but to date no DDR candidate has completed the process. End Note.) ¶13. (SBU) Comment: The findings of corruption and mismanagement in the strategic assessment represent a significant setback to DDR. It appears, however, that DDR donors have not given up on the idea of DDR, but are instead looking to address shortcomings in the process through increased monitoring and transparency. Whether the GoNU and GoSS, and their appointed commissions, are capable of reigning in a process rife with possibilities for corruption remains to be seen. However, with the SPLA attempting to downsize for budgetary reasons, and the SAF seeking to placate former PDF-allies, DDR is the proverbial goose that laid the golden egg, KHARTOUM 00000218 004 OF 004 of great benefit to governments in both the north and the south. It therefore seems likely that they will make at least superficial efforts to assure its survival. End Comment. WHITEHEAD