PROPOSED AFGHANISTAN DETAINEE MONITORING STRATEGY

S E C R E T KABUL 000688

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS AF
SUBJECT: PROPOSED AFGHANISTAN DETAINEE MONITORING STRATEGY

Classified By: Assistant Chief of Mission Joseph Mussomeli for Reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This cable includes an action request; please see
paragraph 10.


2. (S/REL ISAF) SUMMARY: In response to the President's
executive order banning torture, the Washington interagency
Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies recommended
that Embassy Kabul develop a plan to physically monitor the
status of detainees transferred by U.S. forces under ISAF
command to GIRoA custody. Monitoring is complicated by the
scale of U.S. detention operations. We believe an effective
monitoring strategy therefore must leverage NGO and Afghan
government (GIRoA) support, and include:

-- DoD commitment to create a detainee tracking system and
adopt a policy to transfer detainees only to vetted NDS
facilities;
-- prompt notification of human rights monitoring groups when
detainees are transferred to the Afghan government;
-- ,smart monitoring,, of targeted Afghan detention
facilities by State personnel and NGOs; and,
-- continued U.S. human rights mentoring and training for
Afghan detaining authorities.

We propose to have State officers assigned to Embassy Kabul
and subordinate PRTs monitor National Directorate of Security
detention facilities in Kabul, Regional Command South (RC-S)
and Regional Command East (RC-E). We request the support of
State and/or DoD to conduct an initial survey of all
detention facilities to which U.S. forces under ISAF
authority presently transfer detainees in order to develop
a baseline against which to judge detention conditions and to
identify which NDS facilities are concerning and that we
should not make transfers to. As we develop the monitoring
program it is possible it will have personnel and other
resource implications necessitating additional support to the
mission. END SUMMARY.

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BACKGROUND
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3. (S) In 2009, the Task Force on Interrogation and
Transfer Policies -- a Justice Department-led panel created
by President Obama,s January 22 executive order banning
torture -- recommended that Embassy Kabul physically monitor
the status of detainees transferred by U.S. forces under ISAF
command to GIRoA custody. Post offers the following
recommendations for a risk mitigation and monitoring plan.

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THE MONITORING CHALLENGE
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4. (S) The U.S. is the largest detaining and transferring
authority in Afghanistan. From January to
December 2009, U.S. forces under ISAF detained 643
individuals, and transferred 370 of them to GIRoA. While the
scale of our detention operations makes a comprehensive
monitoring program challenging, human rights organizations
point to a dubious distinction -- we are the only detaining
nation in Afghanistan that does not have a monitoring
program. Detention operations are further complicated by
ISAF,s "96-hour rule," which requires our forces to release
detainees or transfer them to the GIRoA within 96 hours of
capture; as a result, our forces typically transfer detainees
to the closest Afghan authority. (NOTE: on February 19 the
Secretary of Defense authorized detentions of up to 14 days,
or transfer to Operation
Enduring Freedom detention facilities in cases with
exceptional intelligence value; however, most detentions will
remain subject to the ISAF 96 hour rule.) In 2009, U.S.
Forces under ISAF command and control sent 370 transfers to a
wide range of different facilities operated by Afghan
detaining authorities including the Ministry of Interior,
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice and National
Directorate of Security. Moreover, the GIRoA releases a
majority of transferred detainees within 72
hours, making it even more difficult to institute a
monitoring program that tracks each detainee,s progress.
Monitoring is much easier for our coalition partners whose
forces only operate in a single region and therefore only
detain a limited number of individuals and can restrict their
transfers to a small group of Afghan detention facilities.

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DOD Tracking/Transfer Policy
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5. (S/REL ISAF) U.S. Forces under ISAF presently do not
assign a tracking number to detainees they transfer to the
Afghan government. In order to ease monitoring under these
complexities, we recommend that U.S. forces under ISAF create
a tracking system that allows us to locate all detainees who
are ultimately transferred to NDS detention facilities. We
also recommend that U.S. forces under ISAF adopt a policy to
transfer detainees only to vetted NDS facilities that meet
basic human rights standards, as determined by the survey of
detention facilities we recommend in paragraph 10.


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SMART MONITORING WITH SUPPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs
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6. (S/REL ISAF) Rather than monitor all the detainees we
transfer to the Afghan government (as
personnel and other resource constraints make this
unrealistic),we recommend that U.S. forces notify detainee
family members (if possible),the Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) within 48 hours of transferring a
detainee to the GIRoA. This allows these bodies to add these
detainees to their existing national monitoring regimens and
allows us to focus our efforts more narrowly on those the
Afghan government is likely to keep in its NDS-operated
long-term detention. According to human rights groups that
conduct monitoring programs in
Afghanistan, torture is more likely to occur within the first
hours or days of detention. Yet, reports of mistreatment are
more frequently collected through interviews of detainees
once they are in longer-term facilities where they feel safer
discussing their experience - another reason for us to focus
our monitoring on persons in long-term Afghan detention
facilities.


7. (S/REL ISAF) We further recommend that the monitoring
officers focus on conditions in NDS detention facilities in
Kabul, RC-E and RC-S, to which GIRoA consigns long-term
detainees. These facilities include NDS Department 17 in
Kabul and NDS detention facilities in RC-S and RC-E. State
monitoring personnel should conduct monthly visits to
designated facilities. Rather than interview all detainees,
we would randomly select 10 detainees to interview from a
list of U.S.-transferred detainees in the facility. The
Embassy would work to raise any human rights abuse issues
uncovered to the appropriate Afghan authorities and provide
quarterly monitoring reports to JTF 435 and the Task Force on
Interrogation and Transfer Policies. It will be imperative
that DoD provide assets, including transportation, to enable
State monitoring personnel to carry out their
responsibilities. As we develop the monitoring program it is
possible it will have personnel and other resource
implications necessitating additional support to the mission.


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HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING
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8. (U/REL ISAF) As an extension of a monitoring program,
we recommend continuing to provide focused human rights
training and mentoring of GIRoA correction and detention
authorities through existing INL, OGA and JTF 435 mentoring
programs for prison, detentions and intelligence personnel.
Additionally, we recommend that FSI incorporate detainee
monitoring training into its course offerings for
Afghanistan-bound PRT and Political-Military affairs
officers.

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MOU with NDS
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9. (S) Implementation will require the Embassy to develop
and negotiate an MOU with NDS granting us access to their
facilities. NDS in December blocked Canadian and British
access to its facilities in RC-S. In a subsequent meeting to
resolve the issue with NDS, Minister Saleh told the Canadian
Embassy that he was frustrated by coalition partners
demanding access to NDS facilities absent an MOU with the
NDS. He pointed out that their MOUs are with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Justice, yet the
implementation rests with NDS. He also expressed frustration
with each detaining nation requesting a different level of
access to NDS facilities (the Canadians require support for
surprise visits while the British conduct announced monthly
visits). Saleh asked that coalition nations develop a
uniform approach to monitoring in order ease the burden on
NDS officials. We will continue to work with coalition
partners on developing a more common approach. British and
Canadian officers have told us that their capitals may be
swayed to adjust their monitoring MOUs if the U.S. can
negotiate a model MOU that NDS finds helpful and
workable.

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ACTION REQUEST
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10. (S/REL ISAF) Before beginning a monitoring program,
however, ICRC recommends that we conduct a survey of all NDS
detention facilities used in Kabul, RC-E and RC-S. The
survey would help us establish a baseline against which to
judge detention conditions in various NDS facilities, and
help us identify more problematic facilities to which it is
not responsible to transfer detainees. Post requests
Washington,s support in sending two TDY personnel from State
and/or DoD for a three-week period to assist with this
survey. Post strongly urges DoD to instruct military units to
support this civilian mission
through operational channels, providing assets including
transportation inside Afghanistan.


11. (U) Task Force 435 has cleared this cable.
RICCIARDONE