SE GRATION DISCUSSES DARFUR PEACE, SECURITY WITH JSR GAMBARI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000121 SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/22 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS SU CD SUBJECT: SE GRATION DISCUSSES DARFUR PEACE, SECURITY WITH JSR GAMBARI REF: 10 KHARTOUM 254; 10 KHARTOUM 282 CLASSIFIED BY: Robert E. Whitehead, Charge d'Affaires; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Government of Sudan (GOS) appears eager to conclude an agreement at the Doha peace talks while rebel groups remain intransigent, UNAMID Joint Special Representative (JSR) Ibrahim Gambari told SE Gration on February 20. He expressed concern about lack of humanitarian access to civilians displaced by the recent fighting in Jebel Moon and Jebel Marra, noting he is exerting pressure on both the GOS and rebel movements to cease hostilities to permit the delivery of relief supplies. In the wake of the ambush of a UNAMID police patrol in Nyala, the mission is working with the GOS to set up "security enhancement measures" through improved information sharing, but significant reforms to the justice system are needed to transform the culture of impunity in Darfur, he said. Gambari also discussed UNAMID's willingness to support the January 15 Ndjamena Accord between Chad and Sudan, as well as a planned Darfur summit in Kigali, Rwanda, which he hoped would streamline international coordination on efforts to return peace, security and development to the beleaguered region. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On February 20, SE Gration met with UNAMID Joint Special Representative (JSR) Ibrahim Gambari in Khartoum. Gambari briefed SE on his recent trip to Doha for consultations with the belligerent parties, noting that the GOS is "ready to deal" while the rebel groups remain intransigent. JEM continues to insist it should be the only group at the negotiating table, he said, while the Addis Group and Tripoli Group are still focused on internal discussions. Gambari said he urged JEM to lead by example and constructive behavior, while urging the Tripoli and Addis groups to overcome their differences and unify. Gambari also met with Government of Qatar Foreign Minister Al Mahmoud, who he described as initially discouraged by the lack of progress, but later more upbeat. He noted that Al Mahmoud took up his suggestion of downgrading the rebels from the five star Doha Sheraton to slightly less plush environs, noting that the rebels "were in no hurry" to reach a deal. Gambari also expressed disappointment that despite his urgings, the rebels showed no interest in playing a role in the upcoming April elections, perceiving them as completely de-linked from the Darfur conflict. ¶3. (C) Gambari also briefed SE Gration on a February 19 meeting called by UNAMID with the humanitarian community to discuss the response to civilian displacement caused by fighting in Jebel Marra and Jebel Moon (ref A). He stated that while the humanitarian community has enough materials to provide support for displaced, the issue of access to affected areas remains in question. Gambari stated that he plans to engage the GOS and rebel movements on the subject, having recently telephoned Paris-based SLA Chairman Abdel Wahid Al Nur to urge the recalcitrant leader to commit to safe passage for the delivery of relief supplies, as well as a cessation of hostilities. Gambari noted that Abdul Wahid was reluctant to speak over the telephone and urged him to visit him in Paris, which he was currently considering. ¶4. (C) Gambari also addressed the upcoming summit called by UNAMID in Kigali, Rwanda to discuss peace and security in Darfur. Special Envoys from China, the UK, France and EU have committed to attend, he said, noting that UN/AU Joint Chief Mediator Bassole may also attend. He described the summit as a "brainstorming session," focused on enhancing security on the ground, providing positive momentum for the peace process, and supporting voluntary returns and recovery efforts. "The end result is consensus" on how the international community will coordinate, he said. ¶5. (C) Gambari also described his visit to Nyala in the wake of the February 16 ambush of a UNAMID patrol (ref B). He credited the survival of the seven injured peacekeepers to UNAMID's Pakistani Level III hospital, without which "we would have lost all of them." Though one of the UNAMID vehicles has been recovered and two perpetrators have been arrested, he urged that arrests in and of KHARTOUM 00000121 002 OF 002 themselves were not enough and that the suspects must be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. The incident has resurrected calls for the GOS to take responsibility for security in Darfur more seriously, he said, as well as to cut down on the layers or flight clearances and other bureaucratic obstacles that make it difficult for UNAMID to respond to emergencies in a timely manner. ¶6. (C) UNAMID Force Commander Gen. Patrick Nyamvumba noted that UNAMID is in discussions with the GOS to set up "security enhancement measures" to target carjackings and banditry through increased information sharing and coordination. However, he expected the cooperation to have a limited effect given the weakness of the justice system in Darfur. UNAMID's limited police trainings have been successful, but "significant" law and order enhancements are needed to transform the culture of impunity, he said. ¶7. (C) On the subject of the January 15 N'Djamena Accord, Gambari was eager to know if the SE had heard whether GOC President Deby (ref C) had expressed any interest in a role for UNAMID in the joint border monitoring mechanism. SE noted that the GOC was clear that the agreement was bilateral in nature, emphasizing the need for confidence-building measures to take place between the two sides without interference. Gambari agreed that the bilateral nature of the agreement was a positive, and agreed with the SE that the USG and UNAMID should remain ready to assist. ¶8. (C) Comment: Abdul Wahid remains a potential spoiler as long as refuses to participate in peace talks, so Gambari's outreach to him is a welcome one. Many have tried and failed before to engage with the recalcitrant leader, however, so we are not particularly optimistic about the outcome. ¶9. (U) This cable has been cleared by the Office of the Special Envoy. WHITEHEAD