Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
10KABUL696
2010-02-25 07:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:
AMBASSADORS CONCEDE ELECTORAL CHANGES, UN PUSHING
VZCZCXRO2795 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHBUL #0696/01 0560740 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 250740Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5882 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4551 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000696
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS: PGOV AF PREL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORS CONCEDE ELECTORAL CHANGES, UN PUSHING
STAFFING PLAN
REF: A. KABUL 00645
B. KABUL 00651
Classified By: A/Amb J. Mussomeli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000696
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS: PGOV AF PREL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORS CONCEDE ELECTORAL CHANGES, UN PUSHING
STAFFING PLAN
REF: A. KABUL 00645
B. KABUL 00651
Classified By: A/Amb J. Mussomeli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. 1. (C) Summary: While the decree recently signed by
President Karzai to amend the electoral law (ref. A) was
roundly decried by ambassadors at the weekly UNAMA meeting in
Kabul on February 22, they concurred that the international
community would not at this point make public statements
condemning the decree but instead work to mitigate the more
objectionable clauses. IN SRSG Kai Eide's absence, the
meeting was chaired by D/SRSG Robert Watkins, who called the
decree "very alarming in tone." Watkins
also confirmed that the plan to restructure UNAMA by creating
a body of up to twenty senior advisors seconded from home
country missions is moving forward and that requests are
beginning to be sent to donor countries to request these
advisors (see ref. B for Mission concerns about the plan).
End Summary.
--------------
2010 Elections - A Bitter Pill
--------------
2. (C) Echoing his counterparts' complaints about the
decree, most of which centered around the nationalization of
the Electoral Complaints Committee (ECC),A/Ambassador
Mussomeli told the group that it might backfire to take too
strong and too public a stance against the decree at this
point and that the United States prefers not to appear
heavy-handed and would prefer at this stage to engage Karzai
with more finesse. Moreover, publicly fighting Karzai now,
after he has already signed the electoral decree, could
offer Karzai the opportunity to wave the flag of sovereignty.
3. (C) U.K. Acting Ambassador Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles
requested that a small group of key donors define red lines
and create a common stance before Karzai. Opposition to the
electoral decree would resonate much more if voiced by
concerned Afghans, the Aga Khan Foundation representative
suggested. He encouraged the international community to help
organize a group of influential Afghans who could
discuss their concerns with Karzai more convincingly than we
could.
4. (C) Watkins noted that, since the Afghan government has
not made the electoral reforms the U.N. has requested, the
U.N. is defining its red lines and could decide to curb its
elections support if its red lines are crossed. The
representative from Norway noted that outstanding issues of
concern include: the potential that the number of
parliamentary seats available to women will be limited;
Karzai's failure to remove Ludin as chair of the Independent
Elections Commission (IEC); and the need to prosecute
officials suspected of fraud in the 2009 elections. Several
representatives noted that the international community is not
likely to withhold full funding for the 2010 elections, but
said that adjustments could be made in the level of support
the international community and U.N. provide to the elections
if desired reforms are not made.
5. (C) Voices of dissent included the representative of the
European Commission, who advocated letting the Afghans run
their election as they see fit as a chance for them to prove
the results of their capacity-building. We shouldn't
pre-judge them, he said, but rather give them the opportunity
to prove they are capable of conducting democratic elections.
The Russian ambassador, who called international involvement
in the 2009 elections a "total mess," also said that these
elections offer an opportunity
for the Afghans to develop their democracy in their own way
and that we should support them in this.
6. (C) In an email on 24 February, a senior UNAMA political
advisor laid out the current thinking within UNAMA on the
role the UN will play in the 2010 elections. Working toward
a deadline of 12 March to submit a proposal to the Security
Council to renew their mandate (which is expected to be
adopted on 22 March),UNAMA is dependent on two things before
they can commit to supporting the 2010 elections: first,
Afghanistan's permanent mission in the UN must formally
request UNAMA,s support, and, second, the
international community must commit to funding the elections.
GIRoA is expected to make the request for
elections support in time for the request to be adopted in
UNAMA,s renewed mandate. If major donors commit to
supporting the elections, the advisor said, the UN will
KABUL 00000696 002 OF 002
support the elections, and conversely they will not support
the elections if the international community withholds
funding. UNDP-ELECT,s participation in the elections is
contingent on UNAMA,s; ELECT will not support the elections
if UNAMA does not.
--------------
Civilian Surge at UNAMA?
--------------
7. (C) Acknowledging that he has received feedback, largely
critical, from several donor countries on the proposal to
create twenty senior advisor positions within UNAMA, Watkins
said that the proposal is going forward. The program will be
staffed by officials seconded from their home agencies.
UNAMA advisor Mark Ward explained that the program is
intended to improve the international community's ability to
respond to requests from GIRoA for funding by providing a
direct link between UNAMA and key ministers. Advisors would
serve as "coaches" to ministers, as Ward does in his current
capacity, and help them to
structure their pitches to donor agencies for funding.
8. (C) Similarly, these senior advisers would also help
ministers learn how to refuse proposed donor programs that
don't fit with GIRoA's objectives and to work with the donor
agencies to develop programs that do meet Afghanistan's
objectives. Since the advisors will come from all of the key
donor agencies, Ward said, they will be able to exercise
their knowledge of how their home agencies work and use it to
help GIRoA make requests that are structured and timed in a
way that they can be supported by the donor agencies. The
advisors would not affect the technical capacity advising
programs that are already
taking place at key ministries; their role and perspective
would be different from the current advisors', he said.
9. (C) The U.S. and U.K. both expressed reservations about
the proposed restructuring, and the Russian ambassador asked
whether the change would require an update to UNAMA's
mandate. Watkins replied that it did not. The Secretary
General has approved the plan and a note verbale has been
sent to permanent missions in New York, requesting that the
advisor position be filled shortly, said Watkins.
RICCIARDONE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS: PGOV AF PREL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADORS CONCEDE ELECTORAL CHANGES, UN PUSHING
STAFFING PLAN
REF: A. KABUL 00645
B. KABUL 00651
Classified By: A/Amb J. Mussomeli for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. 1. (C) Summary: While the decree recently signed by
President Karzai to amend the electoral law (ref. A) was
roundly decried by ambassadors at the weekly UNAMA meeting in
Kabul on February 22, they concurred that the international
community would not at this point make public statements
condemning the decree but instead work to mitigate the more
objectionable clauses. IN SRSG Kai Eide's absence, the
meeting was chaired by D/SRSG Robert Watkins, who called the
decree "very alarming in tone." Watkins
also confirmed that the plan to restructure UNAMA by creating
a body of up to twenty senior advisors seconded from home
country missions is moving forward and that requests are
beginning to be sent to donor countries to request these
advisors (see ref. B for Mission concerns about the plan).
End Summary.
--------------
2010 Elections - A Bitter Pill
--------------
2. (C) Echoing his counterparts' complaints about the
decree, most of which centered around the nationalization of
the Electoral Complaints Committee (ECC),A/Ambassador
Mussomeli told the group that it might backfire to take too
strong and too public a stance against the decree at this
point and that the United States prefers not to appear
heavy-handed and would prefer at this stage to engage Karzai
with more finesse. Moreover, publicly fighting Karzai now,
after he has already signed the electoral decree, could
offer Karzai the opportunity to wave the flag of sovereignty.
3. (C) U.K. Acting Ambassador Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles
requested that a small group of key donors define red lines
and create a common stance before Karzai. Opposition to the
electoral decree would resonate much more if voiced by
concerned Afghans, the Aga Khan Foundation representative
suggested. He encouraged the international community to help
organize a group of influential Afghans who could
discuss their concerns with Karzai more convincingly than we
could.
4. (C) Watkins noted that, since the Afghan government has
not made the electoral reforms the U.N. has requested, the
U.N. is defining its red lines and could decide to curb its
elections support if its red lines are crossed. The
representative from Norway noted that outstanding issues of
concern include: the potential that the number of
parliamentary seats available to women will be limited;
Karzai's failure to remove Ludin as chair of the Independent
Elections Commission (IEC); and the need to prosecute
officials suspected of fraud in the 2009 elections. Several
representatives noted that the international community is not
likely to withhold full funding for the 2010 elections, but
said that adjustments could be made in the level of support
the international community and U.N. provide to the elections
if desired reforms are not made.
5. (C) Voices of dissent included the representative of the
European Commission, who advocated letting the Afghans run
their election as they see fit as a chance for them to prove
the results of their capacity-building. We shouldn't
pre-judge them, he said, but rather give them the opportunity
to prove they are capable of conducting democratic elections.
The Russian ambassador, who called international involvement
in the 2009 elections a "total mess," also said that these
elections offer an opportunity
for the Afghans to develop their democracy in their own way
and that we should support them in this.
6. (C) In an email on 24 February, a senior UNAMA political
advisor laid out the current thinking within UNAMA on the
role the UN will play in the 2010 elections. Working toward
a deadline of 12 March to submit a proposal to the Security
Council to renew their mandate (which is expected to be
adopted on 22 March),UNAMA is dependent on two things before
they can commit to supporting the 2010 elections: first,
Afghanistan's permanent mission in the UN must formally
request UNAMA,s support, and, second, the
international community must commit to funding the elections.
GIRoA is expected to make the request for
elections support in time for the request to be adopted in
UNAMA,s renewed mandate. If major donors commit to
supporting the elections, the advisor said, the UN will
KABUL 00000696 002 OF 002
support the elections, and conversely they will not support
the elections if the international community withholds
funding. UNDP-ELECT,s participation in the elections is
contingent on UNAMA,s; ELECT will not support the elections
if UNAMA does not.
--------------
Civilian Surge at UNAMA?
--------------
7. (C) Acknowledging that he has received feedback, largely
critical, from several donor countries on the proposal to
create twenty senior advisor positions within UNAMA, Watkins
said that the proposal is going forward. The program will be
staffed by officials seconded from their home agencies.
UNAMA advisor Mark Ward explained that the program is
intended to improve the international community's ability to
respond to requests from GIRoA for funding by providing a
direct link between UNAMA and key ministers. Advisors would
serve as "coaches" to ministers, as Ward does in his current
capacity, and help them to
structure their pitches to donor agencies for funding.
8. (C) Similarly, these senior advisers would also help
ministers learn how to refuse proposed donor programs that
don't fit with GIRoA's objectives and to work with the donor
agencies to develop programs that do meet Afghanistan's
objectives. Since the advisors will come from all of the key
donor agencies, Ward said, they will be able to exercise
their knowledge of how their home agencies work and use it to
help GIRoA make requests that are structured and timed in a
way that they can be supported by the donor agencies. The
advisors would not affect the technical capacity advising
programs that are already
taking place at key ministries; their role and perspective
would be different from the current advisors', he said.
9. (C) The U.S. and U.K. both expressed reservations about
the proposed restructuring, and the Russian ambassador asked
whether the change would require an update to UNAMA's
mandate. Watkins replied that it did not. The Secretary
General has approved the plan and a note verbale has been
sent to permanent missions in New York, requesting that the
advisor position be filled shortly, said Watkins.
RICCIARDONE